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(313) 764-9348

December 12, 1984
Honorable Ralph J.Gers9n
Chairperson, Governor's Cabinet Council
on Jobs and Economic Development
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan 48903
Dear Mr. Gerson:
I have the honor to send you and the Cabinet Council on Jobs and Economic
Development my attached report as the Governor's Special Counselor on
Workers' Compensation, in accordance with the charge given me by Governor
James J. Blanchard on September 14, 1983. I understand the Cabinet Council
will review my findings and conclusions, and ultimately report its
recommendations to Governor Blanchard, mindful of the Governor's desire to
ensure a workers' compensation system that is "just, humane, and equitable
for all parties."
As discussed more fully in the Introduction of my report, I am most
grateful to you and many others throughout the State, both in and out of
government, who gave so unstintingly of their time and effort to assist me in
this study.
My conclusions are encouraging. Legislative changes of the past few
years, specifically, the provision for open competition in insurance and the
tightening up of benefit eligibility in the workers' compensation law, appear
to have saved the business community well over a half billion dollars in the
last two years, while at the same time the maximum weekly benefits for many
disabled workers have been increased substantially.
Since the workers' compensation amendments of 1980 and 1981 have not yet
been definitively interpreted, and the long-range effects of competition in
insurance are still unknown, I urge caution in pursuing further major
substantive legal changes at this time. The case backlog at the Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board has become staggering, however, and I do recommend
significant modifications in the decision-making process. Finally, I propose
the creation of a new, permanent workers' compensation labor-management
advisory council to engage in an ongoing review of the system and to
recommend appropriate changes to the Governor and the Legislature.
Very truly yours,

~~-S::f.~
Theodore J.
•
toine
Governor's S
al Counselor
on Workers' Compensation
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 14, 1983, Governor James J. Blanchard issued the following
statement and charge in appointing Theodore J. St. Antoine as Special
Counselor on Workers' Compensation:
In the past two decades, workers' compensation has been the
subject of much discussion and debate among all segments of the
industrial community and the several branches of state government
in Michigan. During this period, three separate commissions have
engaged in extensive analysis of the Michigan Workers'
Compensation Law. In 1980, and again in 1981, substantial
amendments were added to the statute. Nonetheless, the
controversy over this system continues.
Important and deserving interests are at stake. The employee who
is the victim of industrial accident or disease is entitled to
prompt, reasonable compensation. The employer who must pay
should be burdened with no more than fair and appropriate costs.
The public generally must be assured of a vibrant, competitive
economy in this State.
In order to respond to the pressing need for further
this area, I hereby appoint Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law at the University of
Special Counselor on Workers' Compensation, with the
duties and functions:

review in
James E. and
Michigan, as
following

(1) To review and analyze the operation of the
existing Michigan statutes, including the recent
amendments, to determine how adequately and
effectively they are protecting employees against
losses from industrial accident or disease without
imposing improper or excessive costs on employers;
(2) To examine current administrative practices and
procedures to determine whether all parties are being
fairly treated in the various proceedings and whether
the law is being enforced in a timely and efficient
manner;
(3) To determine if there are .distinctive areas of
system abuse in Michigan which may make the system
more costly;
(4) To examine the current insurance and funding
arrangements to determine whether adequate,
efficient, and appropriate provision has been made
for the coverage of various industrial injuries and
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disabilities;

(5) To compare the standards and procedures under the
Michigan statutes with those of other industrial
states to determine whether the insurance coverage is
effectively competitive with that of other industrial
states;
(6) To consult with employers, employees, labor
organizations, the medical profession, insurance
carriers, legal counsel, government officials, and
other appropriate individuals and groups to determine
their needs and concerns and the impact of existing
administrative procedure and practice on their
various interests;
(7) To report his findings and conclusions to the
Cabinet Council on Jobs and Economic Development for
their review, consultation with the Governor's
Conmission on Jobs and Economic Development and
recommendations to the Governor, concerning the
amendment or alteration of existing administrative
procedures and law so as to ensure a workers'
compensation system for the State of Michigan that
will be just, humane, and equitable for all parties.
Governor Blanchard added: "I am pleased that leaders of business and
labor have agreed to this process and are pledging to work to implement the
special counselor reconnnendations. This process also has the support of the
legislative leadership, which is a strong signal that the Special Counselor's
work will indeed help Michigan set aside its traditional business-labor
warfare over workers' compensation."
During the past fourteen months I have met with many interested groups
and individuals in this State. I am deeply indebted to all of them for their
generosity in taking the time and trouble to arrange presentations, compile
data, and provide frank and illuminating couments on the actual operation of
the Michigan compensation system. Organizations with which I consulted,
sometimes more than once, included the Michigan Manufacturers Association and
the "Big Three" automobile companies; the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce;
the Michigan State AFL-CIO, along with representatives of the Auto Workers,
the Steelworkers, and other major unions; the Economic Alliance; the Council
of the Workers Compensation Section of the State Bar; the Governor's
Entrepreneurial and Small Business Commission; the Governor's Commission on
Jobs and Economic Development; the Greater Detroit Chamber of Connnerce; the
Michigan Mutual Insurance Company; the Michigan Self-Insurers' Association;
the State Accident Fund; the Michigan Merchants Council; the Michigan Trial
Lawyers Association; and the Michigan Injured Workers Organization. I am
also especially indebted to several distinguished members of both the
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plaintiffs' and the defendants' compensation bars for speaking with me
privately to give me the benefit of their technical expertise. Numerous
other individuals and groups submitted their views in writing.
Members of both the legislative and the executive branches of State
government were 11101t giving of their time, counsel, and assistance. I spoke
with the majority and the minority leadership and Labor C0111Dittee members
from both the Senate and the House. There were frequent sessions with the
Director of the C0111Derce Department, the Director of the Labor Department,
the Director and the Deputy Directors of the Bureau of Workers' Disability
Compensation, and a representative group of administrative law judges and
members of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board. Other officials consulted
in State government included the Insurance Conmissioner, the Director of
Management and Budget, the State Personnel Director, the State Business
Ombudsman, and various members of their staffs. In addition, I spent one day
each visiting with the Directors and staff members of the workers'
compensation systems of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Ohio. In the course of the
year I also attended two national conferences on workers' compensation, one
at the University of Maine and the other at the Cornell School of Industrial
and Labor Relations.
Finally, I was fortunate enough to get several leading authorities on
workers' compenaation to provide specialized studies on various aspects of
the subject. Professor John F. Burton, Jr. of Cornell, Chairman of the
1971-72 National Coamiasion on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, undertook a
comparative study of workers' compensation coats and benefits in various
states, with particular emphasis upon the Great Lakes region. He was
assisted by one of the moat knowledgeable persons concerning the Michigan
system, Dr. H. Allan Runt, Research Director of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, and by Alan B. Krueger and Dane M. Partridge. Professor
Arthur Larson of Duke, author of the standard treatise on workers'
compensation law, prepared a comparative review of the currently hot legal
topics of exclusivity of remedy and third-party suits. Professor Solomon
Axelrod of the University of Michigan School of Public Health reported on the
timely and sensitive issue of medical costs containment. Dr. Axelrod also
arranged for Eugenia S. Carpenter, Research Scientist at the Michigan School
of Public Health, to investigate the important but often neglected area of
vocational rehabilitation. Lastly, Professor Larwrence Joseph of Hofstra
University School of Law prepared a comprehensive study of the treatment of
occupational diseases in the workers' compensation systems of the Great Lakes
states. I shall set forth the principal findings of all these studies in the
main body of my report. The complete reports will eventually be made
available in limited quantities in separate appendices.
Acknowledgment and sincere thanks are also due Michael Madden, who served
as my liaison in Lansing throughout this project; Robert A. Boonin, my legal
research assistant; and Nan Druakin, my indefatigable secretary.
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II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROURD

Workers' compensation was a pioneering form of no-fault insurance. By
the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the rapid growth of industry in the
United States, often marked by inadequate attention to the safety needs of
working people, had produced a veritable plague of industrial accident. Yet
injured employees seeking damages from their employer found that the connnon
law had erected three almost insurmountable obstacles to their recovery.
These doctrines, developed in the quite different preceding era of small,
paternalistic, frequently family-operated firms, were contributory
negligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk.
Under the principle of contributory negligence, even if an employee could
establish that the employer's negligence caused an accident, the employer
would not be liable if it could show that negligence on the part of the
employee contributed in any way to his injury. The fellow servant rule
prevented recovery if the injury resulted from the negligence of a
co-worker. Assumption of risk was based on the notion that a worker was free
to bargain for wages commensurate with the hazards of a given job. Thus,
voluntary acceptance of employment under obviously dangerous conditions
amounted to an assumption of the risk that injury might result from those
conditions.
After some halting efforts were made to modify the harshness of the
common law doctrines, a whole new concept emerged to sweep the country in the
second decade of this century. Drawing upon European antecedents, all but
eight of the states had enacted workers' compensation laws by 1920. These
incorporated the principle that industrial accident was part of the cost of
the finished product, and that· compensation for resulting death or injury
should be paid by the ultimate consumer, without regard to the fault of
either employer or employee. In their ultimate form, workers' compensation
laws represented an important trade-off between employers and employees.
Employers lost their traditional connnon law defenses, but on the other hand
employees lost the possibility of maintaining tort actions and securing
enormous damage awards from sympathetic juries. The ideal was a swift, sure,
nonlitigious system to make the injured employee whole for his actual wage
loss and medical expenses.
The Michigan statute was initially adopted as Public Act 10 of 1912. It
applied to personal injury and death "arising out of and in the course of
employment," except for that caused by an employee's own "intentional and
willful misconduct." The law was substantially rewritten by Public Act 317
of 1969. Significant amendments were added in 1980 and 1981, and these will
be a major concern of this report.
In 1979 Dr. H. Allan Hunt of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
quoted from a 1962 speech by William Hart, then-Director of the Michigan
Workmen's Compensation Department, setting forth Hart's catalog of the major
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problems confronting the Michigan system at that time. They were as follows
(quoted in H. A. Hunt, Worker•' Coape1141ation in llichigan: Probleas and
Prospect• 7-8 (Upjohn 1979)):
1.

There are too many contested cases.

2.

There are too many redemptions.

3.

Payments to workers are not prompt.

4.

There is an inadequate consciousness of rehabilitation.

5.

Maximums p~ovided by law are not realistic.

6.

Political propagandists are using the field of workmen's
compensation to make required reforms impossible and ~o
push regressive measures which endanger the whole program.

Dr. Hunt concluded that Hart's diagnosis was generally still valid seventeen
years later, but omitted a number of problems confronting the system in 1979.
As we shall see, the observations of both Hart and Hunt retain much force in
1984.
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III.

COSTS ARD BENEFITS

The 1980 and 1981 "reform legislation" substantially modified Michigan's
workers' compensation law. Many of these amendments did not take effect,
however, until January 1, 1982, or March 31, 1982. The most important changes
included the coordination of workers' compensation benefits with unemployment
compensation benefits, employer-financed wage continuation plans, pension
plans, disability insurance plans, and the amount of an employer's
contribution to old age benefits under Social Security. The basic benefit
formula was changed from two-thirds of gross wages with a maximum of
two-thirds of the State's average weekly wage to 80 percent of after-tax
wages with a maximum of 90 percent of the State's average weekly wage.
Minimum benefits were eliminated except in the case of death and scheduled
1nJuries. The so-called "fictional 40-hour week," was eliminated,. and fringe
benefits were generally excluded from the calculation of an employee's
average weekly wage. "Disability" was statutorily defined for the first time
with regard to personal injuries, and the rules governing "favored work" were
tightened. A presumption was established against a wage loss on the part of
a retired person who is drawing a private or government pension. In
addition, a 1981 amendment would have prohibited redemptions, effective
January 1, 1984, but this ban was lifted by a 1983 statute, which imposed
stricter controls on redemptions and required each party to an approved
settlement to contribute $100 to a new Redemption Fund to help defray the
State's administrative expenses.
Besides these substantive changes in the workers' compensation law, there
have been significant changes in insurance law and practice. In December
1981 the Michigan Legislature mandated a 20 percent overall reduction in
workers' compensation insurance rates, effective January 1, 1982. In
response, the Michigan rating bureau, a private organization which at that
time filed rates on behalf of all insurers writing workers' compensation
insurance in Michigan, announced a voluntary 22.2 percent rate reduction,
effective January 1, 1982. Then, during 1982, the Legislature provided that
open competition in the writing of workers' compensation insurance in
Michigan would go into effect on January 1, 1983.
Unfortunately, it is DDCh too soon to draw any definitive conclusions
concerning the ultimate effect of all these interacting statutory changes.
Less than two years have passed since the effective date of fundamental
modifications in both the substantive law and the insurance coverage of
workers' compensation. The eventual impact on employers' costs and
employees I benefits will not be known for several more years. All that can
be expected at this time are preliminary, tentative findings. With those
qualifications, however, I believe that what follows is the most accurate and
up-to-date set of figures the state of the art permits.
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A.

Workers' Compensation Costs:
Michigan Trends

Interstate Comparisons and

1. Comparative insurance rates. As mentioned earlier, Professor John F.
Burton, of the Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations, and Dr. H.
Allan Hunt, of the Upjohn Institute, collaborated in producing a report
entitled, "Interstate Variations in the Employers' Cost of Workers'
Compensation, with Particular Reference to Michigan and the Other Great Lakes
States." Their paper runs to about 200 double-spaced pages, including
footnotes and tables, and contains the most intricate statistical analysis.
Although the full report will be made available separately in limited
quantities, I shall do no more than cite its most salient points here.
Professor Burton has devised a highly sophisticated technique for
meaningful comparisons between the workers' compensation costs of different
states. He starts by rejecting the crude method sometimes employed of
ascertaining the ratio of earned premium to payroll for each state. Such an
approach wholly fails to take account of the varying mix of industry from
state to state, and the varying extent to which self-insurance may be
practiced. Burton uses as a constant the model of the national payroll
distribution according to as many as 71 major occupational classifications.
Using the insurance rates applicable to each classification in a particular
state, he can then calculate an average rate for every state that will be
genuinely comparable to all others.
Burton's next problem was to determine what is the critical insurance
"rate." The published "manual" rates are only a point of departure in
seeking to find what any given employer actually pays. After adjustments to
take account of experience rating, certain expense and loss constants,
premium discounts, retrospective rating, and dividends, Burton arrives at
what he defines as the high adjusted manual rate. In recent years even that
adjusted rate has had to be further modified to reflect such competitive
devices as open competition, deviations, and schedule rating. That brings
Burton finally to what he calls the low adjusted manual rate. In a state
like Michigan, where open competition prevails, it is the low adjusted manual
rate that best represents the actual net cost of insurance to an employer.
In assessing the impact of open competition, Burton begins cautiously:
"One view of workers' compensation is that prior to open competition, the use
of dividends, retrospective rating, et al. had squeezed all excess profits
and unnecessary expenses out of workers' compensation insurance. If this is
true, then arguably the only result of open competition will be to reduce
insurance rates at the beginning of the policy period with a corresponding
reduction in dividends at the end of the policy period. This view amounts to
saying that open competition has no impact on the employers' costs of
workers' compensation •••• " After that warning, Burton proceeds as follows in
the draft version of his report:
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The other view of workers' compensation insurance is that prior to open
competition and other competitive devices discussed in this section, excess
profits or unnecessary administrative expenses existed in the insurance
industry, and that open competition eliminates or reduces these expenses,
thereby reducing the costs of workers' compensation to employers. This view
is equivalent to saying that the difference between manual rates and adjusted
manual rates is greater in states with open competition.
Michigan is the only state with data that permit a preliminary assessment
of this view. Open competition has been in effect in Michigan since January
2, 1983. Lines (3) and (4) of Table 14 present data provided by the
Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan (CAOM) for 1984 policies for
which information was available by August 1984. Comparable data for all 1983
policies are provided in lines (3) and (4) of Table 15. These data are
derived from the "Information Page" that each carrier must file with the CAOM
for each workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance policy sold
to Michigan employers. The "Information Page" contains information on the
insurance classifications, the annual payroll, manual premium, and total
estimated annual premium after application of premium discounts, experience
rating, et al. The only factors influencing insurance costs that are not
included on the "Information Page" are retrospective rating and dividends.
These factors are discussed below.
In states without open competition, carriers are required to use the
manual rates included in the state's current schedule as the starting point
for determining the premiums charged to employers. Had Michigan not adopted
open competition, the simulated manual rates shown in line 1 of Tables 14 and
15 would have represented these initial charges. Under open competition, the
initial charges offered to employers will vary among carriers. The average
manual rates charged by carriers in actual transactions with employers during
1984 are shown in line 3 of Table 14 for five different combinations of
employers. Similar information for the average manual rates in actual
transactions in 1983 are shown in line 3 of Table 15. The data indicate that
under open competition, the manual rate charged by carriers are considerably
less than the manual rates that would have been charged using the procedure
used to develop manual rates in states without open competition. (This can
be seen by comparing (1) and (3) in Tables 14 and 15.)
Under open competition in Michigan, carriers are also able to compete by
using different experience rating formulas, expense and loss constants, and
premium discounts than are used in states without open competition. The
insurance rates actually charged to employers in Michigan during 1984 after
these factors are taken into account are shown in line 4 of Table 14 for five
different combinations of employers. Similar information for the actual
charged rates in 1983 are shown in line 4 of Table 15.
There are two additional adjustments to manual rates that are not
reflected in line 4 of Tables 14 and 15. The adjustments due to
retrospectives rating cannot be measured in Michigan •••• The other factor not
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TABLE 14
Michigan WorkerEI Compensation Insurance Rates in 1984

24 Classes
in Division
A

44 Classes
in Divisions

A• B

24 Manufacturing
Classes in Divisions
A, B, • C

56 Classes

71 Classes

in Divisions

in Divisions

A, B, • C

A, B, C • D

Average Costs of Manual
Rates (Simulated) in Effect
on January 1, 1984

2.071

2.214

6.223

2.432

2.903

Average Costs of High Adjusted
Manual Rates (Simulated Using
NCCI Data)

1.682

1.799

5.057

1.976

2.359

Average Manual Rates in Actual
Transactions

1.627

1.120

4.960

1.908

2.239

Average [ Charged Rates]
in Actual Transactions

1.374

1.422

3.855

1.554

1.816

Low Adjusted Manual Rates
after Estimated Impact of Dividends

1.239

1.283

3.477

1.402

1.638

Gross Impact of Open
Competition (1)-(5)

40.2%

42.1\

44.1\

42.41

43.61

26.3%

28.7%

31.2%

29.01

30.6%

(1)

Net Impact of Open
Competition (2)-(5)

--m

TABLE 15
Michigan Workerlf Compensation Insurance Rates in 1983

24 Classes
in Division
A

44 Classes
in Divisions
A•B

24 Manufacturing
Classes in Divisions
A, B, • C

56 Classes
in Divisions
A, B, • C

71 Classes
in Divisions
A, B, C • D

Average Costs of Manual
Rates (Simulated) in Effect
on January 1, 1983

2.203

2.327

7.038

2.602

3.045

Average Costs of High Adjusted
Manual Rates (Simulated Using
NCCI Data)

1.862

1.967

5.947

2.199

2.574

Average Manual Rates in Actual
Transactions

1.724

1.818

5.316

2.021

2.347

Average [ Charged Rates]
in Actual Transactions

1.483

1.573

4.436

1.730

2.016

Low Adjusted Manual Rates
after Estimated Impact of Dividends

1.360

1.443

4.068

1.586

1.848

Gross Impact of Open
Competition (1)-(5)

38.31

38.0I

42.21

39.0I

39.31

Net Impact of Open
Competition (2)-(5)
(2)

27.01

26.61

31.6%

27.91

28.21

-m

accounted for in line (4) of Tables 14 and 15 is dividends paid after the
expiration of the policies. Dividends to policyholders are rather
substantial nationally, representing 7.8 percent of standard earned premium
in 1980-1982.
If open competition is driving down the initial rates charged to
employers (manual rates) and also leading to competition in terms of premium
discounts, experience rating, and similar factors, then reducing dividends is
an obvious way for carriers to adjust their overall charges for workers'
compensation insurance if the rates prior to open competition were not higher
than necessary to cover losses and administrative expenses. It is too early
for a definitive judgment about the impact of open competition on dividends
in Michigan because open competition only began on January 1, 1983, because
dividends are typically paid in a year on the basis of experience with
policies from previous years, and because the latest data on Michigan
dividends pertain to 1983. There is, however, one aspect of the Michigan
experience in recent years that provides a possible clue to the impact that
open competition will have on dividends. In 1981, the Michigan Legislature
mandated a 20 percent overall rate reduction effective January 1, 1982. In
response, WCRIAM, which filed rates on behalf of all insurers writing
workers' compensation insurance in Michigan, announced a voluntary 22.2
percent rate reduction effective January 1, 1982. The benefit changes
effective that date were estimated to increase insurance costs by 4.6
percent, and so the overall reduction of 22.2 was largely due to a 25.2
assumed improvement in experience. This large a rate reduction for 1982
could have been expected to result in lower dividends in 1983. However,
dividends as a percentage of premium increased in 1983, both when 1983
dividends are compared to 1983 premiums and when compared to 1982 premiums.
The data on dividends on Michigan workers' compensation insurance
indicate that dividends as a percentage of payroll increased every year from
1978 to 1983 when measured on a concurrent basis and increased every year
from 1979 to 1983 when dividends are compared to the previous year's
premiums. As indicated before, it is still too early to be confident about
the ultimate impact of open competition on dividends in Michigan. However,
through 1983, there is no evidence that dividends as a percentage of premium
are declining in Michigan. The data used for subsequent adjustments of
Michigan insurance charges will be a three-year average of dividends compared
to premiums from the previous year.
For 1983, the three-year average of dividends as a percentage of lagged
premiums was 9.8 percent. This 9.8 percent was used to reduce the average
charged rates for 1984 shown in line (4) of Table 14 to produce the low
adjusted manual rates after estimated impact of dividends shown in line (5)
of Table 14. A similar procedure was used for the 1983 rates shown in Table
15, where the low adjusted manual rates in line (5) are 8.3 percent lower
than the average charged rates shown in line (4); the 8.3 percent impact of
dividends is the 1982 figure.
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The low adjusted manual rates shown in line (5) of Table 14 are our best
estimates of what the five combinations of Michigan employers designated in
the column headings of the table are actually paying for workers'
compensation insurance in 1984, considering all the consequences of open
competition, such as carrier decisions on manual rates, experience rating
formulas, and dividends. These actual charges are considerably below the
simulated manual rates shown in line (1) of Table 14, which represent our
estimates of the manual rates that would have been promulgated on January 1,
1984, if open competition had not been adopted in Michigan. Line (6) of
Table 14 indicates that the low adjusted manual rates in line (5) are from
40.2 percent to 43.6 percent below the simulated manual rates shown in line
(1). It would be inappropriate, however, to attribute all of the differences
shown in line (6) to open competition since even in the absence of open
competition, most Michigan employers would have paid insurance rates less
than manual rates because of premium discounts, dividends, et al. Our best
estimates of what Michigan employers would actually have paid in 1984 if open
competition had not been adopted are shown as the simulated high adjusted
manual rates in line (2) of Table 14. The net impact of open competition is
the difference between these high adjusted manual rates (line (2)) and the
low adjusted manual rates (line (5)); the percentage estimates of the net
impact of open coapetition are shown in line (7) of Table 14 and range from
26.3 percent to 30.6 percent, depending on the combination of employers
chosen.
The apparent net impact of open competition on workers' compensation
costs for Michigan employers is substantial, according to our best
estimates. We stress that this finding must be used with caution. One
reason, as discussed earlier, is that more time is needed before the ultimate
impact of open competition on dividends can be determined. The substantial
dividends [through 1983] may dissipate with time. Also, the initial result
of open competition may be to induce a degree of competition among carriers
that cannot be sustained over time. Arguably, some carriers are engaged in a
form of predatory price-cutting that will jeopardize some carriers' financial
solvency and ultimately will lead to more realistic (or sustainable) and
higher rates. More time will be needed to assess the permanent consequences
of open competition on workers' compensation insurance rates.
We do not have sufficient data to assess the ultimate impact of open
competition. However, the 26.3 to 30.6 percent net impact for 1984 shown in
Table 14 is consistent with several other data sets from Michigan. For 1983,
the data on line (7) of Table 15 indicate that the net impact of open
competition on insurance charges in Michigan was between 26.6 percent and
31.6 percent, virtually the same range shown from the 1984 data in Table 14.
We also tried different weighting schemes for those five combinations of
employers shown in Tables 14 and 15. Those tables relied on the national
payroll distributions among the 71 insurance classifications. We substituted
Michigan payroll distribution for the 70 classes with available data. For
1984, using the Michigan 1984 payroll distribution, the net impact of open
competition was from 26.0 percent to 30.4 percent. For 1983, using the
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Michigan 1983 payroll distribution, the net impact of open competition was
from 26.0 to 33.4 percent. In essence, the different weighting schemes make
virtually no difference in the apparent net impact of open competition on
workers' compensation insurance rates in Michigan.

***
Michigan employers paid about $533 million for workers' compensation
insurance premiums in 1983, and about $493 million in 1984. On the basis of
Professor Burton's calculations that those amounts were about 30 percent less
than what they would have been in the absence of open competition, one can
estimate that open coapetition saved Michigan eaployers $229 million in 1983
and another $212 million in 1984.
After dealing with the likely effect of open competition on workers'
compensation insurance rates in Michigan, Professor Burton proceeds to deal
with interstate variations, with special emphasis on comparisons between
Michigan and the other Great Lakes states:
Table 20 is based on the view that open competition and deviations do
h-ave a net impact on workers' compensation costs, and produce what are t-ermed
"low adjusted manual rates."
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 20 present the average cost of adjusted manual
rates on January 1, 1984 for 24 and 44 classifications using national payroll
distributions. Column 3 presents the averages for 24 manufacturing classes
using national payroll distribution. Column 4 presents the average adjusted
manual rates based on the 56 classifications in Divisions A, B, and C, and
column 5 shows the rates based on the 71 classes in Divisions A to D.
The results in Table 20 can be interpreted as the percentage of the
payroll expended on workers' compensation insurance by employers in 47
jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) as of January 1, 1984. The
results in column 2 of Table 20 are the most reliable and useful ••••
Table 28 provides information in the adjusted manual rates for the 44
classes of employers in Divisions A and B. This combination of employers was
selected because it is the largest combination for which a historical record
is available from 1958 to 1984. The Michigan data are shown in line (1), and
indicate that Michigan employers expended an amount equivalent to 0.450
percent of payroll on workers' compensation insurance in 1958. This
percentage increased through time until 1978, when Michigan employers
expended 1.890 percent of payroll on insurance premiums. From 1978 to 1984,
the cost of insurance as a percentage of payroll dropped, to a figure of
1.799 if high adjusted manual rates are used or to 1.283 percent if low
adjusted manual rates are used.
The performance of Michigan workers' compensation costs relative to those
in other states can also be traced with the data in Table 28. The average
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Table 20. Interstate Variations in Average Costs of Low Adjusted Manual Rates
for Classes in Each Division of Table 3, Weighted by National Payroll Distributions

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Ind:lana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virgin:la
Wisconsin

24 Classes
In
Division A
0.838
2.131
0.924
0.775
1.752
0.937
1.581
0.968
1.938
1.475
0.598
3.386
1.197
0.851
0.324
0.799
o. 734
0.553
0.934
1.500
1.633
1.388
1.239
0.933
0.842
0.608
1.449
0.715
1.328
1.154
1.833
1.055
0.512
1.476
1.317
1.580
1.217
0.893
0.961
0.678
0.694
1.520
0.638
0.798
0.854
1.951
0.802

44 Classes
In
Divisions
A and B
0.848
2. 027
0.995
0.819
1.936
0.999
1.644
1.023
1.915
1.552
0.617
3.647
1.228
0.846
0.340
0.801
o. 772
0.579
0.970
1.570
1.651
1.467
1.283
0.980
0.854
0.646
1.479
0.736
1.374
1.231
1.881
1.079
0.524
1.521
1.348
1.615
1.235
0.976
0.972
0.694

0.732
1.581
0.664
0.812
0.850
1.855
0.846

24 Manufacturing
Classes
In Divisions
A,B,,c
1.964
3.619
2.382
1.972
4.293
2.423
3.419
3.547
4.293
3.010
1.641
7.491
2.694
1.958
0.690
1.462
1.746
1.493
2.333
3.425
3.130
3.499
3.477
2.824
1.908
1.487
3.081
1.574
3.430
2.857
3.677
2.709
0.988
2.863
3.316
3.516
2.491
2.945
1.811
1.382
1.768
3.994
1.619
1.657
1.286
2.955
1.993

56 Classes
In
Divisions
A,B,,c
0.909
2.110
1.075
0.887
2.068
1.076
1.112
1.183
2.045
1.608
0.678
3.384
1.319
0.910
o.359
0.836
0.828
o.636
1.054
1.659
1.112
1.577
1.402
1.097
0.911
0.696
1.572
0.112
1.504
1.322
1.982
1.169
o.544
1.576
1.476
1.725
1.284
1.090
1.011
o.735
o.794
1.736
0.120
0.854
0.861
1.926
0.910

71 Classes
In
Divisions
A,B,c,,D

1.064
2.354
1.275
1.042
2.412
1.237
2.092
2.363
1.842
0.778
4.411
1.538
1.067
0.416
0.9'11
0.985
0.750
1.252
1.984
1.889
1.638
1.275
1.067
0.822
0.901
1.829
1.515
2.265
1.351
0.644
1.758
1.725

----1.246
1.196
0.876
0.980
2.024
0.825
0.973
1.017
2.174
1.092

TABLE 28
Workers' Compensation Costs in Michigan Relative to National Average and Other Great Lakes States Average, 1958-1984:
Adjusted Manual Rates for 44 Classes in Divisions A and B of Table 3
1958

1962

1965

1972

1975

1978

.450

.694

.715

.914

1.238

1.890

1.799

1.283

(2) U.S. Average
(28 states)

.618

.711

.791

.783

1.019

1.420

1.433

1.334

(3) Ratio Michigan to
U .s. ((1)/(2))

.728

.976

.904

1.167

1.215

1.331

1.255

.962

( 4) Seven Other Great Lakes
States Average
.514

.577

.600

.648

.871

1.275

1.112

.978

(5) Ratio Michigan to Seven
Great Lakes States
((1)/(4))
.875

1.203

1.192

1.410

1.421

1.482

1.618

1.312

(6) Six Other Great Lakes
States Average (sans
Indiana)
.534

.613

.634

.692

.947

1.408

1.241

1.085

1.132

1.128

1.321

1.307

1.342

1.450

1.182

( 1)

Michigan

to Six
Great Lakes States
((1)/(6))

I

1984H

1984L

(7) Ratio Michigan

.843

Average for Seven Other Great Lakes States is a six states average for 1958-1965;
Average for six other Great Lakes States is a five states average for 1958-1965; New York data not available prior to 1972.

cost for the 44 types of employers in 28 states are presented in line (2);
this number of states is used because it is the largest combination of states
with data available for the 1958 to 1984 period. This series also shows a
continuing increase through time in the employers' costs of workers'
compensation. Indeed, if the high adjusted manual rates are used, costs
increased every year nationally from 1958 to 1984. The Michigan performance
relative to the national (28 states) average is reported in line 3. From 1958
to 1965, Michigan employers were spending less on workers' compensation
insurance than were employers elsewhere. However, Michigan costs increased
more rapidly than the national average from 1965 until 1978, when Michigan
costs were 33.1 percent above the national average. By 1984, the high
adjusted manual rates were only 25.5 percent above the national average. Of
course, these are simulated high adjusted manual rates, which indicate what
Michigan employers would have been paying in 1984 if open competition had not
been introduced into the state. Our best estimate of what Michigan employers
were actually paying in 1984 is represented by the low adjusted manual rates,
and the data indicate that as of 1984 the eaployers in Michigan were paying
about four percent less than the national average figure for workers'
COllpensation insurance.
The experience of the other Great Lakes states is presented in Table 28
in line (4). The seven other states that bound the Great Lakes are Illinois,
Indiana, Minnesota, New York (for which data are only available since 1972),
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. From 1958 through 1984, the other Great
Lakes states on average have always had workers' compensation costs below the
national average, as can be seen by comparing lines (2) and (4). As a
result, the Michigan performance relative to the other Great Lakes states
(shown in line (5)) or to the others exclusive of Indiana (shown in line (7))
is less favorable than Michigan's performance relative to the national
average (shown in line (3)). From 1962 to 1984, Michigan costs have always
been above the average in the other Great Lakes states. From 1978 to the
high adjusted manual rates in 1984, Michigan's costs ratio increased,
indicating that without open competition the Michigan cost disadvantage
relative to the Great Lakes states would have worsened. However, the impact
of open competition that is reflected in the 1984 low adjusted manual rates
indicates that Michigan employers improved their relative costs compared to
the other Great Lakes states from 1978 to 1984. In 1984, Michigan employers
expended 31.2 percent more than did comparable employers in the other Great
Lakes states, down from a 48.2 percent cost disadvantage in 1978 •••• [The
respective figures were 18.2 percent and 34.2 percent, with the exclusion of
Indiana.]
The rationale for excluding Indiana from certain comparisons is that
Indiana is the only Great Lakes state that has made inadequate benefits a
pronounced feature of its workers' compensation program. For example, as of
January 1, 1984, the maximum weekly benefit for total disability in Indiana
was $156.00, which meant that the most an injured worker could receive in
Indiana was below the poverty level for a family of four. No other Great
Lakes state could match this record. [Rote by St. Antoine: Michigan must try
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Workers· Compensation Costs in Michigan Relative to National Average and
Other Great Lakes States* Average, 1972-1984: Adjusted Manual Rates
for 44 Classes
2.0
$

1.8 tRate per
L6
1.4

$100
payroll
I

1.2
1.0
0.8

0.6
0.4

0.2
0.0

Year
1975

1972

■ Michigan

lffl

U.S. Average (28
states)

B

1978

1984

6 Other Great
Lakes States·
Average (m1nus
lnd1ana)

ffiilil 7 Other Great
Lakes States·
Average

*Great Lakes States 1nclude M1ch1gan, 1111no1s, Indiana, Ohio,
Wtsconstn, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and New York

to disengage itself from its fixation on the workers' compensation costs of
Indiana, despite that state's unfortunate geographical proximity. As Table
20 documents, Indiana has simply opted out of Twentieth Century public policy
in its slighting of the injured worker. Its expenditures are dead last by a
wide margin among all the fifty states. Alabama and Mississippi are prodigal
by comparison. If and when federal standards are mandated in workers'
compensation, no state will have a greater claim to responsibility than
Indiana.]

***
2. Self-insured operations. Dr. H. Allan Hunt took primary
responsibility in the Burton-Hunt collaboration for analyzing recent
developments in the experience of self-insured employers under the Michigan
workers' compensation system. His portion of the report is as follows:

It is not a simple matter to measure the workers' compensation costs of
self-insured employers in a way that makes them directly comparable to the
cost of workers' compensation insurance coverage purchased from commercial
insurance carriers. The major difference is that self-insured employers are
generally operating on roughly a pay-as-you-go basis. Commercial insurance
on the other hand is usually prepaid. In workers' compensation insurance,
with its long-tailed distribution of claims, there is an enormous difference
between payments in one year to all existing claims and pre-funding potential
lifetime payments to all claims arising in one year. The former is the
pay-as-you-go option while the latter is prepaid.
There are other, less obvious differences which prevent direct
comparisons between the cost of self-insurance and commercial insurance
coverage. The cost of administration is frequently not measured by
self-insurers in a way that makes it easy to include with the cost of benefit
payments. Litigation costs may be hidden in other budgets and not identified
as related to workers' compensation in any way. In addition, commercial
insurance carriers generally perform other services for employers, such as
loss-control programs, safety consulting services, and others. These may or
may not be performed in self-insured firms, but it is highly unlikely that
the cost of such services will be measured comparably in the two sectors.
Despite these difficulties in making direct comparisons, it is important
to make some attempt to determine the experience of self-insured employers in
Michigan as well as those with commercial insurance. In recent years,
approximately 40 percent of all workers' compensation benefit payments in
Michigan have been made by self-insured employers. Clearly, the experience
of such a large group of employers cannot be ignored. This is especially
true because there is reason to believe that the 1980 and 1981 reforms may
have impacted large, high-wage employers differently than smaller, low-wage
employers. Changes in maximum benefit levels, minimum benefit provisions,
and benefit coordination would be likely to have differential effects across
industries with varying wage and benefit levels. In addition, there would be
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no reason to expect the deregulation of the insurance market to have any
effect on the costs of self-insured employers.
Letters were sent to a select group of large self-insured employers in
Michigan with a request for data on their workers' compensation costs.
Specific items were suggested, with emphasis on annual benefit payments and
litigation experience. These employers were asked to submit data that would
facilitate analysis of cost trends from 1978 through 1983 and that would
permit interstate cost comparisons where that was relevant for the firm.
The most surprising result of this informal non-random survey was the
great difficulty encountered by self-insureds in responding. This was not
due to a lack of cooperation, but reflected the inability of the firms to
report their data in the simple format requested. Inconsistencies between
firms' practices and gaps in the data were very serious. Reasonably
comparable benefit payment data were obtained from seven large self-insured
firms with major operations in the State of Michigan, including the Big Three
auto producers. While these data cannot in any sense be regarded as
generalizable to all self-insureds, they should be sufficient to indicate
whether the changes in workers' compensation insurance costs in Michigan are
confirmed in the benefit cost trends experienced by some notable self-insured
employers in the state.
Table III-1 presents summary results for the workers' compensation
benefit payments per $100 of payroll for the Big Three auto producers and for
four other self-insureds. The Big Three benefit payments are reported
separately for Michigan operations and all non-Michigan self-insured
operations. Individual firm's costs were weighted by the relevant payroll to
arrive at the sunnnary figures. Before proceeding to a discussion of the
findings in Table III-1, it is important to point out so~e limitations of the
analysis.
First, annual benefit payments do not adequately measure the cost of
workers' compensation programs for these firms. As indicated earlier, there
are serious problems in determining such measurements in different
self-insured firms. Thus, the choice was made to stick to the simplest facts
that could be collected reliably, namely, annual benefit payments. Clearly,
annual benefit payments seriously understate the total cost of workers'
compensation coverage for these self-insured employers. The cost of
administration, Second Injury fund and other assessment costs, litigation
expenses, in-plant medical treatment costs, and many others are not included
in the benefit cost measurement used here. Annual benefit payments also do
not include any reserve for claims incurred but not reported or even reserves
for future payments on known cases.
There is another problem with comparing the Big Three costs in Michigan
with their costs elsewhere. Since a large proportion of managerial and
professional staff is employed in Michigan, workers' compensation costs in
Michigan are understated relative to the other states. This is because the
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Michigan payroll figures include a higher proportion of employees who are
both well compensated and unlikely to suffer a compensable accident.
Unfortunately, complete data were not available to make a correction for this
factor, but partial reports indicate that the Michigan costs are probably
understated by from 40 to 80 percent relative to other states. There is no
particular reason to expect this bias to change over time, however, so it
should not distort the comparisons of costs over the years 1978 to 1983.

TABLE III-1

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFIT COSTS PER $100 PAYROLL
SELECTED SELF-INSURERS

Big Three

Other Self-Insureds

Year

Michigan
Operations

Non-Michigan
Operations

Michigan
Operations

1978

$0.86

$0.44

$0.52

1979

0.95

0.55

0.56

~00

1.36

0.67

0.61

1981

1.18

0.64

0.60

1982

1.23

0.72

0.58

~~

0.98

0.66

0.55

Table III-1 shows that the general trend of workers' compensation costs
for these self-insured employers in Michigan has been downward since 1980.
Annual benefit pa:,aents relative to payroll by non-auto self-insureds have
declined by 10 percent since 1980 while the auto producers have realized a 28
percent reduction over the same period. The reduction for auto employers was
particularly marked in 1983. This may reflect the coordination of benefits
and other new provisions of the law, but it is interesting to note that there
has been a marked reduction in the number of claims as well. It may also be
a consequence of distortions introduced by the 1982 figure. The 1982 costs
for the Big Three showed a slight increase over 1981. Presumably this
reflected the recession and consequent layoffs in the auto industry. Both
the payroll figures and the number of claims illustrate strong sensitivity to
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employment levels in the industry. If 1982 was artificially high, it would
make the 1983 drop look more impressive than it actually was.
The other interesting comparison in Table III-1 is between the Michigan
and non-Michigan operations of the Big Three auto producers. Recalling the
earlier caution about likely understatement of the Michigan costs due to the
inclusion of more white-collar workers in Michigan payrolls, the comparisons
are still revealing. Michigan operations show a much higher benefit cost
level than other states in the Big Three's experience. However, the good
news for Michigan is that the ratio of Michigan costs to non-Michigan costs
has declined from roughly twice as high in 1980 to one and one-half times as
high in 1~83. This reflects the fact that non-Michigan costs do not show the
same downward trend but seem to bounce around more from year to year.
This analysis is certainly not definitive, but it does indicate
improvement in Michigan's workers' compensation cost problem for
self-insurers. Since the deregulation of workers' compensation insurance in
1983 would not be expected to impact the benefit costs of the self-insureds,
it is apparent the earlier changes in the law have resulted in some cost
reductions in the self-insured sector. The number of litigated claims
appears to be down and retiree claims in the auto industry have been
reduced. The trend in the number of redemptions is clearly downward over the
last two years both in the insured and the self-insured sectors. On the
basis of the evidence presented in Table III-1, a beginning has been made.

* * *
3. ClailDS filings. Another way to forecast the likely future direction
of workers' compensation costs is to observe the long-range trends in claims
filings. As Table III-2 shows, there was a generally steady increase in the
number of cases opened and the number of contested claims from the early
1970s right through the early 1980s. Since then, however, there has been a
rapid and dramatic decline. From a high of'145,459 cases opened in 1982, the
figure dropped to 83,591 in 1984, or a fall of 42.5 percent in a mere two
years. Contested cases went from a peak figure of 44,054 in 1981 to only
23,103 in 1984, or a decline of 47.6 percent in just three years. In each
instance that brought the total figures back to below the level of 1971. In
view of the delays in processing contested cases, which often involve more
serious and longer-lasting disabilities, the current lower filing rates
foreshadow even greater savings for the future. It is also good news that
the rate of contested claims has fallen below the 30 percent mark, which
: _"means that once again almost three-quarters of all claims are being paid
voluntarily.
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TABLE
WORKERS'
1971
Cases opened
(Form 101)

83,972

% change from
previous year

Contested cases
received
(Form 104)

23,769

COMPENSATION

III-2

BUREAU:

ANNUAL

CASELOAD

STATISTICS

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984*

89,577

97,486

102,254

95,156

95,857

103,436

122,064

137,955

136,996

129,640

145,459

85,568

83,591

+6.67

+8.83

+4.89

-6.94

+o.74

+7.91

+18.01

+13.02

-0.70

-5.37

+12.20

26,336

25,982

28,107

28,776

29,681

29,782

40,232

44,054

30,636 37,865

32,674

-41.17 -

28,605

-2.31

23,103

% change

from previous
year

---

+10.80

-1. 34

+8.18

29.40

26.65

27.49

+2.38

+3.14

+0.34

+2.87 +23.60

+6.25

+9.50

30.24

30.96

28.79

25.10

29.37

33.98

-25.83 -12.45 -19.23

% of contested

cases to cases
opened

2 8. 31

27.45

22.46

33.43

27.64

Office of Strategy
10/16/84
( Percentages by St. Antoine)
*Projection based on actual data for first 9 months of 1984.

B.

Benefits:

Interstate Comparisons and Evaluation of Adequacy

In addition to the Burton-Hunt comparative study of workers' compensation
costs, Professor Burton and an associate provided a companion paper,
entitled, "Workers' Compensation Benefits in Michigan and the Other Great
Lakes States." Although permanent disabilities of one kind or another
account for only about one-quarter of the total number of cases in the
workers' compensation system, they account for approximately two-thirds of
all cash benefits paid injured workers, both nationally and in Michigan.
(Medical benefits for various classes of permanently disabled workers range
between one-fifth and one-third of the benefits provided them; medical
expenses constitute about one-quarter of all workers' compensation
payments.) In view of the great financial impact of permanent disabilities,
therefore, Professor Burton concentrated most of his attention upon them.
I. Comparative benefits in Michigan and other Great Lakes states. The
last year for which comprehensive data are available concerning both benefits
and costs under workers' compensation is 1978. Comparing Michigan and the
other Great Lake states as of that year, Professor Burton has this to say in
the draft version of his report:
Table B25 presents the sum of the average cost of indemnity benefits and
medical benefits for each type of claim, as well as claim frequency. Death
cases, corrected for employment, are most frequent in Michigan, and least
frequent in Indiana and New York. The average cost of death benefits,
considering both the indemnity and medical benefits, is least expensive in
Indiana, and most expensive in Minnesota. Death benefits in Michigan are
well below the Great Lakes average.
The frequency of permanent total cases per 100,000 workers was greatest
in Michigan, and lowest in Indiana and New York. The average cost of
indemnity and medical benefits for permanent total disability was least
expensive in Indiana and Michigan, and most expensive in Minnesota.
The rate of major permanent partial disability cases was highest in
Michigan and Illinois, and lowest in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and New York.
The average cost of indemnity and medical benefits for major permanent
partial cases was below the Great Lakes average in Indiana and Wisconsin,
approximately equal to the average in Illinois, Michigan, and New York, and
above the average in Minnesota and Pennsylvania.
Minor permanent partial disability cases per 100,000 workers were least
frequent in Pennsylvania and Indiana, and most frequent in Illinois. The
average cost of minor permanent partial cases, including both indemnity and
medical benefits, was below the Great Lakes average in New York, Michigan,
Indiana, and Wisconsin. The average cost was well above the Great Lakes
average in Minnesota.

17

Table 825
Clal■

Frequencv and Average Costs of lnde■nlfy and Medical Benefits bv Type of
and A_.age Benefit per Workr • 19791 • Seven Stat•

Ciel■,

Awr-1199 Benefits
Death
Frequency 2

eosi'
(cbl larsl

Per•nent Total
Frequency 2 cost'
(cbl larsl

!!!,!or Per•-1' Partial
Frequency 2 Cost'
(cbl larsl

Minor

Per•-1' Partial

Freq•ncy 2 Cost'
(cbl larsl

T!!!!or!!l Tota I
Freq•ncy 2 Cost'
(cbllars l

Madi ca I On If
Freq•ncv2 Cost'
(dol larsl

eer Wort<er-4
(cbl larsl

SEVEN
STATE
AVERAGE

8

125,247

10

200,023

130

44,458

'89

6,065

2,025

2,203

11,972

86

166.32

IL

9

129,736

6

149,516

231

43,420

888

6,024

1,910

1,788

11,791

94

219.67

IN

6

46,836

I

76,086

61

28,456

171

5,897

1,520

1,355

12,841

78

61.63

Ml

10

58,731

21

96,494

274

43,890

341

5,621

2,172

2,272

14,295

107

230.21

MN

B

214,740

17

427,821

122

58,351

'84

9,255

2,400

2,831

11,604

86

274.56

NY

6

161,787

1

150,539

76

43,350

420

4,872

1.2»

2,892

7,496

74

105.94

PA5

7

127,331

18

208,294

39

68,429

13!1

9,821

1,912

2,487

---

---

144.59

WI

7

60,797

5

286,068

109

37,209

'81

5,981

3,027

1,079

13,805

75

124.92

Cc■penutlon

Insurance, ~nual St11tlstlc11I Bulletin; 1982 ed., Ellhlblt O; 1983 ed•, Ellhlblt N as adapted by authors•

Sources:

Claim frequency fr0111 National Council on
Average costs source cl tad In Tab le 823.

Notes:

15ee Note 2, Table Bl•
2fhe frequency Is the number of cases per 100,000 •nlyears.
3Tt111 cost Is the sum of the average costs of lnde■nlfy and ■edlcal benefits for the fype of cases shown.
4rhe 11_.1199 benefit per worker Is the product of the cl11l11 frequency and the 11wr11ge cost per cl11l11, sUIIIIINld across the cases shown, divided by 100,000.
'Med1c111 benefit data are not 11v11llable for Pennsylanlll• The average cost figure for each type of case for Pennsylvania Is the sum of the average lnde■nlfy
benefit for Pennsylv11nl11 and the 11_.1199 niedlcal benefit for the sewin-states. To calculate the 11"8r11ge benefit per worker In Pennsyl"8nl11 the sewin-state
average llledlcal - only clalm frequency and benefit were used.

Temporary total disability cases, corrected for employment, were least
frequent in New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and most frequent
in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The average cost of a temporary total
case was below the Great Lakes average in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Illinois.
The average cost in Michigan was approximately equal to the Great Lakes
average, while Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New York were above average in
cost.
Medical benefit only cases were least frequent in New York and most
frequent in Michigan. The average cost of medical only claims was lowest in
New York and Wisconsin, and highest in Michigan.
Table B25 also reports the average benefit per worker per year, including
all types of cash (indemnity) and medical benefits. The average benefit is
lowest in Indiana, and highest in Minnesota. Indiana, New York, Wisconsin,
and Pennsylvania are below the Great Lakes average, and Illinois, Michigan,
and Minnesota are above the average.
Table B26 presents the average benefit per worker data from Table B25,
and compares it to an estimate of employers' average yearly insurance
premiums per worker, a figure of the type developed in the comparison study
(the Michigan Eaployers' Costs Study). The average yearly net cost of
insurance as of July 1, 1978, for the 45 types of employers in the Great
Lakes states on average, was $148.51 per employee. The net cost of insurance
in Indiana was $52.78 (36 percent of the seven-state average), while the net
cost in Michigan was $227.24 (153 {ercent of the seven-state average).
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania also had a net cost of insurance which was below
the seven-state average, Illinois was within about seven percent of the
average, while Minnesota and New York were more than 30 percent above the
average.
The benefit and cost data presented in Table B26 may be compared in a
rough way, although one must do so with some trepidation. The data do
illustrate some interesting aspects of the benefits and costs of workers'
compensation on a relative basis, across the seven Great Lakes states.
Wisconsin, as might be expected, clearly has the most favorable relationship
between benefits paid to workers and insurance costs to employers of the
seven states. New York, on the other hand, clearly has the least favorable
relationship. Illinois and Minnesota are also relatively higher than the
seven-state average, Indiana and Pennsylvania slightly above the average, and
Michigan somewhat below the average. Given the nature of the data, an exact
judgment is impossible about whether Michigan employers as of 1978 were
receiving an appropriate value for their insurance dollars, but the rough
judgment is that they were. In essence, the high costs of workers'
compensation insurance in Michigan as of 1978 compared to other Great Lakes
states appear largely to be explained by the high benefits received by
Michigan workers compared to benefits in these other states.
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Table B26
Average Benefit per Worker, Employers' Net Cost of Insurance,
and Benefit/Cost Ratio, 19781, Seven States

Average Benefit eer Worker2
(dollars)
Benefit Relative
to 7-state Average
(Percentages)

Net Cost3
(dollars)

Benefit/ Cost
Ratio4
Cost Relative

to 7-state Average
(Percentages)

Seven-State
Average

166.32

100.00

148.51

100.00

1.12

IL

219.67

132.08

159 .28

107. 25

1.38

IN

61.63

37 .06

52.78

35.34

1.17

MI

230.21

138.41

227 .24

153.01

1.01

MN

274.56

165.08

194.12

130.71

1.41

NY

105.94

63.70

199.89

134.60

0.53

PA

144.59

86.93

123.86

83.40

1.17

WI

124.92

75.U

82.26

55.39

1.52

Source:

Average Benefit data from Table B25; Net Cost data from Martin W. Elson and John
F. Burton, Jr., "Workers' Compensation Insurance: Recent Trends in Employers
Costs," Monthly Labor Review, March 1981, Table 1.

Notes:

lSee
2see
3Net
4The

Note 2, Table Bl.
Note 4, Table B25.
cost is the average weekly insurance premium per worker, multiplied by 52.
Benefit/Cost ratio is the Average Benefit per Worker, divided by the Net Cost.

1983 Projected and Actual Premiums and Savings
Savings Due lo 1960-61 Amendments lo "Benefit
Provisions· ($32 million)

t
Savings Due to ·0pen
Competition· per Public Acts 7
and 8 of 1982. effective
1/1/83 ($229 million)

+
Premiums Actually
Paid by Michiga,

Commerctany Insured
Employers
($533 mmion)

Total Projected Premiums Without Recent Changes.............................. $794 m111ion
Actual Premiums Paid ......................................................................... - $533 million
TOTAL SAYINGS....................................................... $261 allllN

1984 Projected and Actual Premiums and Savings
Savings Due lo 1980-61 Amendments lo
Provisions· ($30 million)

Savings Due lo ·0pen

Competition· per Public Acts ....
7 and 8 of 1982. effective
111/63 ($212 million)

•eenent

•

Premi\11\S Actually
Paid by Michigan
Conmercially
Insured Employers
($493 million)

Total Projected Premiums Without Recent Changes.............................. $735 million
Actual Premiums Paid ......................................................................... - $493 million

TOTAL SAYINGS....................................................... 1242 ailliN

***
Turning to the period since 1978, Professor Burton reports some
significant changes in Michigan:
Although it is too early to provide a definitive assessment of the impact
of the 1980 and 1981 amendments to the Michigan workers' compensation law,
the data are consistent with the view that the amendments are having
significant effects on several aspects of the program. Permanent partial
cases as a percentage of all cases have declined about 30 percent in recent
years (Table B19), while attorney involvement (Table B20) and lump-sunauing
[redemptions] (Table B21) appear to have declined even more sharply. There
is no clear evidence that the amendments have affected the rela_tive
importance of permanent total disability cases (Table B19) or the proportion
of cases accounted for by workers over age 50 (Table B22). The latter finding
has some relevance for the retiree "problem" in Michigan; some feel that a
disproportionate share of benefits accrue to workers who have already reached
their normal retirement ages ••••
One conclusion that seems appropriate in light of the data in the two
studies is this: Given that the comparison between benefits and costs in
Michigan as of 1978 suggested that Michigan employers were receiving an
appropriate value, and given the evidence that the net impact of open
competition has been to reduce insurance costs about 30 percent below what
they otherwise would have been in 1984, then as of 1984, Michigan employers
are probably receiving a favorable benefits/costs ratio for workers'
compensation comp,red to employers in most other states.

***
In round figures, Professor Burton estimates that the 1980 and 1981
legislative reforms reduced benefit costs in Michigan on the order of 6.2
percent in 1983 and 1984. That would have amounted to a saving for insured
employers of about $32 million in 1983 and about $30 million in 1984. Since
self-insurers in Michigan provide approximately 40 percent of all benefits,
the savings for them would have been about $21 million in 1983 and about $20
million in 1984. If one adds in the cost savings previously discussed
attributable to open competition, one could fairly conclude that the business
conaunity in Michigan has been saved well o•er one-half billion dollars in
workers' coapensation costs in the last two years alone.
2. Benefit levels. During my extensive round of interviews with
representatives of organized labor, the business community, individual
employees, and other interested parties, there was surprisingly little
emphasis upon the issue of benefit levels as such. In addition to the full
payment of medlcal expenses, of course, the current standard for
compensation, as set by the 1980 amendment, is 80 percent of an employee's
after-tax wages, with a maximum of 90 percent of the State's average weekly
wage. The figure for each new calendar year is determined on the basis of
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Table B19
Permanent Total and Permanent Partial Injuries as
Percentage of Claims, Accident Years 1979-1983
Permanent Total

1979

1980

-1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

0.39

0.36

0.20

0.24

0.35

0.32

0.30

.92

18-month

0.47

0.38

0.24

0.27

0.36

·0.21

.75

30-month

0.46

0.43

0.35

Valuation Date

0.41

Permanent Partial

Valuation Date

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

6-month

7.51

7.22

7.14

5.86

4.77

18-month

10.91

10.46

11.11

7.38

30-month

11.85

11.33

11.77

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

7.29

5.32

.73

10.83

7.38

.68

1979-81

11.65

Source: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Detail Claim Call - State of Michigan
(Accident Year 1979-1983)."

Table B20
Attorney Involvement p·ercentage, All Injury Types and
Permanent Partial Injuries, Accident Years 1979-1983
All Injuries

1979

-1980

1981

-1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

17.26

17 .49

15.10

11.37

6.29

16.62

8.83

.53

18-month

20.52

21.49

17.93

13.33

19.98

13.33

.61

30-month

22.02

22.20

18.47

Valuation Date

20.90

Permanent Partial

1979

-1980

1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

71.69

64.92

56.35

50.41

20.91

64.32

35.66

.55

18-month

'10.14

66.39

59.54

51.43

65.36

51.43

•'19

30-month

'11.36

66.88

60.32

Valuation Date

Source:

See Table B19.

66.19

Table B21
Lump Summing Percentage, All Injuries and
Permanent Partial Injuries, Accident Years 1979-1983
All Injuries

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

7.28

6.30

4.73

2.90

2.21

6.10

2.56

.42

18-month

15.89

14.87

10.90

4.91

13.89

4.91

.35

30-month

16.91

15.58

11.21

Valuation Date

14.59

Permanent Partial

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

22.09

21.79

14.72

13.64

7.27

19.53

10.46

.54

18-month

46.46

43.47

37 .71

22.86

42.55

22.86

.54

30-month

46.39

43.35

37.23

Valuation Date

Source:

See Table B19.

42.32

Table B22
Percentage of Claims by Age Interval 50 and over
All Injuries and Permanent Partial Injuries, Accident Years 1979-1983
All Injuries

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

19.42

21.50

19.09

19.46

17.66

20.00

18.56

.93

18-month

19.49

21.52

19.06

19.44

20.02

19.44

.97

30-month

19.47

21.53

19.06

Valuation Date

20.02

Permanent Partial

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1979-81

1982-83

Ratio:
1982-83 to
1979-81

6-month

27.51

29.63

25.38

23.14

25.45

27 .51

24.30

.88

18-month

26.08

29.03

25.00

20.72

26.70

20.72

.78

30-month

25.71

28.79

25.16

Valuation Date

Source:

See Table B 19.

26.55

the prior year's average wage. The maximum in Michigan for 1984 is $334.00
per week. That represents a substantial improvement over the pre-1980 era,
when Michigan's maximum was two-thirds of the State's weekly wage, resulting
in a maximum benefit that was the second lowest (after Indiana) among our
neighboring states.
Nonetheless, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
recommended in 1972 that the maximum weekly benefit for temporary total
disability should be at least 100 percent of a state's average weekly wage as
of July 1, 1975, and at least 200 percent of it as of July 1, 1981. At
present 30 states and the Federal Longshoreman's and Harborworkers' Act meet
or surpass the 100 percent standard. These jurisdictions include the Great
Lakes states of Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
The inevitable effect of Michigan's lower cap is that a substantial
percentage of high-wage earners (for example, virtually all Big Three
employees) will actually have less than 80 percent of their spendable income
replaced. Yet Michigan's status as a high-wage jurisdiction still means that
its maximum weekly benefits compare favorably with most of the other Great
Lakes states:
State

Maximum Weekly Benefits

Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Minnesota
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

$463.44
156.00
334.00
313.00
255.00
335.00
320.00
305.00

(133. 33% SAWW)
(90% SAWW)
(100% SAWW)
(100% SAW)
(loo% SAWW)
(loo% SAW)

Furthermore, Michigan's current maximum incorporates the results of a
dramatic increase from $181.00 (with no dependents) in 1981 to $307.00 in
1982, a 70 percent increase in maximum benefits in a single year. Wholly
apart from the question of maxima, the previous figures provided by Professor
Burton indicated that Michigan is second only to Minnesota in the average
benefits provided for disabled workers. Finally, the state has only recently
emerged from a serious economic recession. For all these reasons, I join in
the earlier recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Workers'
Disability Compensation that no change be made in the basic benefits formula
at this time. Report of the Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability
Coapensation Upon the First Bi-4nonal Study of the Adequacy of Weekly
Benefits Paid Under the Workers' Disability Co.pensation Act (Aug. 12,
1983).
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The Bureau Director's report as a whole is a thoughtful, comprehensive
document, and deserves the closest reading. Perhaps its most telling
contribution is the demonstration of the ravages of inflation upon the
compensation due the long-term disabled employee. I therefore endorse the
general thrust of the concluding recommendations (id).:
The results of this study demonstrate what is known to most
persons involved in workers' compensation which is, long term
totally disabled employees have economic problems attributable to
fixing the weekly compensation rate at the year of injury.
Legislation creating the supplemental fund has addressed this
problem and the Bureau recommends that the Legislature continue
to consider legislation that will address the economic problems
of long term totally disabled employees who do not qualify for
the inflationary protection available to totally and permanently
disabled employees.
C.

General Observations

Although it is still too early for final judgments, all the preliminary
indications are that Michigan's workers' compensation system has undergone a
major transformation since 1980. Current insurance costs are probably down
about 30 percent as a result of open competition. Benefit reductions are
producing additional savings on the order of 6.2 percent. The business
community may be gaining by substantially more than $250 million a year.
Insurance rates adjusted to reflect the actual net cost to employers have now
declined to a level at or below the national average. Although they still
remain about 18 percent higher than the average of the rest of the Great
Lakes states (excluding Indiana), the margin has greatly narrowed in the last
few years. Clai1BS for workers' compensation have dropped by more than 40
percent just since 1982, and contested claims have dropped by almost 50
percent since 1981. At the same time, maximum weekly benefit levels were
substantially increased, effective in 1982, and special supplementary
benefits were provided to offset the adverse effect of inflation on long-term
disabled employees who were injured prior to December 31, 1979. Overall,
Michigan seems to have retained its position as a high-benefit compensation
state.
On the basis of all this, I draw one fundamental conclusion: It is
entirely too soon to seek further major amendments affecting the substantive
rights of eaployers or employees under Michigan's Worker's Disability
Coapensation Act. Much has been accomplished, especially for the business
community, but in certain important respects for workers as well. Just how
much, however, we cannot yet say with any certainty. Prudence would counsel
a pause for reflection while the outlines of what has already been wrought
grow clearer.

It would certainly be a mistake to engage in any further substantial
cutting of employee benefits at this time. On the other hand, I would
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recommend against any haste to restore the benefits eliminated in 1980 and
1981, until we have a far better notion of their exact economic impact on
both employer and employee. Specifically, the relief provided small
businesses employing temporary, or part-time, or low-wage help should be
allowed to stand for now. There is much to be said for abolishing the
"fictional 40-hour work week" and for absolving any given employer from
having to pay a "minimum weekly benefit" that might well be greater than the
wages actually earned. But the general exclusion of even the more readily
quantifiable forms of fringe benefits from the calculation of an employee's
average weekly wage is a question that should someday be revisited. In
addition, it can be said that in most states having weekly minimum payments,
the amount is so small as to be meaningless (the Great Lakes states of
Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are among the exceptions). But
in a more propitious economic climate, the State of Michigan should reexamine
how long-term disabled workers can be provided with a decent minimum weekly
benefit.
Similarly, I am satisfied that the "coordination of benefits" prov1s1ons
in the 1980 and 1981 amendments should remain in the statute, probably
permanently. The principle of avoiding duplicative payments under workers'
compensation and other income maintenance programs, such as private pensions
and Social Security, was endorsed by the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws, although the National Comission would have
preferred not to reduce the workers' compensation payments (Report at 57-58,
65-66). As will be discussed in more detail later, the coordination
arrangements have also served to check, if not eradicate, one of the most
criticized aspects of Michigan's workers' compensation system, namely, the
payment of disability benefits to retired workers who almost by definition
are suffering no wage loss. As I understand it, organized labor is not so
much opposed to the concept of coordination of benefits as to its application
even in situations where noncoordination would not have resulted in a
worker's receiving more than he would have earned if working. There is some
merit in this view, but it is offset by the long-standing notion that income
replacement should not be total lest it prove a disincentive to work, and
that in any event an unemployed person will be spared certain daily expenses
incurred by an active worker. Concededly, the impact of inflation may cut
against this argument, but that I believe is a problem which ought to be
addressed directly.
Many of these issues lend themselves best to cool, deliberate, unhurried
inquiry, away from the immediate pressures of statutory drafting. They are
prime candidates for consideration by a continuing bipartisan advisory body
of interested parties, of the sort I shall discuss later in this report.
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IV.
A.

DISABILITY ABD OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

Disability and the Effects of Subsequent Employment

1. Definitional probleas. Over the past decade one of the fiercest
controversies concerning workers' compensation has centered on the definition
of "disability." Before the 1981 amendments, the statute contained no
definition of "disability" specifically applicable to personal injuries. For
many years, however, a definition of "disability" had appeared in Chapter 4
of the Act, which deals with occupational disease. Section 418.401 of MCL
defines "disability" as the "state of being disabled from earning full wages
at the work in which the employee was last subject to the conditions
resulting in disability."
In the absence of an express statutory definition for "disability" in the
case of personal injury, the Michigan courts developed one which became
almost unique in American law. The starting point was a long-existing
provision which declared that an employee's wage loss should be based on "the
proportionate extent of the impairment of the employee's earning capacity in
the employments covered by this act in which the employee was working at the
time of the personal injury" (emphasis supplied). MCL § 418. 371(1).
Although this section dealt directly only with the basis of determining wage
loss, not the definition of disability, the courts concluded in effect that
disability should be defined as "inability to do the work the claimant was
doing at the time of injury." See 2 A. Larson, Workaen's Compensation Law
§ 57.22; Kaarto v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich. 128 (1962); Tury v.
General Motors Corp., 80 Mich. App. 379 (1978), leave denied, 402 Mich. 908
(1978). By contrast, compensable disability is more commonly defined as
"inability, as the result of work-connected injury, to perform or obtain work
suitable to claiaant's qualifications and training" (emphasis supplied). 2
A. Larson, supra§ 57.22, p. 10-103. (For an effort to incorporate this more
standard definition of "disability" into Michigan law, see S.B. 1178, 78th
Mich. Leg. Reg. Sess., § 40l(a)(1975).)
In the words of the country's preeminent legal authority on workers'
compensation, Professor Arthur Larson, the Michigan approach led to
interpretations of total disability which amounted to "sheer freakishness."
Id., p. 10-118. Depending on the circumstances, either the employer or the
employee could be the victim. Thus, in one case, a motor tester who had
suffered a broken arm was considered totally disabled because he could not
continue to work as a motor tester, even though he was earning just as much
in the equally skilled and closely related job of motor inspector. Geis v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 214 Mich. 646 (1921). On the other hand, a skilled
coal miner who had suffered burns on his hands and face in a mine explosion
was regarded as having no permanent disability at all, despite being left
with serious sensitivity to extreme temperatures. The reason was that the
miner was able to resume work in the relatively constant temperature of the
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mine. When the region's mines later closed for economic reasons, the injured
miner discovered that he could not work as a common laborer, since he could
not stand the summer heat or winter cold. The Michigan Supreme Court
concluded, reluctantly, that he was not entitled to workers' compensation
because he was not impaired in "the employment in which he was working at the
time of the injury." Kaarto v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich. 128 (1962).
Michigan's emphasis upon the particular employment in which an employee
was working at the time of injury led to an important distinction between the
treatment of skilled and unskilled workers. If a skilled worker could not
resume his former job, like the motor tester in Geis, supra, he would be
totally disabled, even though he was entirely capable of performing equally
skilled and equally well-paid work. At the same time, if he could return to
his former duties, like the burned coal miner in Kaarto. supra, then he was
not disabled at all, even though he was physically impaired in a way that
would prevent him from performing a variety of other jobs within his
pre-injury capabilities. On the other hand, an unskilled worker is at least
partially disabled if a work-related injury limits in any way his or her
capacity to compete in the general field of common labor. It is not critical
whether an unskilled worker can return to his own particular job. See, e.g.,
Adair v. Metropolitan Building Co., 38 Mich. App. 393 (1972). The practical
effect, at least prior to the 1981 amendments, was that a skilled worker was
usually totally disabled, if disabled at all, while an unskilled worker with
a permanent impairment was ordinarily just partially disabled (unable to
perform some job in the field of common labor), but not totally disabled
(unable to perform any job as a common laborer). For a fuller discussion of
these distinctions, see E. Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan§§
8.02-8.06, pp. 78-84 (1984).
The possibility that an employee having a statutory disability but
getting equal pay in a substitute job could obtain a "double dip" by securing
workers' compensation benefits in addition to his new income (Geis, supra)
was laid to rest in 1927 when the State Legislature added what is now the
last sentence of MCL § 418.371(1): "The compensation payable, when added to
the employee's wage earning capacity after the personal injury in the same or
other employments, shall not exceed the employee's average weekly earnings at
the time of the injury." This provision did not, however, change the basic
definition of "disability"; it simply provided for an offset of compensation
benefits to the extent of substitute earnings in a new job.
By Public Act 200 of 1981, the Legislature finally provided a definition
of "disability" to cover personal injuries. "Disability" was defined as a
"limitation of an employee's wage earning capacity in the employee's general
field of eaployment resulting from a personal injury or work related disease"
(emphasis supplied). The provision adds: "The establishment of disability
does not create a presumption of wage loss." MCL § 418.301(4). As yet we
have no definitive interpretations of this new section by the Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board or the courts. One of the possible effects of the
phraseology, "limitation of ••• wage earning capacity in the employee's general
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field of employment," might be to obliterate some of the more artificial
distinctions between disabilities incurred by skilled and unskilled workers,
as discussed above. That would be a salutary result. But for all the talk
about "tightening up" the definition of "disability," I doubt that the new
1981 definition of disability as such will have much impact on the typical
compensation case. Indeed, as pointed out in a most perceptive article by
former Appeal Board Chairman Michael J. Gillman, the real focus of Public Act
200 shifted from the definition of disability to the so-called "favored work"
process, that is, the effect on benefit entitlement resulting from a disabled
employee's subsequent employment in another job. See Gillman, "The Rise and
Fall of Reasonableness: Favored Employment in Michigan Workers'
Compensation," 1 Cooley L. Rev. 177, 205-06 (1982). We shall deal with the
Legislature's treatment of subsequent employment shortly.
Before turning to the more significant aspects of Public Act 200, we
should understand why the importance of the exact scope of "disability" in
t~e Michigan compensation system has probably been much exaggerated. There
are, to speak rather broadly, two principal theories of disability
compensation in this country. One is the "physical impairment" theory and
the other is the "wage loss" theory. An impairment jurisdiction will attempt
to measure the extent of any disability in terms of a certain percentage of a
"whole" healthy person. This may be done by resort to a predetermined
"schedule," under which the loss of a hand is fixed as a 30 percent
disability and the loss of vision in one eye as a 25 percent disability. Or
else there may be an ad hoc determination on the basis of medical testimony,
for example, that a back injury in a particular case constitutes a 20 percent
or a 40 percent disability. These percentages are then translated into a
certain number of weeks of compensation, on the basis that the "whole" person
represents so many total weeks, that is, 600, 1,000, or whatever. Advantages
of the physical impairment theory include the grant of some economic "balm"
to every injured worker, regardless of whether he or she suffers any loss of
earnings, and the certainty of the amount of the employee's benefits and the
employer's liability, once the percentage of disability is set.
Disadvantages include the enormous difficulty of fixing the percentage of
disability in cases of unscheduled injuries, and the incapacity of the
physical impairment theory to reflect accurately the widely varying economic
impact of particular injuries on particular people. The loss of the little
finger of a left hand may mean almost nothing to the livelihood of a
practicing attorney, for example, but be absolutely devastating to a concert
pianist.
The "wage loss" theory, which has enjoyed a resurgence of support in
recent years and of which Michigan has long been regarded as a prime
exponent, operates quite differently. See generally 2 A. Larson, Workmen's
Coapensation Lav§ 57.14(g)~(j). The central idea is that each injured
worker will be treated individually, and will receive, in addition to
necessary medical expenses, a percentage of his or her actual wage loss (or,
more precisely, loss of earning capacity), however short or long that loss
may continue. The key advantage of this approach, of course, is that it

25

adapts much more readily to the widely varying circumstances of given cases.
The lawyer who has lost the little finger on his left hand will receive
little or nothing; the concert pianist with the same injury will be entitled
to benefits until reasonable alternative employment is made available. That
very advantage is also the main disadvantage; the duration of entitlement may
be quite uncertain at the time of an award, and the employer faces the
potential of life-long liability. In practice this element of uncertainty
has led many employees and employers to settle or compromise claims by
so-called "redemptions," discussed elsewhere in this report. Redemptions
usually consist of lump-sum settlements, but they may also be "structured" to
provide for fixed payments over a fixed period of time. In any event, their
effect is to make the Michigan wage-loss system function much more like an
impairment-rating system by standardizing the amounts paid for typical
classes of injury.
The most important point to be gleaned from all this analysis is that in
a wage-loss system, such as Michigan's, once "disability" is established, the
extent of disability makes little or no difference. As long as the
disability continues, however slight it may seem in terms of physical
impairment, full compensation benefits will at least theoretically be due
from the employer. Inability to earn wages in fact will presumptively be the
measure of the loss of wage earning capacity. Whether an employee is
technically "totally disabled" or "partially disabled" is unimportant as a
practical matter. In either case he or she will receive full benefits under
Michigan law if substitute employment is not proffered.
There are several significant qualifications to this rule. First, as
mentioned earlier, MCL § 418.371(1) (supplemented now by§ 418.301(5)(b))
provides for an offset against any earnings by the employee in other work.
(Section 418.301 (S)(b) also seems to limit all employees, whether "totally"
or "partially" diabled, to 80 percent of the difference in after-tax wages in
the pre-injury and post-injury jobs; formerly, § 418.361(1) so limited only
workers with a "partial" incapacity. "Totally" disabled workers could
receive 100 percent of the difference.) Second, an employee cannot receive
wage loss benefits while he refuses, "without good and reasonable cause," to
accept a "bona fide offer of reasonable employment" from his previous
employer, another employer, or the Michigan Employment Security Commission.
MCL § 418.301(5)(a). Finally, as we shall explore more thoroughly later, any
subsequent employment of substantial duration may result in establishing a
new "wage earning capacity," with significant effects upon a worker's
entitlement to continuing compensation.
The notion that a disability of any degree will create the possibility of
life-long benefits will undoubtedly be viewed by the injured worker as no
more than his fair entitlement. If his continuing incapacity, or even
recurrence of incapacity, to match his wage level at the time of injury can
be traced back to that initial injury, why should not his entitlement to
compensation parallel that loss of earnings or of earning capacity? On the
other hand, what the employer sees is an employee with only a moderate

26

physical impairment who is hardly worse off, in the sense of employability,
than many other fellow unemployed workers in a recessionary or underemploying
economy. In essence, the employer sees the workers' compensation system
being transformed into a specialized high-benefit unemployment compensation
program.
The sad fact, as I see it, is that both the employee and the employer are
right, from their particular perspectives. The Michigan system should seem
entirely fair to all parties in periods of relatively full employment.
Either the case law or the new statutory definition of "disability" may or
may not be rather generous in sweeping injured workers within the coverage of
the system. But such workers lose their entitlement to benefits if they
unreasonably refuse bona fide offers of alternative employment,. and the
compensation due them is reduced proportionately by their earnings in any
employment. The rub comes when that other employment is not available, or is
available only intermittently.
My conclusion is that the solution to the problea probably does not lie
in further tinkering at this time with the new statutory definition of
"disability." If I could write on a clean slate, I would prefer to see the
Michigan definition brought even closer into the mainstream of American law
by declaring that "disability" means a "limitation of an employee's wage
earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training
resulting from a personal injury or work related disease." That would simply
substitute Professor Larson's classic formulation of "work suitable to
claimant's qualifications and training" for the "employee's general field of
employment" as contained in Public Act 200 of 1981. At least that might serve
to reassure those who believe that the State's definition of "disability" is
a major flaw in our compensation system. But it would probably be of small
practical consequence. Moreover, the current statutory language was the
product of a hard-fought legislative battle, with give and take on all
sides. There is something to be said for letting the contending parties rest
with their respective gains and losses, at least until we have a considerably
clearer picture of just what those may be. While it has been suggested in
certain reputable quarters that the Legislature was actually doing no more
than codifying the case law on "disability," I am satisfied that the phrase
"general field of employment" (emphasis supplied) should at least rid us of
such sillier constructions of the former law as Kaarto (the burned miner
case).

The only way to have a dramatic impact upon eligibility for wage loss
benefits by a change in the definition of "disability" would appear to be
through the adoption of the sort of extremely strict definition employed in
Social Security disability determinations.. There it is provided that
an individual ••• shall be determined under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
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engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work. 42 U.s.c. § 423(d)(2)(A).
But that definition was designed for a program whose purpose was to provide
benefits for injured workers expected to die or remain disabled for at least
twelve months; its harshness is totally inconsistent with the conception of
disability under the workers' compensation laws of this country generally;
and I cite it only to indicate the lengths to which one would have to go to
impose significant further limitations on eligibility for benefits under a
wage loss system simply through a redefinition of "disability."
One could also redraw the boundaries of compensation entitlement by
redefining disability in such a way as to import modified notions of
causation, aggravation of preexisting condition, apportionment of liability
as between work-related and nonwork-related activities, and so on. But that
would be to load down the concept of "disability" with a pile of baggage that
is really quite foreign to its proper function. The problems of causation,
aggravation, and the rest are quite genuine ones, but they deserve to be
treated on their own merits, and not smuggled into a consideration of
"disability." The Legislature was on sounder ground in 1981 when it
expressed its apparent disapproval of such grosser excesses as Geis and
Kaarto, defined "disability" in fairly general terms, and left it to the
process of case-by-case interpretation to shape the contours of the term more
precisely.
To summarize, the choice may lie between a more restrictive definition of
"disability" and the retention of the sensible, individualized, and
ultiaately fairer wage-loss theory of workers' compensation. The inherent
superiority of the wage-loss principle should not be sacrificed to some
superficially appealing and expedient gains that might be derived from
greater emphasis on a physical impairment concept. To my mind, attention
would better be directed to the quite practical problem that so engaged the
energies of the 1981 Legislature, namely, the consequences of a disabled
employee's subsequent employment and loss of that employment while still
disabled.
2. Effect of subsequent eaploy.ent. It is now well accepted that a
partially disabled employee cannot remain idle when work is available that is
reasonable in light of his or her existing capacity. That is often known as
the "favored work" doctrine. Former Appeal Board Chairman Michael Gillman
summarized the law in Michigan as it stood before the 1981 legislative
amendments in the following terms:
[A] partially disabled employee may be offered work which fits
his reduced wage-earning capacity. The burden of proving with
adequate specificity the nature of the work, and the capacity of
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the worker to perform it is initially upon the employer. The
offer must be reasonable in all aspects, with that determination
a fact-finding to be made by the administrative agencies. Upon
such showing, the burden shifts to plaintiff to either accept the
offered work or explain a refusal. Such refusals are then
lik~wise tested as to reasonableness under all the circumstances,
a fact-finding determination of the agencies. As a matter of
law, refusal to perform because the employee's bargaining unit is
on strike bars benefits. As does a discharge from such favored
work resulting from the employee's act of moral turpitude or
predicated upon "just cause." Factual elements in determination
of the employer or employee's reasonableness, but specifically
not dispositive as a matter of law, include: (1) employee's place
of residence, (2) date of job offer, (3) medical opinions on
employee's capacity, (4) offers of non-union employment, (5)
location of the job offered, (6) extent of other on-going
rehabilitation efforts. Arguably, "moral turpitude" and "just
cause" for discharge will likewise be factual determinations
protected from judicial invasion by Article VI, Section 28 of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963. Gillman, "The Rise and Fall of
Reasonableness: Favored Employment in Michigan Workers'
Compensation," 1 Cooley L. Rev. 177, 211 (1982).
There were several other significant elements in the favored work
doctrine, as Mr. Gillman indicates elsewhere in his article. For example, an
unreasonable refusal of favored work did not result in a permanent forfeiture
of all future benefits, but only in the suspension of the right to
compensation during the period of the refusal. Id. at 201. Furthermore, an
unreasonable refusal to take favored work paying a lower wage than the
employee's average weekly wage at the time of injury did not result in the
loss of all right to compensation; the worker remained entitled to benefits
based upon the difference between his wages at the time of injury and the
lesser rate of the job he refused. Id. at 196, citing Sims v. J. A. Utley
Co., 1955 WCABO 642, and Howard v. Eberhard Foods, Inc., 1981 WCABO 1004. In
effect, the employee was treated just as if he had taken the job at the
lesser wage, which also would have proportionately reduced (but not
eliminated) his entitlement to benefits.
There is a knottier problem about the effect of subsequent employment.
If the employee accepts the proffered favored work, and then proves incapable
of performing it, he or she is obviously entitled to continuing benefits.
Similarly, it has been held that if the favored work terminates for reasons
beyond the employee's control, such as a plant shutdown or nonwork-related
health problems, benefits should also be resumed. E.g., Powell v. Casco
Nelmor Corp., 406 Mich. 332 (1979); Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 412 Mich.
172 (1981). Nonetheless, it can be argued that under Michigan law the key to
compensation benefits is the loss of "wage earning capacity," not the loss of
wages as such, and that an employee's successful handling of a new position
for any substantial period of time has in effect established a new wage
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earning capacity.
terms:

Professor Arthur Larson deals with the problem in these

On the one hand, if the intervening job had continued only a few
days, it would seem unconscionable to deny compensation. On the
other hand, if a worker has become established in a new line of
work, there obviously must be a limit beyond which he cannot
reach back and claim disability because of the impossibility of
going back to his original disabling job. These cases will
probably have to be solved by asking whether the duration and
presumable permanence of the new job was sufficient to justify
the conclusion that claimant had become established in a new line
of work for which he had demonstrated his fitness and with whose
economic prospects his fortunes would thereafter have to rise and
fall. 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law§ 57.62, pp.
10-164.132 - 164.133.
What is at stake, fundamentally, has been alluded to previously. The
workers' compensation law is designed to provide benefits for workers who
have lost the capacity for gainful employment as a result of work-related
1nJuries. It is not a premium form of unemployment compensation. Once an
employee has truly established a new wage earning capacity through
post-injury employment, the only continuing loss of capacity is the
difference (if any) between his new earnings level and his earnings level at
the time of the injury. The employee can properly be considered as a newly
reconstituted economic unit. Under this analysis, termination of his
subsequent employment is then primarily a matter for relief under the usual
unemployment compensation provisions.
In a long series of cases, the Michigan courts have wrestled with the
question of when a post-injury employment' does or does not establish a new
wage earning capacity. The closest they seem to have come to articulating a
rational standard for distinguishing the two situations is to say that if an
employee accepts "favored work" in the sense of a temporary position of
limited demands as a concession to his disability, he has not acquired a new
wage earning capacity, while if he accepts a "recognized regular employment,
with the ordinary conditions of permanency," he has established such a new
capacity. See, e.g., Markey v. SS. Peter & Paul's Parish, 281 Mich. 292,
299-300 (1937); Pulley v. Detroit Engineering & Machine Co., 378 Mich. 418
(1966); Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp., supra (dissenting opinion).
Complications arose, however, when the term "favored work" was apparently
extended to almost any kind of subsequent employment undertaken by a disabled
worker. That left little if any logical basis for distinguishing between
employment establishing and not establishing a new wage earning capacity by
an examination of the nature of the work itself. Indeed, one knowledgeable
practitioner-commentator has suggested that all the actual holdings of the
Michigan cases on this point can be reconciled by ignoring the nature of the
work and concentrating instead on the reason for its termination. If the
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employee was responsible for interrupting it, he would be treated as having
established a new wage earning capacity; otherwise, not. E. Welch, Worker's
Compensation in Michigan§ 10.14, pp. 116-18 (1984).
The Legislature came to grips with the problem of favored work or
post-injury employment in Public Act 200 of 1981 in provisions now found in
MCL § 418.301(5) - (9):
Sec. 301. (1) An employee, who receives a personal iajury arising out of and in
the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of
the iajury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. In the case of death
resulting from the personal iajury to the employee, compensation shall be paid to
the employee's dependents as provided in this act. Time of injury or date of iajury
as used in this act in the case of a disea,e or in the case of an iajury not attributable
to a sinsle event shall be the last day of work in the employment in which the
employee was last subjected to the conditions that resulted in the employee's
disability or death.
(2) Mental disabilities and conditions of the aaina process, includin1 but not
limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed
to or agravatecl or accelerated by the employment in a sipiflcant manner. Mental
disabilities shall be compensable when arisin1 out of ac:tual events of employment,
not unfounded perceptions thereof.
(3) An employee 1oin1 to or from his or her work, while on the premises where
the employee's work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and
after his or her workin1 hours, is presumed to be in the coune of bis or her
employment. Notwithstandin1 this presumption, an illiury incurred in the pursuit of
an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under
this act. Any cause of action brought for such an iajury is not subject to section
131.

(4) As used in this chapter, "disability" means a limitation of an employee's
wa,e earnin1 capacity in the employee's general field of employment resultin1 from
a personal iajury or work related disease. The establishment of disability does not
create a presumption of wa,e loss.
(5) IC disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), entitlement to weekly
wqe loss benefits shall be determined pursuant to this section and as follows:
(al If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from
previous employer, another employer, or throuab the Michiaan employment
security commission and the employee refuses that employment without good and
reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed
himself or herself from the work force and is no longer entidcd to any wage loss
benefits under this act during the period of such refusal.
(b) If an employee is employed and the average weekly wqe of the employee is
Jess than that which the employee received before the date of injury, the employee
shall receive weekly benefits under this act equal to 80% of the difference between
the injured employee· s after-tax weekly wage before the date of iajury and the
after-tax weekly wage which the iajured employee is able to earn after the date of
injury, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as
determined under section 355.
(c) If an employee is employed and the average weekly wage of the employee is
equal to or more than the average weekly wage the employee received before the
date of iajury, the employee is not entided to any wage loss benefits under this act
for the duration of such employment.
(d) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this subsection for
100 weeks or more loses his or her job through no fault of the employee, the
employee shall receive compensation under this act pursuant to the followin1:
(i) If after exhaustion of unemployment benefit eligibility of an employee, an
administrative law judge determines for any employee covered under subdivision
(d), that the employments since the time of iajury have not established a new wqe
eamin1 capacity, the employee shall receive compensation based upon his or her
wqe at the original date of iajury. There is a presumption of wa,e earnin1 capacity
established for employments totalling 250 weeks or more.
(ii) The employee must still be disabled as determined pursuant to subsection (4).
If the employee is still disabled, be or she shall be entitled to wage loss benefits
based on the difference between the normal and customary wages paid to those
persons performing the same or similar employment, as determined at the time of
termination of the employment of the employee, and the wages paid at the time of
the i,tjury.
(iii) If the employee becomes reemployed and the employee is still disabled, he or
she shall then receive wqe loss benef"rts as provided in subdivision (b).
(e) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this subsection for
less than 100 weeks loses his or her job for whatever reason, the employee shall
receive compensation based upon his or her wage at the original date of iajury.
(6) A carrier shall notify the Michigan employment security commission of the
name of any injured employee who is unemployed and to which the carrier is
paying benefits under this act.
(7) The Michipn employment security commission shall give priority to finding
employment for those persons whose names are supplied to the commission under
subsection (6).
(8) The Michigan employment security commission shall notify the bureau in
writing of the namt of any employee who refpses any bona fide offer of reasonable
employment. Upon notification to the bureau, the bureau shall notify the carrier
who shall terminate the benefits of the employee pursuant to subsection (5)(a).
(9) "Reasonable employment", as used in this section, means work that is within
the employee's capacity to perform that poses no clear and proximate threat to that
employee's health and safety, and that is within a reasonable distance from that
employee's residence. The employee's capacity to perform shall not be limited 10
JObs in his or her general field of employment.
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Provisions that are generally parallel to the above were added to Chapter 4
of the Act, covering occupational diseases, by Public Act 199 of 1981; these
are now found in MCL § 418.401(3) - (7).
Former Appeal Board Chairman Michael Gillman provides a comprehensive and
highly critical analysis of this new legislation in his article, "The Rise
and Fall of Reasonableness: Favored Employment in Michigan Workers'
Compensation," 1 Cooley L. Rev. 177-214 (1982). Mr. Gillman objects that the
new amendments draw harsh and arbitrary lines between different groups of
employees engaged in favored work; that they ignore subtle and salutary
refinements in the rules established by the preexisting case law, sometimes
to the detriment of employers and sometimes to the detriment of employees;
and that the amendments are inherently contradictory and confusing. Id. at
204-10. Mr. Gillman recommends that Public Act 199 and 200 be repealed and
the case law reinstituted, with some minor modifications. Id. at 210-14.
There is much merit to the Gillman critique. But he may fail to take
adequate account of the underlying problem recognized by Professor Larson,
and dealt with in rather fumbling fashion by the Michigan courts for nearly
half a century. After an eaployee bas undertaken a "recognized regular
eaployment, with the ordinary conditions of permanency," and bas performed it
for a certain period of ti.ae, it may be only fair to treat bia or her as
having acquired a new ''wage earning capacity," which now must govern future
benefit entitleaent in the event of the tennnation of that subsequent
employment. There is some heavy-handedness in the legislative methodology,
but the idea of linking certain fixed time periods with the establishment of
a new wage earning capacity (at least presumptively) may have more to commend
it than the courts' apparent approach of letting everything turn on the
employee's responsibility for the termination of the post-injury work.
The 1981 amendments retain the framework of the judicially developed
favored work doctrine, but make numerous changes in it, some minor but a
number quite substantial. For example, MCL § 418.301(5)(a) enunciates the
basic concept that an employee must have a reasonable cause for rejecting a
bona fide offer of reasonable employment, or else he or she will lose the
right to wage loss benefits during the period of the refusal. The amendment
adds the quite acceptable but practically rather insignificant element that
the offer may come from another employer or through the Michigan Employment
Security Commission, as well as from the employee's own previous employer.
Another change is more important. At least literally, the section
disqualifies an employee who unjustifiably rejects a good offer from "any
wage loss benefits" during the period of the refusal, while the case law
would still entitle him or her to benefits based upon the difference between
the wages at the time of injury and the wages that could have been received
in the subsequent employment. Thus, under Appeal Board precedent, a worker
making $200 a week prior to injury who declines a reasonable job offer at
$150 a week would still have been entitled to benefits based upon a $50 a
week wage loss. The new statutory language would seem to preclude any
entitlement.
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By far the most troubling of the new provisions is MCL § 418.JOl(d) and
(e). If a disabled employee obtains subsequent employment for less than 100
weeks and then loses his or her job "for whatever reason," the employee is
entitled to compensation based on "his or her wage at the original date of
injury" (subsection (e)). That seems to create a conclusive presumption
against the establishment of a new wage earning capacity for the employee
whose post-injury job lasts less than 100 weeks. It is more favorable to the
employee than the pre-amendment case law, because it makes it irrelevant
whether the job is terminated by the employee voluntarily, because of his
fault, or for reasons beyond the employee's control. (Inexplicably, the
parallel provision in MCL § 418.401{3)(e), applicable to occupational
diseases, provides that for terminations in less than 100 weeks, benefits
based on the original wage will only be paid if the subsequent job is lost
"through no fault of the employee." This inconsistency was probably the
result of legislative inadvertence. It should be remedied, because it
introduces one more unnecessary basis for litigation over whether a
particular disability falls within the coverage of Chapter 3 (personal
injury) or Chapter 4 (occupational diseases). In neither instance is it
clear whether the "100 weeks" must be consecutive or may be cumulative.)
If the employment lasts 250 weeks or longer, there is a presumption that
a new wage earning capacity has been established (subsection (d)(i)). For
employments lasting at least 100 weeks but less than 250 weeks, a more
elaborate procedure is established. Subsections (d)(i) and (d)(ii) seem to
apply to two different situations. Both require that the job be lost
"through no fault of the employee" (subsection (d)). Both seem to assume the
"exhaustion of unemployment benefit eligibility," which sounds like an
absolute prerequisite to any compensation benefits, although it would appear
fairer merely to offset the unemployment benefits. Cf. MCL § 418.358. Then,
if an administrative law judge determines that the employee has not
established a new wage earning capacity, compensation will be paid "based
upon his or her wage at the original date of injury" (subsection (d)(i)).
Subsection (d)(ii), on the other hand, would apparently apply to those
situations where the administrative law judge does not make such a
determination, that is to say, where a new wage earning capacity has been
established. If the employee is still disabled, he is entitled to wage loss
benefits, but only on the basis of the difference between the "normal and
customary wages" paid at the time of termination and the wages paid at the
time of the initial injury.
Unfortunately, the relationship between subsections (d)(i) and (d)(ii) is
sufficiently confusing that as astute an interpreter as Michael Gillman
believes that even an employee who has not established a new wage earning
capacity is only entitled to compensation ''based upon the difference between
the wage at tiae of injury and 'normal and customary wages paid to those
persons performing the same or similar employment' as he was performing at
the time he was terminated. In effect, for benefit purposes, he is deemed to
be still working!" Gillman, supra, 1 Cooley L. Rev. at 208-09 (emphasis in
the original). While the Gillman analysis is certainly not inconceivable, he
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himself stresses that it would lead to "incredible" results, and I think
there are several reasons for not attributing such a scheme to the
Legislature.
First, if subsections (d)(i) and (d)(ii) both apply to the same
situation, namely, where an administrative law judge has determined that an
employee has not established a new wage earning capacity, this means that the
Legislature has left totally uncovered the situation where the employee has
established such a new capacity. Second, interpreting the provisions as I
have suggested above would be much more in conformity with the prior case
law, and the Legislature is always presumed to have acted in light of
existing precedent. Third, subsection (d)(iii), which is also applicable to
the employee who has worked for 100 weeks or more, states that if such
employee becomes reemployed while still disabled, he or she shall then
receive benefits "as provided in subdivision (b)." Subsection 5(b) in turn
provides for the standard payment based upon the differential between the
employee's wage before injury and the wage the employee is able to earn
afterwards. That would mean, under the Gillman reading, that the reemployed
worker could be getting almost exactly the same differential compensation
benefits under subsection (d)(iii) as an unemployed worker who had not
established a new wage earning capacity under subsections (d)(i) and
(d)(ii). If it can be avoided, such an incongruity should not be regarded as
the intent of the Legislature. Finally, the authoritative and
contemporaneous analysis by the Senate Analysis Section, dated January 7,
1982, quite plainly regards the employee terminated after 100 or more weeks
who has not established a new wage earning capacity as entitled to
"compensation based on his or her average weekly wage at the time of the
injury" (p. 3). It is only the 100-plus week employee about whom such a
determination has not been made, that is, one who has presumably established
a new wage earning capacity, who is relegated to differential benefits (id.)
Superficially, subsection 5(e) might seem to give the employee terminated
from a post-injury job lasting less than 100 weeks a considerable, and
perhaps unjustified, advantage over similarly situated employees under the
preexisting case law since subsection 5(e) applies when the job is lost "for
whatever reason." But at least this could not cover a voluntary quit,
because that would conflict with the obvious purpose of subsection (5)(a),
which suspends benefits during any period in which an employee is refusing
without good cause a bona fide offer of reasonable employment. Beyond that,
the more favorable treatment accorded the 100-minus week employee under
Public Act 200 of 1981 can fairly regarded as a pragmatic legislative
trade-off to counterbalance the less favorable treatment accorded employees
terminated after 100 or more weeks.
As indicated earlier, MCL § 418.301, as amended by Public Act 200 of
1981, has not yet received any extensive interpretation by the Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board or by the courts. If interpreted reasonably, and
in light of the preexisting case law on favored work and the establishment of
a new wage earning capacity, the new amendments on the effect of subsequent
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employment could provide the basis for a decent balance between employer and
employee interests, and for greater predictability of result in any given
case. For two years after undertaking a new job, a disabled employee would
be better off than under the former case law. For the next three years he or
she would be in about the same position. After approximately five years, the
employee would be presumed, at least in the absence of unusual circumstances,
to have established a new wage earning capacity, and to be subject to the
same economic vicissitudes affecting all other fellow workers. While the
statute could well stand technical amendments to ensure clarification of soae
of the more obvious drafting lapses, the underlying rationale for the new
provisions is sufficiently defensible to merit a trial by experience. This
is especially true if it would help avoid still another bitter confrontation
between strong opposing forces, which will inevitably divide the Legislature
and divert it from other vital tasks in the workers' compensation area and
elsewhere as well.
B.

Occupational Diseases

1. In general. Only a scant two pages were devoted to "work-connected
diseases" in the R.eport of the Rational Coaai.ssion on State Workmen's
Coapensation Laws in 1972. Id. at S0-51. The former Chairman, Professor John
F. Burton, Jr., of Cornell has since commented that it is "unimaginable" that
the subject would be handled in such a "facile fashion" during the 1980s.
Among the reasons are the increasing awareness of the magnitude of the
problem of occupational diseases, and the difficulty of dealing with them
through the workers' compensation system. There is no doubt about the
significance of claims based upon an allegation of occupational disease. A
recent study of some 1200 litigated cases in the Michigan system disclosed
that 25.6% involved a claim of occupational disease only, while an additional
32.7% involved claims of both occupational disease and personal injury. H.
A. Hunt, Workers' Coapensation Systea in Michigan 106-08 (1982). Thus,
almost 60% of all the litigated cases asserted an element of occupational
disease. In light of the inherent difficulties presented by such.claims, as
will be discussed in more detail shortly, we might fairly conclude that the
relatively greater attention paid to occupational disease in recent years is
one of the principal causes of the current high rate of contested cases.
In an early decision under the Michigan workers' compensation law, Adams
v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157 (1914), the Supreme Court
interpreted the coverage formula's "personal injury" requirement
restrictively, limiting it to disabilities resulting from an "accident," an
unexpected, fortuitous event. Occupational diseases were expressly declared
noncompensable. The Legislature eventually responded, first in 1937 by
providing compensation for 31 "scheduled" diseases, and then in 1943 by
eliminating the schedule and defining "personal injury" to include "a disease
or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic
of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and
in the course of employment." The provision is nowMCL § 418.40l(2)(b),
which goes on to state:
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An ordinary disease of life to which the public is generally
exposed outside of the employment is not compensable. llental
disabilities and conditiona of the aging process, including but
not li.aited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be
ccapenaable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the
911Ployment in a significant manner. llental disabilities shall be
coapenaable when arising out of actual events of eaployaent, not
unfounded perceptions thereof. A hernia to be compensable must
be clearly recent in origin and result from a strain arising out
of and in the course of the employment and be promptly reported
to the employer. (Emphasis supplied.)
The boldface language was added by Public Act 357 of 1980, and took effect
January 1, 1982. The 1972 National Commission formally recommended "that the
'arising of and in the course of the employment' test be used to determine
coverage of injuries and diseases. Report at 50. The same approach was
adopted in the Model Act drafted by the Council of State Governments, which
Professor Arthur Larson declares had the "full concurrence of some of the
country's most experienced representatives of business, labor, insurance,
medicine, law, and administration." In this respect the language in MCL
S 418.401, "due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and
peculiar to the business of the employer," is plainly more restrictive than
the recommendations of the National Commission or the Council of State
Governments.
The term "disability" as used in Chapter 4, dealing with occupational
diseases, is defined as "the state of being disabled from earning full wages
at the work in which the employee was last subject to the conditions
resulting in disability." MCL S 418.401(1). Everything here seems to turn
on the employee's capacity to return to the former job, much like the case of
the skilled worker suffering from a personal injury prior to the 1981
amendments.
Most of the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Michigan Act apply equally to
personal injuries and occupational diseases. Whether the special limitations
of Chapter 4 are also applicable, however, can be highly significant in any
given case. One experienced practitioner has suggested that there are at
least nine potential differences if an "occupational disease" is involved,
including the effect of a misrepresentation concerning a prior condition,
apportionment of liability between employers, apportionment with a
nonoccupational disease, the date of injury, the responsibility of the last
employer, the time for giving notice, and the effect of leaving a subsequent
employment. E. Welch, Workers' Compensation in Michigan S 9.01, p. 90
(1984). Unfortunately, there is considerable vagueness about what exactly
constitutes an occupational disease, as Welch's summary indicates (id.,
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§

9.03, p. 92):

1.

The fact that a disability arose over a period of time does
not make it an occupational disease.

2.

If the disability was caused by a single-event trauma, it
is almost surely not an occupational disease.

3.

Orthopedic problems tend not to be occupational diseases,
but there are exceptions.

4.

Lung problems tend to be occupational diseases.

In view of this confusing and troublesome overlap between personal
injuries and occupational diseases, it would be advisable to prune away the
special provisions and duplicative language of Chapter 4 as far as possible,
retaining only those particular limitations that can truly be justified by
the peculiar nature of occupational diseases.
2. Comparative analysis. At my request, Professor Lawrence Joseph of
Hofstra University School of Law prepared a comprehensive study of the
special coverage problems posed by occupational diseases, with emphasis upon
a comparison of the law of Michigan and that of its neighboring Great Lakes
states. The following is a selected portion of his concluding analysis:

Disabling injuries or diseases suffered by employees may be placed,
analytically, on a spectrum measuring the extent of employment contribution
to the disability. At one end of the spectrum are disabling bodily injuries
clearly caused by an employment "accident" in a restrictive "accidental"
sense. An example would be an injury to an employee's hand from the machine
at which he works. At the same end of the spectrum would be a disabling
"disease" suffered by an employee after an acute exposure to a toxic
substance, in the course of employment, which results in illness within a few
minutes or a few hours. These types of injuries or diseases - in which
effect follows closely, immediately, and clearly from an employment cause
are indisputably covered under any act's definition of "accident," "injury,"
or "disease." These types of injuries or diseases, moreover, do not present
factual causation problems. At the other end of the spectrum are diseases
"ordinary" or "common" to employees and nonemployees that are, in a
more-probable-than-not sense, not employment related. These diseases may be
appropriately categorized as "ordinary diseases of life." An example would
be Parkinson's disease. These types of diseases are excluded from the
compensation system under any act's definitions of "accident," "injury," or
"disease."
Most contested cases on coverage issues involve disabilities that exist
between the analytical extremes on the spectrum. These contested cases -which, technically, have been categorized as "injuries" or "diseases" -involve disabilities that may involve employment and nonemployment causes.
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There are, basically, two types of disabilities caused by employment and
nonemployment factors. The first type includes, for example, heart and
cardiovascular, back, mental, hernia, and certain respiratory and cancerous
disabilities. These disabilities have been usually catergorized as
"injuries." The second type of disability caused by employment and
nonemployment factors includes silicosis, asbestos, coal miners'
pneumoconiosis, and other "toxic substance" related -- often cancerous
disabilities. These disabilities are usually categorized as "diseases." •••
(a) Multiple causation injury cases. The coverage of injuries of
multiple, unknown etiology - especially heart and cardiovascular and mental
injuries -- has proven problematic since the inception of workers'
compensation systems. The source of the problems is the multiple factor
causation that underlies these injuries. Most courts, including the Michigan
Supreme Court, utilized the "personal injury" or "personal injury by
accident" concepts to limit recovery, as a threshold matter of law, in
multiple causation injury cases. The courts, first, centered their analysis
on whether the result of the injury was, factually, "accidental." This
approach limited recovery to injury cases that factually involved an unusual,
unexpected traumatic external event which occurred at a definite,
ascertainable time. This approach was innnediately, and correctly, perceived
by dissenting judges as arbitrarily restrictive; the existence of an
external, traumatic event that occurred at a definite time in a multiple
causation injury does not factually ensure a causal connection to the
employment. Accordingly, courts began to adopt an interpretation of "injury"
or "injury by accident" that encompassed a fact situation in which the result
of the injury was unexpected, even if it developed gradually over a period of
time. This approach was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in its
landmark multiple causation injury cases -- Sheppard [348 Mich. 577 (1957)),
a back injury, Coombe [348 Mich. 635 (1957)), a cardiovascular injury case -and affirmed in Carter [361 Mich. 577 (1960)), a mental disability case. The
Court's elaborate technical reasoning in these opinions is bottomed on the
implicit premise that the essential coverage issue in multiple injury cases
is not whether the injury was "accidental" but, instead, whether the
employment aggravated - in a more-probable-than-not factual sense - the
claimant's personal predisposition to the injury. The Court held that this
issue should be addressed in the technical context of the arise-out-ofemployment inquiry. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted basically the same
substantive approach as the Michigan Court. In Minnesota and Pennsylvania,
the supreme courts adopted the Sheppard and Cooabe analysis after their
respective state legislatures deleted the "accident" requirement. The
Illinois and Indiana supreme courts rejected the "accident" concept to
include injuries in which the result, as well as the cause, was unexpected.
The Ohio Legislature statutorily extended the definition of "accident" in the
Ohio Act to include an unexpected result.
The Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio supreme courts, however, nevertheless
still require that an injury occur, factually, at a specific time; a claimant
in a multiple injury case must show that his injury involved a "specific

38

incident." This restrictive approach clearly reflects a policy choice. The
existence of a specifically identifiable employment "incident" -- whether the
cause or the result of an employment stimulus -- does not medically ensure a
causal connection between the injury and the employment. The Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio courts, therefore, have chosen, as a matter of policy, to
restrict coverage in multiple causation inquiry cases to injuries that occur
at a definable, "specific" time. The effect on recovery of this approach is
potentially underinclusive: a claimant who may have suffered an employment
related injury in a multiple causation injury case is denied compensation, as
a matter of law, if his injury did not factually arise from a definable,
specific event.
If the policy threshold is satisfied in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, a
claimant must still satisfy the factual issue whether the employment
aggravated his injury in a more-probable-than-not factual sense. This
factual issue is the basic coverage inquiry in Michigan, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. However, the arise-out-of-employment inquiry in
multiple causation inquiry cases also is inherently bottomed on arbitrary,
evaluative, and policy-based decisionmaking. In Michigan, since Sheppard,
Cooabe, and Carter, the most visible and controversial opinions on coverage
issues have involved multiple causation injury cases. The evaluative nature
of the arise-out-of inquiry in multiple causation injury cases is exemplified
in the Deziel (403 Mich. 1 (1978)], Kostaao (405 Mich. 105 (1979)], Derwinski
[407 Mich. 469 (1979)), Dressler (402 Mich. 243 (1978)] and Miklik [415 Mich.
364 (1982)] opinions. It is also apparent in the 1980 amendments to Sections
301 and 401, which statutorily define coverage for mental and heart and
cardiovascular disabilities.
The issue in Deziel centered on the standard to determine whether a
mental disability arose-out-of the employment. The Court in Deziel, in
effect, stated a specific factual causation standard for mental disability
cases. The Court justified its "subjective" causation standard on the
grounds that mental disabilities may be caused, medically, by a claimant's
subjective perception of reality. The Court did not recognize that a mental
disability also may be caused by an employee's external employment, or
nonemployment realities, and - in every multiple causation injury case
that it is impossible medically to quantify or qualify the degree of
employment, nonemployment, or personal causal contribution to the
disability.
The central issue in Kostaao involved the standard of factual proof in
heart or cardiovascular related disability cases. The Court, in Kostamo, in
effect, disregarded the factual record of the triers of fact and imposed, as
it did in Deziel, a specific factual causation standard. The Court directed
the triers of fact also to consider "lay testimony" on the causation issue.
The Court did not recognize that neither lay testimony nor medical testimony
can ensure a causal connection to the employment in heart and cardiovascular
cases.
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In Deziel and Kostaa:>, the Court failed to recognize that the
arise-out-of inquiry in multiple causation cases inherently involves an
evaluation decision because an aggravate-accelerate arise-out-of standard is
impossible to prove in a more-probable-than-not factual case. Thus, in
Deziel and in Koataa:>, the Court created and endorsed standards that, in
turn, created overinclusive classes of claimants: under the Deziel
"subjective causal nexus" standard or the koataao "lay testimony" standard
some claimants may receive compensation who may not be entitled to benefits
because their employment did not aggravate their disability in a
more-probable-than-not sense.
Sections 301(2) and 401(2)(b), the provisions that statutorily define
coverage for mental and heart and cardiovascular disabilities, are intended
to rectify the potentially overinclusive effect of Deziel and Kostaao.
However, analytically, neither statutory provision eliminates the underlying
evaluative process in mental, heart, and cardiovascular disability cases. In
mental disability cases, neither the factual finding that the disability
arose from an "actual event" of employment and not an "unfounded perception"
of an actual event of employment, nor the requirement that the employment
aggravated the disability "in a significant manner" factually ensures, or can
factually ensure, that the mental disability is employment-related. The
requirement that heart and cardiovascular disabilities be aggravated by the
employment "in a significant manner" also does not ensure a causal relation
to the employment. The same analysis applies to the language defining
compensation for disabling herniae in Section 401(2)(b). It also applies to
the statutory standard for "emotional stress" injuries in the Wisconsin Act.
Analytically, any attempt to define eaplo,-ent causal relation for a
disabling injury that involves nultiple causation necessarily includes the
potential for underinclusive or overincluaive administrative and appellate
decisi01111aking. (This analytical reality is, arguably, the underlying reason
for Section 405 of the Michigan Act, which provides presumptive coverage, as
a matter of policy, in policemen and firemen heart and respiratory cases.)
The Derwinski, Dressler, and Niklik opinions reveal a different, yet
equally troublesome substantive dimension to multiple causation cases. The
substantive differences between Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the Act encourage
claimants or employees to categorize a multiple caused disability as an
"injury" or a "disease." However, the technical categorization between an
"injury" or a "disease" in a multiple causation case is ultimately
artificial: it is, medically, equally plausible to argue that a back and
heart related disability is an "injury" under Chapter 3 -- brought on by a
"single event" - or a "disease" under Section 401. A trier or appellate
court, therefore, must confront the threshold technical determination whether
the disability is an "injury" or a "disease." This inquiry is, in actuality,
an arbitrary, evaluative decision.
The difficult, yet apparent conclusion is that workers' compensation
systems cannot deal effectively with cases involving "injuries" that result
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from multiple, complex, indeterminable etiology.
(b) llultiple causation disease cases. In 1941, In Adams v. Acme White
Lead & Color Works, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly excluded
"occupational diseases" from coverage under the Worker's Compensation Act.
The Court's approach was not atypical: courts generally perceived the
workers' compensation system as a system to provide compensation for
"accidental" injuries. By the late 1930s, it had become apparent that the
system, as interpreted by the courts, had become grossly unfair and
discriminatory toward claimants who suffered disabling diseases which may
have been caused, or at least substantially aggravated, by employment.
Consequently, state legislatures enacted statutory compensation schemes for
disabling occupational diseases.
The coverage standards in occupational disease schemes have reflected,
since their initial enactment, a legislative awareness that most occupational
diseases present complex etiological issues which, in turn, present coverage
and liability problems for the compensation system. The general legislative
policy underlying statutory schemes for compensating occupational diseases
has been restrictive. Each state act varies in its types and degrees of
restrictions. The statutory barriers to recovery are formidable.
The primary restriction is definitional; every Great Lake state, except
Wisconsin, requires that a disease be "characteristic of" or "peculiar to"
the employee's occupation. The required employment risk is further defined
by excluding from coverage an occupational disease which might also be
characterized, generally, as an "ordinary disease of life." This definition
has been limited even further in certain states by statutory language that
narrowly defines the required causal relationship between a disease and the
employment in occupational disease cases. See, e.g., Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Act, Section 176.11(15); Illinois Workers' Occupational Disease
Act, Section l(d); Indiana Workmen's Occupational Disease Act, Section 10.
Another type of restriction requires that an employee be exposed to a
disease hazard for a specified length of time as a condition to recovery.
See, e.g., Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, Section 176.66(10); Wisconsin
Workers' Compensation Act, Section 102.565; Ohio Workers' Compensation Act,
Section 68; Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 411(2), Section
413; Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, Section 1401. Restrictions are
often applied to specific occupational diseases as a matter of legislative
policy. See, e.g., Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, Section 102.555
(occupational deafness, 90-day total exposure to noisy employment); Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act, Section 8(16) (loss of hearing, "sufficient
exposure" to defined noise levels); Illinois Workers' Occupational Disease
Act, Section l(d) (silicosis and asbestos, 60-day exposure); Indiana
Workmen's Occupational Disease Act (silicosis and asbestos, 60-day exposure);
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 27(1) (silicosis from
silicon dioxide dust, asbestosis, tuberculosis and hepatitis, heart and lung
disease suffered by fire fighters after four years of service, byssinosis,
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and coal-related silicosis, at least one year exposure to the hazard of the
disease claimed); Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 412,
Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, Section 140l(a) (silicosis, anthraco
silicosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis or asbestosis, two year aggregate
employment in Pennsylvania and exposure to hazard of the disease claimed
during ten year period preceding the disability); Pennsylvania Occupational
Disease Act, Section 140l(g) (silicosis, anthraco silicosis, coal worker's
pneumoconiosis, asbestosis "or any occupational disease which developed to
the point of disablement only after an exposure of five or more years,"
six-month exposure required to impose liability on last employer). However,
the extent or degree of exposure to a hazard does not medically provi~e a
measurement of the causal relationship between the hazard and the disease.
These policy restrictions are, therefore, inherently arbitrary in their
effect on recovery.
A third type of restriction is contained in provisions that define the
time limitations during which a disease claim must be brought. Each Great
Lake state system distinguishes between time limitations for "injuries" or
"accidents" and "diseases." In "injury" or "accident" cases, the time of the
injury or accident, generally, prescribes the time during which a claim may
be brought. (In Michigan, under Section 301(1), the date of injury in a case
in which the injury is "not attributable to a single event" is the last day
of work in the employment that caused the injury.) In "disease" cases, two
basic approaches have developed. The first approach, adopted by the Michigan
Legislature in Section 441, establishes a time period during which to bring a
claim after actual or constructive knowledge of the disability. See also
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, Section 176.151; Wisconsin Worker's
Compensation Act, Section 102.17(4). The second approach bars recovery unless
the disability or death occurs within a specific time period after the last
exposure to a hazardous substance. See, e.g., Illinois Workers' Occupational
Disease Act, Section l(f); Indiana Workmen's Occupational Disease Act,
Section 9(f); Ohio Workers' Compensation Act, Section 68; Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 411,; Pennsylvania Occupational Disease
Act, Section 1401. The latter approach creates inherently arbitrary results
because the latency period between exposure to a disease and manifestation of
a disease may, and can, take years.
A fourth type of restriction imposes an absolute maximum limit in
recovery for specified diseases. See e.g., Wisconsin Worker's Compensation
Act, Section 102.565 ($13,000 maximum for compensable "toxic or hazardous
substance" claims, all other claims against the employer barred);
Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, Section 1401(2) ($12,750 maximum
liability, $75 per month thereafter, for compensable silicosis,
anthraco-silicosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis or asbestosis claims). A
similar restriction - exemplified by the special Dust Disease, PBB and
Logging Industry Fund in Chapter 5 of the Michigan Act -- provides a
statutory recovery limit for a specified disease, combined with additional
compensation to be paid from a special fund. These schemes, inherently and
clearly, reflect restrictive policy decisions.
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The substantive effect of the various restrictive statutory measures that
have been enacted to deal with the multiple causation dimension of
occupational diseases is clear: the statutory restrictions have an
underinclusive effect on recovery. Thus, claimants who may in fact suffer
diseases caused by their employment most probably will be precluded from
rece1.v1.ng compensation under "occupational disease" coverage standards as a
result of statutory policy-based limitations on coverage and liability.

***
3. Ca.aentary. The central message conveyed by Professor Joseph is that
1a1ltiple causation occupational disease cases present an inherently
intractable problem. Whatever legislative (or judicial) rules are devised
will still leave open the possibility in any given case that a deserving
claillant will be excluded or that a nondeserving one will be included. For a
society which likes to think all things are perfectable, that may be a hard
lesson to accept. Nonetheless, I believe it contains much wisdom.

In my judgment, the provisions of Public Act 357 of 1980, which amended
both MCL §§ 418.301(2) and 418.401(2)(b) to provide that "mental disabilities
and conditions of the aging process" are compensable only if aggravated or
accelerated by the employment "in a significant manner," provide ample
legislative direction to the agency and the courts for a commonsensical
determination of compensability. Any effort to draw sharper demarcation
lines at this time would seem premature, and could lead to arbitrary
standards hurtful of one interest or another.
From time to time the workers' compensation system has been savaged for
awarding benefits in what appear to be dubious circumstances. Often there is
involved a difficult factual question of causality, for example, whether the
mental stress of a particular job contributed to bringing on a fatal heart
attack. See, e.g., lB A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law§ 38.65, p.
7-202 n. 57.6 (citing numerous cases awarding compensation for heart attacks
resulting from stress, overwork, etc.). This is a problem for almost every
workers' compensation system in the country, and Michigan holds no copyright
on headline-making sensations. Frequently the true story is garbled in the
telling. Occasionally a decision-maker is simply wrong. What is important
to realize is that fallible minds will inevitably err, one way or another,
and that any system should be judged by its overall performance, not by the
aberrational case.
There is one quirky, probably unintended, result of the 1980 amendments
which should be addressed. Previously, MCL § 418.435 provided that in the
case of an occupational disease, the last employer held liable could seek
apportionment from previous employers where the worker had been exposed to
the same deleterious conditions. Perhaps believing that this added
unnecessarily to the length and cost of litigation, the Legislature repealed
the apportionment provision. That leaves the last employer liable for all
compensation, which for most cases may be a sensible solution.
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Unfortunately, the current version of MCL § 418.435 could mean that the last
employer would be responsible for a claimant's total compensation, even
though the exposure there was for so short a time that it did not result in
an aggravation of the employee's condition. See, e.g., Hudson v. Jackson
Plating Co., 105 Mich. App. 572 (1981). Surely it would be preferable to
impose liability on the last employer whose establishment's environment
contributed to the worker's disease.

c.

"Sunset" Provisions

Public Acts 199 and 200 of 1981, amending respectively MCL §§ 418.401 and
418.301, contain the following provision in Section 3 of both acts: "This
aaendatory act shall expire December 31, 1984." (Emphasis supplied.) Act 199
amended the provisions of the statute dealing with occupational disease.
Even more important, Act 200 amended the provisions dealing with compensation
generally, the provisions which trigger the operation of all the rest of the
statute covering "a personal injury arising out of and in the course of
employment." Without MCL § 418.301 and the language just quoted, the rest of
the Worker's Disability Compensation Act becomes meaningless. Since Article
4, Section 25 of the Michigan Constitution (1963) prohibits "blind"
amendments, the whole of MCL § 418.301, including the critical triggering
clause, was incorporated in the amendatory act. That has led to the
question: If Act 200 expires on December 31, 1984, without extension or
replacement, does that also terminate the triggering language of MCL
§ 418.301, thus terminating the Worker's Disability Compensation Act in its
entirety?
The intent of the Legislature is of course the key to any statutory
construction. Workers' compensation is one of the key social programs of the
Twentieth Century. It exists in every state of this country, every province
of Canada, and nearly all of Western Europe. That the Legislature of a
progressive state like Michigan would allow such a basic piece of legislation
to expire simply because of the lapse of some relatively technical
amendments, without any express declaration of such a momentous purport,
quite boggles the mind. In my considered judgment, so startling a result is
beyond rational contemplation. Insofar as the language of Acts 199 and 200
addresses the matter, Section 3 of each statute merely states that the
"aaendatory act" -- not "the Worker's Disability Compensation Act" -- shall
expire on December 31. The latter could easily have been specified had that
been intended. Also, significantly, there is no phraseology in Acts 199 and
200 repealing the preexisting provisions of MCL §§ 418.301 and 418.401.
Nonetheless, some persons have been troubled by "black letter" rules
quoted in a number of decisions to the effect that when an amendatory act
repeats an old section, "the old section is deemed stricken from the law, and
the provisions carried over have their force from the new act, not the
former." See, e.g., People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349, 355 (1930); Lahti v.
Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578 (1954); Detroit Club v. State of Michigan, 309
Mich. 721 (1944); Kalamazoo Education Association v. Kalamazoo School, 406
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Mich. 554 (1979). Cf. 1963-64 Att'y Gen. Rep. 417. In all these instances,
however, the quoted principle was applied so as to eliminate preexisting
penalties against citizens (Lowell), increase workers' compensation benefits
(Lahti), extend a private organization's right to sue the State (Detroit
Club), allow a union the use of new unfair labor practice enforcement
procedures (Kalamazoo), or enlarge a Governor's powers of appointment (Att'y
Gen. Rep.). In stark contrast, what is at stake here is the very existence
of one of our most fundamental pieces of remedial legislation. It is
unthinkable that the precedents cited earlier, whose function was to promote
the underlying policies of the statutes involved, should be twisted so as to
destroy a cornerstone of modern social legislation.
That position is confirmed by the current edition of the standard
treatise on the subject. As stated in Sands' Sutherland Statutory
Construction (4th ed.)§ 22.33:
Provisions of the original act which are repeated in the body of
the amendment, either in the same or equivalent words, are
considered a continuation of the original law •••• The provisions
of the original act or section reenacted by the amendment are
held to have been law since they were first enacted and the
provisions introduced by the amendment are considered to have
been enacted at the time the amendment took effect.
See also Wade v. Farrell, 270 Mich. 562, 567 (1935): "[U]nder settled
rules of statutory construction appellant's assertion of a right to relief
under the amendatory act cannot be sustained.
'"When a statute continues a former statute law, that law common
to both acts dates from its first adoption, and only such
provisions of the old act as are left out of the new one are
gone, and only new provisions are new laws. When an act is
amended "so as to read as follows" the part of the original act
which remains unchanged is considered as having continued in
force as the law from the time of its original enactment and the
new portion as having become the law only at the time of the
amendment.' 25 R.C.L. p. 907."
There are few American decisions directly on point with regard to the
effect on the underlying statute of the expiration of an amendment. One of
the closest is Eager v. City of Hackensack, 191 A. 555, 556 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1937), aff'd, 196 A. 739 (N.J. 1938). The amendatory act contained four
sections, one of which was a reproduction of its predecessor plus some new
language. The last section provided that the amendatory act would become
inoperative after July 1, 1934. The court held that "the statute in its
entirety was meant to have only temporary effect and that upon its lapse
prior law revived with full force." The analogy in the case of Public Acts
200 and 199 would simply be the restoration of the status quo ante, the
statute as it existed before the amendments were passed. Potentially
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devastating consequences, including the return of the feast-or-famine rule of
tort law, militate against any other result.
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V.

MEDICAL AND VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

Professor Solomon Axelrod, of the University of Michigan School of Public
Health, is one of the country's foremost authorities on the medical aspects
of workers' compensation. He was kind enough to provide me, as a pro bono
contribution to my project, with the following appraisal of the
extraordinarily important effort to contain medical costs in the
rehabilitation of injured workers. With some minor editing by myself, this
is what Professor Axelrod had to say:
A.

Medical Care Cost Contai1J11ent

1. Background. Medical care is an important component of workers'
compensation in Michigan, accounting for about one-fourth of all expenditures
in recent years.
Eligibility for medical benefits conforms to requirements of eligibility
for cash benefits ("lost time cases"). In addition, medical benefits are
provided for employees with work-related illnesses and injuries who are not
entitled to cash benefits because the duration of their lost time is less
than seven days ("non-compensable medical cases"). Only about a quarter of
all reported cases are "lost time cases," but because of their relative
severity - about 20 percent receive hospital care -- "lost time cases"
account for about 80 percent of all medical expenditures.
The Act requires that the employer or the employer's insurance carrier
furnish an employee injured in the course of employment reasonable medical,
surgical, and hospital services, drugs, "or other attendance or treatment
recognized by the laws of this state as legal, when they are needed." Dental
service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing
apparatus, and other applicances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably
possible, and relief from the effects of the injury, are specifically cited.
Appliances such as corsets, splints, braces, walkers, and wheelchairs are
also included. The injured worker is entitled to vocational rehabilitation
services which include retraining and job placement necessary to restore
useful employment. Vocational rehabilitation is limited to 52 weeks except
by special review.
Medical benefits are provided in a wide variety of settings -- a private
physician's office, an industrial clinic, a hospital emergency room or
inpatient facility - by providers who are designated by the employer or the
employer's insurance carrier and who are reimbursed for their services by
them. After ten days from the inception of medical care, the employee may
change the designated source of care and select a provider of his own
choosing.
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There are estimated to be about 800 entities, private insurance carriers,
and self-insurers, involved in making arrangements for medical care under
workers' compensation in Michigan. Most of them, about 70 percent, are
self-insurers; the rest are private insurance carriers. There is a high
degree of concentration in this arena both with respect to the number of
employees covered, the number receiving medical benefits, and the amounts
paid out for claims. For example, in 1981, the ten highest ranking private
insurance carriers paid out about 38 percent of total medical benefit
expenditures; the ten highest ranking self-insurers, about 31 percent.
Medical benefit expenditures in 1981 were estimated to be about $139
million, a figure which may be understated by as much as $50 million.
Slightly over half of these expenditures (54%) were made by private insurance
carriers; slightly less than half (46%), by self-insurers. Costs per case
receiving medical benefits vary widely depending on type of insurance and
cash compensation status. Thus, in 1981, available data indicate that
average cost per case varied as shown below:
Type of Insurance
Self-insured
Private carrier
Compensation status
Non-compensable
Compensable

Average Cost/Case
$
54.43
434.36
29.13
1,569.08

Administrative responsibility for the medical care aspects of workers'
compensation resided in the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation,
Michigan Department of Labor until 1981, when the 1969 Compensation Act was
amended. The 1981 amendments to the Act mandated medical care cost
containment responsibilities. MCL § 418.315. Statutory authority for
implementing these responsibilities was transferred to the Department of
Management and Budget, Office of Health and Medical Affairs, by Executive
Reorganization Order No. 2-1982.
Until such time as new regulations are put in place, information bearing
on the medical care component of workers' compensation is derived from two
required reports, Employer's Basic Report of Injury, Form 100, and a
semi-annual report on the total number of cases receiving medical benefits
and the total amount spent on such cases, Form 109.
An annual report, Compensable Occupational Injury and Illness Report, is
published by the Bureau of Safety and Regulation, Michigan Department of
Labor. It is based on an analysis of the Form 100 reports. A federal-state
cooperative Supplementary Data System (SDS) furnishes data on reported cases
in regard to injury and illness characteristics, their nature and sources,
parts of body affected, and types of accident or exposure. This report
provides information for the development of educational and training
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materials for employers and employees and should assist them in the planning
of accident and disease prevention activities. The number of reported
compensable injury and illness cases has been declining in Michigan during
the past few years.
For information on medical care in workers' compensation, Form 109 is
relied on. This semi-annual report, as indicated above, provides limited
medical care information, i.e., aggregate data on the number of cases
reported to the self-insured employer and the private insurance carrier, and
the amount paid out for medical benefits both for cases which received weekly
compensation, and for those on which weekly compensation was not payable.
Other information, crucial to an understanding of how this third-party payor
system works, and needed for its evaluation in cost containment terms, is not
available from the program at this time. Such basic information as number of
claille submitted (in contrast to number of caaea), number of services
rendered, and billed charges, by type of provider would have to be obtained
from bills submitted by health care providers to carriers for reimbursement,
on a total or sample basis. Although some carriers use a standard government
billing form such as required by Medicare, no uniform billing form is
required, nor is there a requirement for the provider to use a standard
diagnostic code.
Administration of workers' compensation medical benefits can be
characterized as exhibiting a "hands-off" posture on the part of the Bureau.
Surveillance of the appropriateness of the type and volume of services
rendered and the charges for them is left to the approximately 800 entities
involved in making arrangements for medical care. Some of them, usually the
larger private insurance carriers, use "fee screens" to assess the
reasonableness of billed charges. Others have no written guidelines or "fee
screens" by which to assess the appropriate charge for a service and their
claims review personnel use their "common sense and experience" in making
such judgments. Under these circumstances, flagrant discrepancies in charges
and numbers of services rendered may be detected, but for the most part the
providers' self-determined fees are accepted as reasonable and the hospital's
billed charges are paid.
2. The 1981 aaeaclaeata. The 1981 amendments included a number of
provisions bearing on the administration of medical benefits under workers'
compensation. Briefly summarized, they were as follows (MCL I 418.315):
All fees or charges for medical services shall be subject to
rules promulgated by the Bureau.
The rules shall establish schedules of maximum charges for each
service, subject to annual revision.
The facility or provider shall be paid its usual or customary
charge for each service or the maximum charge established by the
Bureau, whichever is less.
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The rules shall be promulgated not later than one year after the
effective date of this subsection [March 31, 1982] and sent to
the Legislature for review.
Section 418.315 also provided for the appointment of an Advisory
Committee to assist the Bureau in establishing a schedule of maximum
charges. The Bureau was further directed to review health care facilities
for compliance with established charges and to create a system for
utilization review.
As previously mentioned, an Executive Order in 1982 transferred
responsibilities for carrying out these responsibilities from the Department
of Labor, Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation, to the Department of
Management and Budget, Office of Health and Medical Affairs. A 25-member
Health Care Cost Advisory Committee was appointed in early 1983. this
committee has been meeting since then to assist in the development of
proposed fee schedules and utilization review procedures. The development of
a fee schedule which was to have been promulgated no later than April 1,
1982, after being approved by the Joint Legislative Administrative Committee,
has been delayed by lack of consensus in the Advisory Committee. The scope
and specifics of the proposed utilization review procedures have also been
subjected to far-reaching differences of opinion and their promulgation has
likewise been delayed.
In brief, rules have been proposed for the establishment of maximum
charges for medical benefits, a utilization review process, and a reporting
system to permit surveillance of costs and volume of medical benefits
provided.
3. Issues in coat contaiiment. Although both the overall cost of
workers' compensation insurance in Michigan and the number.of reported
compensable cases have been declining since 1981, there is no reason to
assume that medical benefit costs have undergone commensurate reductions. In
a period when medical care costs have been increasing at more than twice the
rate of inflation, and in the face of what is essentially an open-ended,
inadequately controlled third-party payment system, it can reasonably be
argued that in fact this is not the case.
In the absence of mechanisms to limit costs or reduce the use of medical
services such as fee schedules and utilization review procedures, medical
care costs under workers' compensation are subject to the same inflationary
forces that affect all medical care costs. It is therefore important that
the cost contaiiment measures mandated in the 1981 aaenclaents be iapleaented
proaptly.
Medical care coat containaent 1111st, of course, be balanced against an
equally iaportant objective - to ensure that injured workers receive the
best medical care possible to maxilli.ze recovery froa injury. To achieve this
goal, consideration should be given to the creation of a professionally

50

staffed medical unit, such as the Medical Services Division of the Ontario
Workers' Compensation Board, to provide professional surveillance over the
quality of the care and the medical aspects of vocational rehabilitation.

***
B.

Vocational Rehabilitation

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the workers' compensation system is that
it does not put every injured worker back to work. No amount of money can
compensate for that. Every self-respecting human being wishes to be
self-supporting. That obviously means that any humane system for dealing
with employee disabilities must establish as a first priority the restoration
of the worker to a full-fledged position in the work force. The medical and
vocational rehabilitation of injured workers is espoused by everyone as a
primary goal of the workers' compensation system, but in practice it is sadly
neglected. Professor Axelrod arranged for Eugenia s. Carpenter, a Research
Scientist at the University of Michigan School of Public Health, to assess
the existing system of vocational rehabilitation in this State and to make
such recommendations for improvement as she thought appropriate. A sunnnary
of Ms. Carpenter's study follows:
1. s-ry. Restoring the employability of the worker has always been a
goal of the workers' compensation program. Nevertheless, medical and
physical rehabilitation has tended to take precedence over vocational
rehabilitation during most of the history of the program. Even today, there
is a perception that vocational rehabilitation is an underutilized component
of the workers' compensation program.
Section 319 of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act provides
that an injured worker "who is unable to perform work for which he has
previous training or experience ••• shall be entitled to such vocational
rehabilitation services, including retraining and job placement, as may be
reasonably necessary to restore him to useful employment.'" The statute
entitles a worker to up to 52 weeks of vocational rehabilitation services,
and an additional 52 weeks or portion thereof may be authorized by special
order of the Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation,
Department of Labor, if deemed necessary to restore employability.
The statute is predicated on the assumption that vocational services will
be voluntarily offered by the employer or carrier and accepted by the injured
employee. If this does not occur, the Director may, at the request of the
employee, or the employer, or the carrier, or on his own motion, refer the
employee to appropriate vocational rehabilitation for evaluation of
rehabilitation potential. It is important to note that a worker is not
entitled to vocational rehabilitation services while his claim is being
contested. In the case of a redemption, the worker waives all rights to
rehabilitation services under the workers' compensation program.
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Over the past five years, an average of about 3,000 vocational
rehabilitation cases have been opened annually. They represented between two
and four percent of cases opened for payment in each year. On the average,
some 2,700 vocational rehabilitation cases were closed annually between 1980
and 1984. The average success rate during this period, that is, the
percentage of workers who returned to work for the same or a new employer or
redeemed under an approved self-employment plan, was about 27 percent. By
far the majority of successful rehabilitations involved returning to work for
the same employer. Vocational rehabilitation experts estimate that the
proportion of injured workers who are feasible candidates for vocational
rehabilitation services ranges between 0.5 and 5 percent. The Michigan
Bureau's Vocational Rehabilitation Division (VRD) staff (three persons)
estimates the potential to be between 3 and 5 percent of compensable injury
cases. On the average, about 90 percent of injured workers return to work
within 120 days and about 94 percent of compensable cases are off
compensation within 180 days.
The literature on workers' compensation, the experience of Michigan and
other states, and the opinions of experts in the field have identified a
number of barriers and disincentives to the realization of the full potential
of vocational rehabilitation as a tool to restore injured workers to gainful
employment. Some of the problems may be overcome by administrative and
statutory changes. Others are not easily solved and may be an inevitable
part of the complexity inherent in any system to compensate workers who are
injured or disabled in the course of employment. Problems include: lack of
understanding of or support for VR services on the part of employers,
carriers, and injured workers; skewed economic incentives; the litigious
nature of the workers' compensation system; the redemption process; abuses in
the provision of VR services; and lack of adequate program evaluation.

***
2. Recowaendations. Ms. Carpenter made a series of specific proposals
for improving the vocational rehabilitation program. After careful review, I
adopt these recommendations as my own, with one significant modification.
Ms. Carpenter would prohibit outright the waiver of rehabilitation rights in
cases of benefit redemptions or settlements. In keeping with the language of
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (Report,
Recommendation 6.17, p. 110), I simply say that the Bureau should be
"particularly reluctant" to approve such waivers. With that qualification,
the recommendations and the justifications for them are as follows:
(a) A systea of utilization review for rehabilitation services, analogous
to that mandated for aedical care under Section 315 of the Act, should be
developed and iapleaented.
Justification: Allegations about abuses by providers of VR services
cannot be dealt with adequately until standards for the level and quality of
services are developed and applied. The difficulty of accomplishing that
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goal is acknowledged. Unlike medical care, standards for appropriateness of
vocational rehabilitation services are virtually nonexistent. Nevertheless,
until agreement can be reached on criteria for judging-whether services are
in excess of what are needed, or conversely, inadequate to a client's needs,
no effective monitoring of rehabilitation services will be possible.
Although difficult to accomplish, the task of defining professionally
acceptable standards is one that experts in the field of rehabilitation could
assist the state agency in developing. Authorizing legislation would be
required to implement this recommendation.
The sentinel effect of a monitoring system cannot be overemphasized. The
results of the Vocational Rehabilitation Division's monitoring system in
encouraging a sharp rise in voluntary employer referrals to rehabilitation is
an outstanding example.
(b) A coapanion systea to establish standard re:iaburseaent levels for
rehabilitation services covering both public and private providers should be
authorized through aaendaents to the Act.
Justification: There are no controls at present on the amounts that may
be charged for VR services. While some employers and insurance carriers have
a perception that these services are too costly, there are no standards for
judging whether and by how much costs are excessive. In support of cost
containment and restraint, studies in California indicate that the least
expensive rehabilitation plans offer the greatest opportunity to return a
worker to ~mployment.

The difficulties of establishing.reimbursement standards are at least as
great as those surrounding utilization review. The experience of the Office
of Health and Medical Affairs in developing a system of fee schedules for
medical care under Section 315 may provide some guidance in approaches to the
problem, including identifying those to be avoided. Because the notion of
setting levels for payment for rehabilitation is terra nova, there may be
greater opportunities for innovative approaches, including perhaps a DRG-type
approach to classifying clients for purposes of levels of payment to
rehabilitation providers. A fee-for-service system lends itself to abuses
and tends to have an escalating effect on outlays for se~vices, judging by
the experience of the medical care sector.
(c) Statutory changes should be sought to clarify the authority of the
BWCD to approve rehabilitation facilities; approval should be tied to
minimally acceptable levels of performance as determined under the
utilization review criteria recmiaended above.
Justification: The decentralization and pluralistic system for providing
rehabilitation services needs tighter controls and monitoring, according to a
majority of both insurance carriers and rehabilitation facilities responding
to a voluntary survey conducted in Michigan in 1984. Monitoring and quality
control will be most effective if they focus on the process and outcome of

53

services provided, rather than on inputs, as is more usual with traditional
licensing programs.
(d) Efforts to reduce the ti.ae lag in referring potential candidates to
vocational rehabilitation need to be increased. These could include
requiring eaployers to notify injured workers of their rights to VR services;
encouraging physicians and hospitals to initiate vocational evaluation early
in the treat11ent prograa through cooperative educational efforts of the
aedical and rehabilitation coamunities; including a requirement for
vocational rehabilitation evaluation in all work injury cases as a part of
the concurrent review standards being developed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Michigan..
Justification: Though program experience overwhelmingly demonstrates the
critical effect of timing in initiating successful rehabilitation, there
continues to be evidence that opportunities to return injured workers to
gainful employment are lost because delays in referral exacerbate
psychological and other impediments to the process. [Rote by St. Antoine:
Minnesota has been accused by some of "storm trooper" tactics in its
promotion of "mandatory" rehabilitation. But Steve Keefe, Minnesota's
tireless, crusading director of workers' compensation, has a powerful reply:
''You've got to catch disabled workers early. After they start spending time
(up to five years in some systems) trying to persuade everyone how disabled
they are, they will be disabled."]
(e) llehabilitation services should be made available to workers whose
cases are in litigation, and the Bureau should be particularly reluctant to
per.it the waiver of rights to rehabilitation in cases of benefit
redemptions.
Justification: Evidence from studies in Michigan and other states show
high levels of unemployment, low incomes, and dependency among former
workers' compensation claimants. In most of these cases, little effort had
been made to provide vocational rehabilitation, often because the cases were
litigated or settled by a lump-sum payment. Society as well as these
individuals bear the cost of this waste of human potential.

(f) Soae portion of the newly established Redeaption Fund should be
earmarked to support data collection, analysis, and program evaluation in
vocational rehabilitation of workers' coapensation claiaants.
Justification: Formulating and implementing good public policy depends
upon adequate information. Resources to collect and analyze program data are
necessary to ensure efficient and equitable operation of the system. A
longitudinal follow-up of a sample of claimants, including successful and
unsuccessful rehabilitations, redemptions, and litigated cases, could provide
the basis for a rigorous assessment of the cost effectiveness of different
approaches to the rehabilitation of injured and disabled workers. Without
data from longitudinal follow-up of a representative sample of all types of
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cases, cost-effectiveness analysis of VR services cannot be performed.
Similarly, assessing administrative efficiency and identifying obstacles to
effective program implementation require adequate informational resources.

***
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VI.

SPECIAL P1lOBLEMS

\

A.

Exclusivity and Third-Party Actions

In recent years a number of Michigan companies have become alarmed that a
linchpin of the workers' compensation system, namely, the immunity of
employers against employee suits or third-party actions based upon tort
theories, was breaking down. Professor Arthur Larson, the country's
acknowledged authority on workers' compensation law, agreed to provide a
comparative analysis of Michigan law and the law of the neighboring Great
Lakes states on this subject. From Professor Larson's full report, I
reproduce those portions in which he describes the problem and sets forth his
conclusions:
The exclusiveness of the compensation remedy is a universal and accepted
feature of American compensation law. It lies at the heart of the well-known
quid pro quo, under which the employer enjoys tort immunity in exchange for
accepting absolute liability for all work-connected injuries. The last state
to give the employee an option to sue his employer in tort, New Hampshire,
abolished that option in 1947. Since then, no frontal assault of any
seriousness has been made on the exclusiveness principle in this country.
In recent years, however, selective attacks on exclusiveness have been
pressed on a number of fronts. The trend for a time seemed to be toward a
breakdown of exclusiveness. Most recently, however, the trend has been not
only halted but reversed. One must hasten to add, however, that there has
been no let-up in the vigor and variety of attempts to penetrate
exclusivity.

If the various features of Michigan compensation law bearing most
relevantly on exclusiveness of remedy and third party issues are appraised
froa the point of view of hospitality toward employers and carriers, the
conclusion is that on all counts, with one questionable exception, Michigan
law is at least as favorable as that of its neighbors, and that on·some
counts it is more favorable.
The basic statutory provision is as inclusive as any as to kinds of suits
and plaintiffs barred. MCL § 418.131.
As to nonphysical injury, Michigan, unlike Indiana, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, has not yet opened the door to suits based on deceit as a
"second injury" independent of the first compensable injury, although it has
not rejected that possibility either. It has generated a number of cases on
discrimination, humiliation, and emotional distress, but always carefully
limiting suit to kinds of injury not covered by the Act. It has produced one
case [Broaddus, 84 Mich. App. 593 (1978)], which, as it stands, goes further
than any case on record in recognizing a tort remedy for harassment in the
form of delayed or terminated benefits, so long as the damages are
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nonphysical; but the value of the case as precedent is drawn into question by
its apparent ignorance of a penalty provisions enacted shortly before the
decision. MCL § 418.801(2).
As to retaliation [against employees filing workers' compensation
claims], Michigan, in common with Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin,
recognizes a private cause of action.
The dual-capacity doctrine [e.g., treating a company as products
manufacturer rather than employer] bas been clearly rejected in Michigan, as
it has in all the Great Lakes states dealing with the issue, except Ohio.
On the insurer as a suable third party, Michigan's statute is one of the
most comprehensive in its protection of carriers and other agencies making
safety inspections.
Coemployees are immune from suit in Michigan. Only Minnesota among the
neighboring group permits such suits. Michigan has also produced the most
extreme decision to be found anywhere immunizing corporate officers and
stockholders.
Michigan, like all other states but Ohio, has held the line on refusing
to accept gross negligence or even deliberate violation of safety statutes as
"intentional injury," or to accept mere conclusory use of the word
"intentional" in pleadings. Ohio accepts both.
Finally, on the third party's action over against the employer, Michigan
rejects both contribution and indemnity actions, as do Ohio and Wisconsin.
But in Minnesota and Illinois an employer who has paid compensation is still
vulnerable to a contribution suit by the third party in proportion to his
fault, limited to the amount of compensation in Minnesota, but unlimited in
Illinois.
The areas, then, in which Michigan is most conspicuously more protective
of employers are: in relation to dual capacity and the stretching of
"intentional," Michigan is 118.rkedly more favorable to employers than Ohio;
and in relation to third party actions over, Michigan is uuch more favorable
to eaployers than Minnesota or Illinois.

***
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B.

Coaproai.ses or "Jledeaptions"

Under the Michigan "wage loss" theory, one might expect that the standard
award would require the payment of weekly benefits during the period of an
employee's disability and continuing lack of work. In fact, as shown in
Table VI-1, more than half the total dispositions in contested workers'
coapensation cases have consisted for many years of compromises or so-called
"redemptions," usually in the form of lump-sum settlements. Typically, a
redemption terminates all further employer liability for income maintenance,
medical benefits, and vocational rehabilitation. The practical effect is to
transform the Michigan wage loss system, in many cases, into a modified
impairment rating system.

TABLE VI-1
REDEMPTIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF DISPOSITIONS

Total Dispositions
("Decisions" &
Redemptions)

1968

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984*

16,305

25,848

24,807

32,018

41,801 30,797

Redemptions Granted 9,119

15,186

14, 708

19,964

26,657

16,752

55.9%

58.8%

59.3%

62.4%

63.8%

54.4%

Redemptions as%
of Dispositions

*Projection based on actual data for first 9 months of 1984.
Office of Strategy
10/31/84
There is much to be said against redemptions as a matter of principle.
The seriously injured worker may be bedazzled by a settlement offer for the
seemingly munificent sum of $50,000 or more, which might enable the
realization of a life-long dream to open a small business. The risk, of
course, is that a year later the business will be bankrupt, the funds
exhausted, and the worker and his family on welfare. On the other hand, the
possibility of securing a small redemption in the $1,000-$2,000 range, which
an employer may be willing to pay simply to avoid the cost of litigation, may
be a lure to the filing of dubious or unmeritorious claims. Some persons are
also troubled by the arrangement whereby attorneys' fees are paid from the
accrued amount of an award or a lump-sum settlement, which could lead to a
potential conflict of interest in a lawyer's counseling a claimant-client on
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the advisability of accepting a redemption. For such reasons, a number of
jurisdictions prohibit redemptions, and an amendment adopted in 1981 would
have forbidden them in Michigan, effective January 1, 1984. Before the ban
went into effect, however, it was repealed, and Public Act 151 of 1983
established a new and stricter system for Bureau approval of proposed
redemptions. MCL §§ 418.835-836.
Despite their various deficiencies, redemptions are likely to be favored
in many cases by every party directly involved. For the employer it means
converting an uncertain liability of indefinite duration into a fixed and
final obligation. For the employee and his or her attorney, it can mean a
substantial amount of cash on the spot. To many the certainty of that
immediate recovery may well outweigh the prospects of much more (but possibly
nothing) after a long wait. Moreover, one cannot dismiss the notion that a
sizable check in hand provides a sort of psychological "balm" to the injured
worker aggrieved by the damage done him by "the system." And of course there
is a disquieting element of paternalism in telling disabled employees that
they cannot settle their claims even if they wish to. Finally, and not
insignificantly, the administrative burdens of the beleaguered Bureau are
considerably eased through the pressure valve of redemptions.
The National Conmission on State Workmen's Compensation Law was obviously
troubled by the competing arguments concerning compromises or redemptions,
and came up with the following recommendations (Report at 110):
R6.17. We recommend that the workmen's compensation agency
permit compromise and release agreements only rarely and only
after a conference or hearing before the workmen's compensation
agency and approval by the agency.
R6.17. We recommend that the agency be particularly reluctant
to permit compromise and release agreements which terminate
medical and rehabilitation benefits.
Given the enormous backlog of cases which now confronts the Michigan
workers' compensation system (to be discussed more fully in the next
section), I conclude, somewhat reluctantly, that it is unfeasible at this
tiae to consider further stringent restrictions on, or the outright
prohibition of, the practice of redemptions. I am also encouraged by my
experience sitting in on redemption hearings for one day in Detroit. Even
allowing for some differences in approach that might have been caused by the
presence of an outsider, I was impressed by the conscientiousness of the ALJs
(administrative law judges) in examining proposed agreements and in
explaining their consequences to the claimants. I was further impressed by
the efforts that were made to promote so-called "structured" settlements, in
which the claimant would receive a lump sum up front but then be guaranteed a
series of periodic payments over time. The past year has also seen a modest
but promising decline of 15 percent in the rate of redemptions. This whole
area has enough potential for abuse, however, that it calls for continuing
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surveillance.
C.

l.etirees

For many years the most hotly discussed topic concerning the Michigan
workers' compensation system was the so-called "retiree problem." It was
almost unique to this State. Its legal underpinning was the notion developed
by the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, with some support from the
judiciary (cf. Evans v. United States Rubber Co., 379 Mich. 457 (1967)), that
a retired worker, even one who had voluntarily retired and gone on a
company-funded pension, could still be suffering from a loss of wage earning
capacity. If the retiree could demonstrate that he or she had incurred a
disability caused by pre-retirement job activity or working environment (a
bad back from 30 years on the assembly line or a dust disease from 30 years
in a foundry), the retiree was entitled to workers' compensation. It should
be emphasized that in many of these cases the disability was undoubtedly
genuine, at least in the physical impairment sense, and such an employee
would unquestionably be eligible for medical benefits. The fighting issue
was whether he was also entitled to recover for wage loss. Theoretically, of
course, wage loss was not impossible, since a number of retirees, especially
in inflationary times, might well have planned on some extra earnings from
parttime employment. Nonetheless, for a "Big Three" automobile manufacturer
(the most common target of this practice), it was plainly provoking, not to
mention costly, to see workers take early retirement and walk out of a plant
one day and then proceed to file their workers' compensation claims the
next.
In 1973 the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) paid out $51
million in wage loss benefits, of which $24 million, or 47 percent, went to
retirees. For Michigan employers as a whole, out of a total of $191 million
in wage loss benefits, $45 million, or 24 percent, went to retirees. With
such a large part of the compensation dollar going to persons who were no
longer part of the active work force, it was inevitable that reforms would be
demanded. Public Act 357 of 1980 added MCL § 418.373, which provides that an
employee receiving an employer-funded nondisability pension is presumed not
to have a loss of earning capacity. This presumption may be rebutted only by
evidence "that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability,
to perform work suitable to the employee's qualifications, including training
or experience." This is a very stiff requirement, both because the rebuttal
is phrased in terms of disability rather than continuing participation in the
labor market, and because the definition of disability for this purpose is
about as drastic as the Social Security definition of disability. As one
experienced practitioner puts it: "Presumably, this means the retiree must
prove disability from all work for which he or she is qualified." (Emphasis
in the original.) E. Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan§ 8.10, p. 87.
It should be noted, however, that MCL § 418.373(2) makes the new definition
of disability applicable only to wage loss benefits, and thus does not limit
a retired employee's right to medical benefits. In addition to the
presumption against loss of earning capacity, Public Act 203 of 1981 imposed
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still another restriction upon a retiree's former capacity to recover
workers' compensation benefits as well as pension benefits. Under MCL
S 418.354, a new scheme for coordination of benefits is created.
Essentially, in the case of periodic compensation for total disability or
partial disability, or for compensation under a redemption arrangement, there
will be a deduction from the amounts due under workers' compensation to take
account of employer contributions to benefits being received under old age
Social Security, a self-insurance plan, a wage continuation plan, a
disability insurance policy, or a pension or retirement plan. The effect, of
course, was a sharp reduction in the attractiveness of workers' compensation
benefits to retired workers.
The diminished appeal of workers' compensation to retirees is
dramatically reflected in the following tables showing the decline in filings
by employees and former employees of the Big Three in the last few years:
TABLE Vl-2
CIIR.YSLER:

COBTESTED CASE Cl.A.DIS FILED BY RETIREES

HOURLY EMPLOYEES
Number of Contested
Case Claims
Received by Chrysler
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
* Projection

Number of
Claims Filed
By Retirees

% of Claims
Filed by Retireew

3,715
1,762
47.4%
3,047
1,242
40.8%
3,970
1,174
29.6%
5,587
1,668
29.9%
3,052
1,238
40.6%
2,582
816
31.6%
1,217*
NA
NA
based on actual data for first 10 months of 1984.
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TABLE VI-3
FORD:

COlffESTED CASE CLADIS FILED BY UTIUES

Number of Contested
Cased Closed by Ford
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

4,749
5,207
4,775
4,786
3,955
3,854

Number of Cases
Filed by Retirees
1,720
1,660
1,574
1,691
1,336
1,291

% of Cases
Filed by Retirees
36.2%
31.9%
33.0%
35.3%
33.8%
33.5%

TABLE Vl-4
GERERAL IIOTOKS:

COBTESTED CASE CLADIS FILED BY RETIREES

Number of Cases
% of Cases
Number of Contested
Filed by Retirees Filed by Retirees
Cased Closed by GM
1,961
51.9%
1978
3,777
1,964
47.7%
1979
4,199
1,853
39.8%
1980
4,652
2,024
42.9%
1981
4,717
1982
4,302
1,715
39.9%
1,136
32.8%
1983
3,465
25.1%
1984*
3,337
839
*Projected from actual data for first 10 months of 1984.

If the retiree problea cannot be said to be "solved," the above data on
case filings and closings indicate that the combined effect of the
presuaption against lost earnings and the coordination of benefits
requireaent, both of which provisions went into effect only in 1982, have had
a striking iapact in reducing the incidence of the phenomenon. Retiree
claims will never fall to zero. There will always be cases when a retiree is
entitled to medical benefits or when he or she is prevented from any feasible
kind of post-retirement parttime employment by a total disability under the
new, strict definition. But in my judgment, no further legislation regarding
retirees is called for at this time.
D.

Insurance and the Accident Fund

I am not an actuary or an expert on the arcane world of insurance.
Partly for these reasons, partly because insurance issues were being pursued
so vigorously elsewhere in the Administration during the period of this
project, and partly because there were so many other matters to investigate,
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I did not regard the structures and procedures for insuring workers'
compensation in Michigan as a major topic for inquiry. Nonetheless, a few
matters were brought to my attention that deserve at least to be flagged.
A Michigan employer has three options for fulfilling its obligation to
provide workers' compensation protection. It may obtain coverage through a
private insurance carrier, or through the State Accident Fund, or through a
Bureau-approved method of self-insurance, either individual or group. Each
method presents its own separate set of issues.
I. Private insurance. From time to time various persons have looked
longingly toward the seemingly high benefits and low costs of our neighbor to
the south, Ohio, and have proposed establishing a state monopoly like Ohio's
over the insurance of workers' compensation, thus eliminating coverage by
private carriers. Perhaps the most intensive study into the possible
transmutation of a competitive state fund into an exclusive state fund has
been performed by Professor John F. Burton, Jr. of Cornell. He focused on a
particular jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, where such a proposal was extant, and
on Ohio, which was an obvious reference point for Pennsylvania because the
states are contiguous and have similar benefit levels, with Ohio having the
largest exclusive state fund. J. Burton with A. Krueger, Interstate
Variations in the Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation, with Particular
Reference to Ohio and Pennsylvania (1984). Burton concluded (id. at 100-01):
The difference in costs between the two jurisdictions is
relatively small, particularly in comparison to the general
magnitude of interstate differences in the employers' costs of
workers' compensation. This finding should give pause to anyone
who would argue that a change in the insurance arrangements in
either of these states will lead to a significant reduction in
the costs of workers' compensation. The similarity in costs in
Ohio and Pennsylvania, and the considerable differences among
other jurisdictions appear to be much more influenced by factors
such as relative levels of benefits than by the particular form
of insurance arrangement used to provide these benefits.
History is entitled to some deference in assessing schemes to restructure
a multimillion dollar industry. For many years private carriers have
accounted for more than half of all the workers' compensation benefits
provided in this State. Proponents of fundamental change should bear the
burden of persuasion. As the Burton-Hunt studies discussed in Part III of
this report indicate, the insurance industry in Michigan has demonstrated a
remarkable capacity in the last three years to adjust to new mandates and
ultimately to open competition. Huch more evidence is needed than currently
exists to justify basic structural changes in insurance arrangements.
Representatives of small business have expressed concern that
single-person employers often encounter great difficulty in obtaining
workers' compensation coverage, which may be necessary in order for them to
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bid on government contracts. Others find themselves caught between the
standard insurance classifications, and thus unable to qualify. These and
similar technical problems should be resolved.
2. Accident Fund. The proper role and function of the State Accident
Fund have long been a matter of debate. Some would like to see it serve as a
comparative cost yardstick in the manner of the original Tennessee Valley
Authority; others believe that its unique responsibility is to be the insurer
of last resort; and still others feel that the Accident Fund has become indistinguishable from private carriers (or is it group self-insureds?), and
thus has lost its very reason for being. In any event, the Accident Fund
looms less large in Michigan than competitive state funds elsewhere. Its
share of the premium market has shrunk in recent years from 6-7 percent to
only about 3-4 percent. Almost everyone close to the Fund, even if
disagreeing about its exact role, seems in accord that a more aggressive
sales policy is in order.
3. Self-Insurers. Traditionally about 40 percent of all Michigan
workers' compensation benefits are handled through self-insurance. This is a
far higher proportion than in most other jurisdictions, probably resulting
from the prominence of the Big Three in this State. With the approval of the
Bureau Director, an employer may be either a self-insurer or a member of a
group of self-insurers. There are currently about 600 individual
self-insured employers in this State, and about three dozen self-insured
groups. (Altogether, there are about 225,000 employers subject to the
Worker's Disability Compensation Act, and about 250 insurance companies
authorized to write workers' compensation in the State.)
A Self-Insurers' Security Fund has been established to pay benefits to
disabled workers when a self-insured employer becomes insolvent. MCL
§§ 418.501, 502, and 537. Grave doubts have been raised about the capacity of
the Fund to meet its statutory obligations in the event of the insolvency of
a major company or public utility. At one time those might have been
dismissed as merely speculative fears, but unfortunately recent years lend
them much more credence. The Bureau should be directed to study the adequacy
of the Self-Insurers' Security Fund and to report its findings to the
Legislature.
E.

Legal Representation and Attorneys' Fees

Labor organizations have urged that union agents be allowed to represent
claimants in workers' compensation proceedings before the ALJs. That is an
understandable proposal, and I sympathize with the effort to reduce the
formality and expense of the entire compensation process. There appear to be
serious legal and practical difficulties, however, in implementing this
suggestion. Workers' compensation practice has become highly complex and
technical, and the formal representation of claimants in trial hearings
before ALJs is quite possibly the "practice of law." It could therefore be
subject to the exclusive regulation of the Supreme Court of Michigan under
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the State Constitution. See, e.g., 3 A. Larson, Vorlmen's Compensation Law
I 83.15; 3 llichigan Law and Practice, Attorneys & Counselors I 3 (West 1979);
5 Callaghan's Michigan Civil 3urisprudence, Constitutional Law§ 73 (1980).
Guidance on this question may be provided by consolidated cases involving
representation before the Michigan Employment Security Commission, which are
now pending in the State Supreme Court. E.g., State Bar of Michigan v.
Galloway, No. 71983.
In point of fact, the specialized expertise needed to handle workers'
compensation cases effectively is beyond the ken of most practicing lawyers.
In introducing a text designed to enlighten his less knowledgeable
colleagues, one recognized specialist remarked: "Most worker's compensation
litigation is handled by a very small number of attorneys, who are sometimes
accused of having a 'club' or operating a 'closed bar."' E. Welch, Worker's
Coapensation in Michigan xi (1984). Having struggled to educate myself in
the intricacies of the subject, I do not find the demand for expertise
exaggerated or artificial. Nonetheless, a number of states permit lay
representation, including California, Connecticut, New York, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
At any rate, it would be highly desirable to emphasize to claimants at
the earlier, more informal processing stages, handled by the Bureau's
consultants (often in a mediating role) that legal representation is not
always necessary for a favorable result. Regrettably, many workers retain a
lawyer who files a formal application for a hearing before the employer is
even notified of the injury or claim.
Most claimants' attorneys in work~rs' compensation cases operate on a
contingent fee basis. If the claimant loses, the lawyer gets nothing. If
the claimant wins, the lawyer is paid in accordance with a s~hedule of
maximum attorney fees prescribed by the Bureau Director in Rule 14 of the
Bureau's Administrative Rules. In practice the maximum is usually the fee.
For example, if a case is tried and goes to a final Bureau order, the lawyer
is entitled to charge 30 percent of the balance of the accrued compensation,
after deducting his expenses. If a case is redeemed before trial, the lawyer
may get 15 percent of the first $25,000 of the settlement and 10 percent of
the balance. If the case is tried to completion but then redeemed before a
final Bureau order, the lawyer is entitled to 20 percent. Vagaries are
introduced into the system because there are certain types of hearings for
which the lawyer gets nothing, and others (for example, an employer's
petition to stop ongoing payments on the ground the employee is no longer
disabled) for which the attorney is theoretically entitled to a recovery, but
where there will be no funds from which to obtain it. The career claimant's
attorney must simply hope that these gains and losses balance out over time.
I lack sufficient facts to make a considered judgment about the adequacy (or
otherwise) of the current maxi.aua fee schedule for plaintiffs' lawyers, but
do not feel it is inappropriate to leave the matter in the hands of the
Bureau's professionals. I note, however, that (1) the existing schedule on
its face seems generally in line with the differently calculated schedules of
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other states, and (2) the Bureau should be expressly authorized to limit the
length of time for which benefit accrual will be the basis of setting
attorneys' fees. The latter step would eliminate any appearance of a
temptation to lawyers to delay the proceedings so as to increase the amount
accrued at the time of an award.
One statutory inconsistency has emerged as a result of the 1981
amendments. MCL § 418.858 indicates that the maximum should be based on the
benefit amount "after coordination," while§ 418.354(16) states flatly that
fees are to be based on the "uncoordinated" benefit amount. This discrepancy
should be rectified. Theoretically, it might be contended that only the
coordinated benefits result in a net gain for the worker, and thus only they
should be the basis of attorneys' fees. Generally, I think this is correct,
but the establishment of entitlement to workers' compensation may also have
substantial tax implications for the employee and may ensure long-term
benefits in the event of a continuing disability. The Bureau should be
authorized to take these factors into account in drawing up its schedule of
attorneys' fees. At the same time the Bureau should not automatically award
maximum fees in every given case.
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VII.

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Decisions and Appeals

1.
De novo review and Appeal Board backlog. At present there is a
two-tier structure for decision-making in contested cases within the Michigan
workers' compensation system. Hearings are conducted by a single person
whose official title is hearing referee, but who is informally and almost
universally known as an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). For the past
several years there have been approximately thirty ALJs, about equally
divided between Detroit and the rest of the State. Ten additional ALJs have
recently been appointed. ALJs are Civil Service personnel appointed by the
Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation.

Hearings before the ALJ are relatively formal, although they do not
adhere strictly to the rules of evidence. The proceedings are
stenographically reported, but a transcript is not prepared unless there is
an appeal from the ALJ's decision. The ALJ issues a short-form award
granting or denying benefits. Ordinarily there is no statement of reasons
for the decision. For the past two decades the average time from application
to hearing has ranged from about a year to fifteen months. The Bureau's
"long range performance objective" is to process 90 percent of all contested
cases within 270 days. A claimant granted benefits is entitled to 70 percent
of the weekly amount awarded, pending review of the ALJ's decision.
Parties aggrieved by an ALJ's decision have a right of appeal to the
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board. The Appeal Board in its discretion may
hear the parties and allow them to submit additional evidence. In practice
it almost invariably considers the case on the basis of the written record of
the hearing before the ALJ and briefs submitted by the parties. The Appeal
Board must announce in writing its finding of fact and conclusions of law.
MCL § 418.859. In essence, this entitles the parties to a trial "de novo"
(meaning anew) before the Appeal Board, albeit on the record rather than in
person. From a final order of the Appeal Board discretionary judicial review
is available in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the absence
of fraud, however, the findings of fact by the Appeal Board are conclusive
and only questions of law are reviewable by the courts.
In the last two decades the membership of the Appeal Board has grown from
five to seven (1965) to eleven (1973) to fifteen (1978). Of the current
total membership of fifteen, five are designated as representatives of
employee interests, five as representative of employer interests, and five as
representative of the general public. Members are appointed by the Governor,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years.
Table VII-1 sets forth the annual case load of the Workers' Compensation
Bureau since 1968. The most significant fact revealed by these figures is
that the rising tide of claims and contested cases, which continued right
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TABLE VII-1
WORKERS' CtllPENSATJIJl BIIIIQUr rH«W. CASEI.OAD STATISTICS

1"8

19'9

1978

1971

1,n

1973

1974

1975

1976

19"

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

59,483

63,581

71,981

n,437

'9,045

'9,204

'9,847

62,784

70,397

76,934

85,078

97,088

88,387'

77,203

6' 1674

67,450

74,132

71,'34

82,417

84,543

83,972

89,577

97,486

102,254

95,154

95,857

183,436

122,064

137,955

l3' 1996

129,640

145,459

85,5'8

83,591

OISES CLOSEO
<•Pa~nt Stopptd' l
(F11111102)

68,963

77,273

78,830

77,748

82,402

89,594

94,324

86,312

8',358

101,723

114,439

128,175

127,057

120,458

184,751

93,906

96,728

CfflTESTED OISES RtvD
(Fara 104)

20,451

22,347

21,543

23,769

26,33'

25,982

28,117

28,776

29 1'8I

29,782

30,63'

37,8'5

48,232

44,054

32,'74

28,605

23,183
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(6t1nt1dl
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7,186

206
891
238
4,937
914

7,535
89
930
238
5,190
1,088

8,524
57
1,054
295

J0,6,12
82
1,459
433
7,714
974

12,071
112
1,259
403
,,22,
1,068

11,364
130
1,224
407
7,720
1,883

10,099
104
1,395
564
6,437
1,599

10,567
18'
1,439
6,760
1,646

10,320
207
1,283
444
6,706
1,760

12,054
240
1,496
596
8,356
1,366

14,4'8
205
1,591
'87
10,547
1,438

l6 195ol
424
1,984
902
11,338
2,316

15,144
412
1,511
817
11,255
2,151

13,289
261
1,614
1,015
9,012
1,387

15,264
392
1,985
1,273
9,899
1,m

14,~
411
1,637
1,228
8,883

1,012

9,766
93
1,2,s
305
7,076
997

9,119

11,272

12,741

15,317
13,634
1,683

15,186
13,354
1,832

15,789
13,940
1,849

17,284
14,942
2,342

14,708
12,541
2,167

19,371
16,962
2,409

19,659
17,295
2,364

19,964
17,269
2,695

20,223
17,160
3,163

25,916
23,,126
2,358

26,657
24,217
2,448
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1,929
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16,r.12
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6D.r.c

59,3'1.

16,305
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84
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254
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IICl<LOG OF CIMESTED
CASES AS OF
MJIWIYI

13,567

J8,JD8

21,'83

21,716

21,587

23,349

CIWl&E FRIii PRIOR
MWIY I

NIA

4,541

3,875

(129)

1,762

TIITAI. DISPOSITIH

53'

64.71.

65.6¾

62.4'1.

58.3'1.

60,5',(

63.SX
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l,824

54.4'1.

29,938

29,979

32,018

34,691

42,932

41,801

34,584

◄1,m

38,797

247

243

297

280

354

147

162

98

63

42

22,795

24,118

29,775

31,416

32,858

32,847

35,423

34,440

37,288

39,087

30,493

(554)

1,323

5,657

1,641

1,442

2,848

1,799

(3,931)
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Offict of Strategy
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TABLE VII-2
TRENDS IN WORKERS' CIJ1PENSATICN rASELMOS FOR 5-YEAR PERIODS FRIJ11970-1985

[January '70-January '751

[January '75-January '801

[January 'SO-January '85tt]

:I. Change

<Chang, in
Vollne)

:I. Change

(Chang, in
Vol111e)

:I. Change

(Chang, in
Vol1111e>

REPORTS OF INJURY•:
<For11 100)

9.9"1.

(+ 6,266)

39.0Y.

(+27,241)

-23,TI.

(-23,056)

rASES OPENED FOR
PAYHENT:
(Fom 101)

24.0'/.

(+19,767)

34.9'/.

(+35,701)

-39.4'1.

(-54,364)

rASES CLOSED
('PAYHENT STOPPED'):
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22,0'/.

(+17,051)

35. 9"/.

(+33,851)

-24.5¼
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25.8'1.
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34.T/.

(+ 9,758)

-39 ,O'I.

(-14,762)

OISPOSITICNS:
('Decisions' and
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52.~

(+ 9,841)

21.1¼

(+ 6,043)

-11 .2'1.

(- 3,894)

REOB1PTICNS GRANTED:

53.~

(+ 6,012)

17 .O'/.

(+ 2,939)

-17,2'/.

(- 3,471)

BACKLOG OF PENDING
C(J{TESTED rASES:

9.TI.

(+2,135)

46.9'1.

(+11,305)

-13.9'/.

(- 4,930)

INot all claims for ccnpensation arise frm an official 'Report of Injury' <Fom 100).
11Esti11ate of year-end totals for 1984 is a projection using actual data frm first nine months,

Office of Strategy
10-16-84

TABLE VII-3

Percentage of Decisions Appealed to Appeal Board:
Decisions by Admin. Law Judges
Benefits Granted Benefits Denied
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984**

891
930
1,054
1,295
1,459
1,259
1,224
1,395
1,439
1,203
1,496
1,591
1,984
1,510
1,614
1,905
1,637

238
238
295
305
433
403
407
564
536
444
596
687
902
817
1,015
1,273
1,220

Total

1968-84

Appeals Received by
W.C. Appeal Board
694
990
1,131
1,035
1,285
1,231
1,215
1,548
1,450
1,376
1,629
1,926
2,337
1,979
2,229
2,576
2,188

1,129
1,168
1,349
1.,600
1,892
1,662
1,631
1,959
1,975
1,647
2,092
2,278
2,886
2,327
2,629
3,178
2,857

% Appealed*
61.5

84.8
83.8
64.7
67.9
74.1

74.5
79.0
73 .. 4
83.5

77.9

84.5

81.0
85.0
84.8

81.0
76.6
---

*Percentage of decisions appealed must be viewed as approximate because some decisions will
be rendered in one calendar year, but appealed in the following calendar year.
**Projection based on actual data for first 9 months of 1984. This is a conservative estimate
because a recent shortage of clerical staff at the Appeal Board has resulted in fewer appeals
being acknowledged as "Received" by the Board.

Appeals of Decisions Over 5-Year Periods
Total Decisions
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84

8,134
9,951
13,877

Appeals Received
5,897
7,929
11,309

% Appealed
72.5
79.7
81.5

Office of Strategy &Forecasting
November 7, 1984

through the early '80s, has at last begun to ebb. The backlog of pending
contested cases is also now declining. A summary of the trends over
five-year periods since 1970 is contained in Table VII-2. Perhaps the most
important conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the addition of the
ten new ALJs may well result in bringing the case-load problem at the trial
stage under control. The Bureau's announced aim is to have ALJs decide 90
percent of all contested cases within nine months of the application for
hearing. I consider that feasible and reasonably satisfactory. Four to six
months should be the target in the more ordinary case. At least I see no
reason at this time for major structural changes at the ALJ level.
The situation at the Appeal Board is very different. Table VII-3
indicates the number and percentages of ALJ decisions being carried to the
Appeal Board. As can be seen, during the past decade between 75 and 85
percent of all AL.J awards were appealed. That alone is a distressing
commentary on the lack of finality in decision-making at what should be a
much more dispositive step in the administrative process. Even worse, as
Table VII-4 reveals, the accelerating rate and nuaber of appeals in recent
years have caused the Board's backlog to mushroom from a .ere 2,000 cases in
1976 to ala>st 7,000 as of Rovellber 1984. That is the equivalent of about
five or six years' output by the Appeal Board. Such delay in any
administrative system is simply intolerable. It is hurtful financially and
even psychologically to both employees and employers whose rights and
liabilities remain in a state of suspension and uncertainty for many months.
Long delays are also hurtful to the system itself. Confidence in it is
eroded, and additional administrative expenses are imposed on the Bureau and
the parties.

TABLE VII-4
Decisions, Affirmances, and Backlog of Appeal Board,
1975-1984

Decisions
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Affirmances

704

545

607
685
839
1047
1072
614

422
483
586
715
761
474

% Affirmances

Backlog

77
77

2104
2081
2219
2695
3220
4042
4294
4773
5977
6800+*

70
71

70
68
71

77

* November 1984 estimate
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The extraordinarily high rate of appeals, especially in recent years, and
the corresponding build-up in case backlog at the Appeal Board, have several
causes. First, the very notion of de novo review, which means in essence
that a whole fresh look is taken at both the facts and the law by the
appellate body, is an open invitation to disappointed litigants and their
lawyers to seek to retry the case from scratch. Second, whenever the law
seems unsettled, there will be a natural tendency to pursue clarification by
appeal to higher authority. Uncertainty in the law can be created by major
substantive changes in the statute itself, such as occurred in 1980 and 1981.
Uncertainty can also result from the failure of a key decision-maker to speak
with a single voice. The current fifteen-member Appeal Board sits in
rotating panels of three persons each. This undoubtedly constitutes a
fractionating element in the appellate process, and the effect is to
encourage losers below to seek review.
The degree of consistency between the thinking of the ALJs and the Appeal
Board is reflected in the affirmance rate of ALJ decisions by the Board (see
Table VII-4). Since 1970 that has ranged from a high of 84 percent in 1971
(when there were seven Appeal Board members) to 77 percent in the mid '70s
(when there were eleven Board members) to 68-71 percent in the late '70s and
early '80s (when there were fifteen members). It should be noted, however,
that the affirmance rate returned to a healthier 77 percent in 1983. Over the
years the Appeal Board has reversed ALJs on questions of law about one-third
of the time but has reversed them on issues of fact only about one-sixth of
the time.
De novo review makes most sense when an administrative agency that is
handling a relatively light case load, especially an agency in its formative
years, is attempting to have every decision in its entirety be the product of
"the agency." In such a context the hearing officer is essentially the
compiler of the agency's official record rather than a true decision-maker.
When an agency has matured and has established a large body of precedent,
however, and particularly when it has become overburdened with work, it is
fair to ask whether de novo review is any longer a luxury that can be
afforded, or a procedure that is needed.
It is true that de novo review of initial determinations at the trial
level remains the norm of the country's workers' compensation systems -- most
of which are also struggling with serious substantive and administrative
problems. But there is prestigious authority for a different model. For
example, Congress in 1972 amended the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act to provide that "findings of fact in the [ALJ's]
decision under review by the [Benefits Review] Board shall be conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 33
U.s.c. § 92l(b)(3). A similar approach is followed in three states,
Pennsylvania, Florida, and Arizona. 3 A. Larson, Workllen's Compensation Law
§ 80.12(c).
In addition, some states, notably Wisconsin, defer to the
hearing referee's findings of fact when witnesses' credibility is at issue.
Id. § 80.12(d).
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A major study entitled Social Security Hearings and Appeals was published
by Professor Jerry L. Mashaw of Yale Law School and associates in 1978. It
concentrated on ALJ determinations in Social Security disability cases and
subsequent review by the Appeals Council. Under existing regulations, the
ALJ's findings of fact were to stand if supported by substantial evidence.
De novo review was permitted, however, upon the submission of "new and
material" evidence. The authors commented (p. 103):
We can discover no persuasive basis for this provision. If the
claimant has new and material evidence, he should be permitted to
petition to reopen the hearing. The decisions as to whether to
reopen the case and how the case is affected by the new evidence
could then be rendered by the person most familiar with the case,
the ALJ ••••
The only rationale for de novo review is that the reviewer is in
a better position than the original decider. As previously
stated, there is no reason to believe that the Appeals Council
can perform this function better than ALJs. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Although the provisions of the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act
dealing with contested cases do not apply to hearings and appeals in the
workers' compensation system, the elimination of de novo review by the Appeal
Board would be compatible with the APA. Thus, section 81(3) provides: "On
appeal from or review of a proposal of decision the agency, except as it may
limit the issue upon notice or by rule, shall have all the powers which it
would have if it had presided at the hearing." MCL § 24.281(3) (emphasis
supplied). A number of State agencies have in fact opted to proceed in the
usual case on the basis of the record before the hearing referee, without
granting full de novo review. These include the Employment Security
Commission (in practice; cf. Michigan Administrative Code, R 421.1303
(1979)), the Public Service Commission (e.g., Consumers Power Co., PSC Case
No. U-6923, Jan. 20, 1982, regarding interlocutory appeals), licensing boards
under the Public Health Code (MCL § 333.16233(4)) and the Occupational Code
(MCL §§ 339.513(1), 339.514(1), and the Tax Tribunal (in practice).
It can be argued that eliminating de novo review and sharpening the
distinction between the responsibilities of the ALJs and the Appeal Board
would further increase the legalistic nature of what ideally should be a
simple administrative process, in keeping with the original "no-fault"
concept of workers' compensation. Regrettable or not, however, the reality
is that at least in contested cases, workers' compensation law and practice
is an immensely complicated affair, navigable only by skilled specialists,
for the most part legally trained. We would be well advised to accept that
reality and to work within its constraints. Here that means, specifically,
creating an administrative structure where particular functions are performed
at particular levels, and where we abandon the extravagance of duplication of
effort. The primary responsibility of the Appeal Board should be the orderly
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development of a coherent, uniform body of law.
2.
Recoamiendation of substantial evidence review. Drawing upon the
analogous standards for decision and review contained in the Administrative
Procedures Act, therefore, I would reconaend that findings of fact by .AL.Js in
workers' coapensation proceedings be conclusive if "supported by coapetent,
material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." See, e.g., MCL
§§ 24.285, 24.306. Errors of law, of course, would still remain entirely
subject to correction at the Appeal Board level. In my judgment, the
"substantial evidence" standard would nonetheless allow the Appeal Board to
remedy any serious misstep by an ALJ in assessing the evidence and making
factual findings. The great advantage is that the Appeal Board would not be
required to take the time in every case to familiarize itself with the whole
record and to prepare its independent findings of fact. Instead, it could
focus on the appealing party's contentions that particular findings were not
supported by substantial evidence, thus confining its perusal of the record
to those portions that the parties said supported their respective
positions.
Currently ALJs do not prepare written findings of facts and conclusions
of law in the ordinary case. Nonetheless, if they have performed their
function in a rational manner, they have gone through the process mentally.
It should take only a slight amount of additional time to spell out their
findings and conclusions in short, numbered paragraphs. It is imperative
that the inordinate delay that has plagued the Appeal Board not be
transferred to the ALJ stage. To prevent that will require self-restraint by
the ALJs, and an understanding that they are not being asked for elaborate,
artistic opinions. What is needed is a crisp, concise statement of the case,
which will enable a losing party to determine more intelligently than
heretofore whether an appeal is justified, and which may serve in the event
of an appeal as the basis for Board review. Furthermore, when the Board
affirms the ALJ's decision without modification, it should be entitled to
adopt the decision as its own. That would further conserve the Board's
energies for the significant task of interpreting and applying the statute in
the more novel and unprecedented cases.
In the comprehensive 1980 report on the results of the Workers'
Compensation Adjudication Project (the "Lesinski Report"), it was similarly
concluded that ALJs should be required to support their decisions with
findings of fact and conclusions of law (pp. 155-158). The Lesinski Report
would then have the ALJs' findings of fact be binding on the Appeal Board
"unless they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence" (p. 157). My
own suggested standard of "substantial ••• evidence on the whole record" is
deliberately designed to allow the Appeal Board a bit more latitude; the
wording is also more in accordance with existing language in the
Administrative Procedures Act. Otherwise, I agree entirely with Judge
Lesinski that fact findings are better made at the trial level where witness
demeanor can be observed; that written ALJ decisions would inform losing
parties why they lost, which alone might obviate one reason for appeals; that
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eliminating de novo review should also reduce the number of appeals,
especially those aimed at relitigating the facts; and that the Appeal Board
ought to be able to act without a formal opinion in those cases where it can
simply adopt the ALJs' findings.
The requirement of written findings of fact and conclusions of law should
only be imposed for cases in which hearings have not begun when the
amendatory legislation becomes effective. ALJs undoubtedly differ in the
extent to which they take notes at a hearing. Since they will not have the
transcript available when preparing their decisions, they should have due
forewarning of the need for adequate material on which to base their findings
and conclusions.
In perfecting an appeal, the appealing party should be required to
specify those portions of the transcript on which it is relying in disputing
the soundness of the ALJ's findings of fact. Theoretically, this might seem
to place the appealing party in the awkward position of trying to "prove a
negative"; the party might conceivably argue that the record is totally
devoid of any supporting evidence. In practice, there will rarely be a
problem. Both parties will have submitted opposing testimony and exhibits.
At the same time, however, some reviewing courts, cognizant of the
appellant's potential quandary, formally require the appellee to cite those
portions of the record that arguably constitute the substantial evidence
supporting the findings of the ALJ. That would seem a sensible way to
proceed here. The practical consequence is that the parties, between them,
will have narrowed the Appeal Board's inquiry and substantially reduced its
work load. One might also hope that the very process of having to get the
testimony transcribed and exceptions taken to the ALJ's findings through
references to particular portions of the record, in the course of perfecting
the appeal, will itself serve to discourage the less meritorious appeals.
An anticipated objection to the elimination of de novo review is that too
much power will then be reposed in the hands of individual ALJs. Some ALJs
are regarded in certain quarters as deficient in objectivity and impartiality
of judgment. My own examination of the decisional records of the present
group of ALJs suggests that the claims of bias are exaggerated. Naturally,
there is a range of attitude reflected in ALJ awards granting or denying
benefits, but human beings are not calculating machines and some inclination
toward liberality on the one hand or strictness on the other must be expected
in a certain number of any group of reasonable people. Since 1978, the
overall performance of ALJs in Michigan in granting benefits has been as
follows:
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TABLE VII-5
ALJ Awards

of Benefits, 1978-1984

Total Decisions

% Granted

Detroit

Outstate

Total

661
782
1288
837
680
759
648

1462
1606
1598
1490
1949
2419
1495

2092
2388
2886
2327
2626
3178
2143

Totals 5660

11,983

17,643

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Detroit
71

68
71

66
61
61
62
66

Outstate

Total

7.2
70
67
64
61
60

70
69
65
61
60

55

57

64

65
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As can be seen, there has been a rather sharp decline in the rate at
which benefits have been granted, especially in the years 1981 and 1982.
Altogether, 65 percent of the decisions of ALJs during the period of
1978-1984 granted benefits. I examined the "grant rate" of each individual
ALJ who had more than three years' service. There were 26 such persons out
of the then-total complement of 29. Fifteen of the 26 had a "grant rate" that
did not deviate by more than ten percentage points from the "standard" of 65
percent. I then concentrated upon the remaining 11, to see how their
decisions had fared on appeal. The results were as follows:
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TABLE VII-6
AL.J Awards of Benefits and Affirmances

ALJ

% Granted, 1978-1984

% Affirmances, 1978-84

80
78
78

71

A
B
C
D
E

79
63
68
64

77

77

***
54
50
50
49
48
48

F

G
H

I
J
K

Note:

77
77

69
74
74
68

The affirmance rate for all AL.J decisions in
1978-84 was 72 percent.

While there was a considerable range in the percentages of decisions
granting benefits by the 11 ALJs at either end of the spectrum, the
affirmance rate hardly suggests that this group was any more prone to error,
as evidenced by Appeal Board reversals, than their colleagues who were closer
to the average grant rate. The affirmance rate for all AW decisions since
1978 has been 72 percent. The affirmance rate for this particular group
ranges from 63 percent to 79 percent, with the average of their affirmance
rates being 71 percent, almost identical to their colleagues'.
Another way to test the soundness of ALJs' decisions is to compare their
affirmance rate with that of federal district judges or federal
administrative agencies in the federal courts of appeals. In 1980 the courts
of appeals reversed district judges in 19 percent of all civil cases and
reversed administrative agencies in 22.4 percent of their cases. Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, p. 212 (1980). The reversal rate for Michigan .AL.Ts in workers'
C011pensation cases was a c011parable 16-23 percent in 1970-77 and again a
coaparable 23 percent in 1983. Even the overall reversal rate for ALJs of 28
percent in 1978-84 does not look bad, especially when one considers that
their fact findings were subject to de novo review, while federal district
courts are reversed on fact findings only if they are "clearly erroneous" and
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federal administrative agencies are reversed on facts only if their findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.
Although I do not find that the hard data provide significant support for
accusations of bias against ALJs, I concede that a perception of bias or of
political favoritism in their appointment can be almost as damaging to the
acceptability of their awards. In view of the spotlight that has been
focused upon this particular group, I would strongly urge the Legislature or
the Civil Service COlllllli.ssion to establish a bipartisan AL.J Qualifications
Advisory Coaaittee to interview and evaluate prospective candidates, with
ratings to be transmitted confidentially to the appointing authority. My
model for this proposal is the Judicial Qualifications Committee of the State
Bar, which has functioned effectively for a number of years in advising the
Governor on the qualifications of candidates for appointment to fill
vacancies in the State judiciary. Like the Governor, the appointing
authority in the case of ALJs would not be bound by the Advisory Committee's
evaluations, but experience has demonstrated that such assessments are given
significant weight. I should add that I have not closely examined the
question of whether the Bureau Director is the most appropriate person to
appoint ALJs.
A further step that might be considered to enhance the independence of
the ALJs would be to remove them physically from the rest of the Bureau's
offices and to provide them with a Chief ALJ and a Deputy Chief to handle
their assignments and to provide administrative support. But this would
insert another layer of bureaucracy and could reduce efficiency. I myself
have not seen evidence that such action is necessary.
3.
Streaalining the Appeal Board. Hy last major rec01111endation for
restructuring the administrative system is to create a new five-.e.ber, or
possibly seven-meaber, Appeal Board to replace the current fifteen-aeaber
body. An enlarged membership does not necessarily lead to increased output,
and it certainly does not contribute to unified decision-making, especially
when the members operate in three-person panels. My belief is that a
streamlined Appeal Board can be even more effective in providing a consistent
interpretation of the law, and that a smaller body should be able to cope
with a future case load where it has only limited responsibility for findings
of fact. My preference would be to start with just five members and move to
seven only if that proves necessary.

As shown in Table VII-1, contested case filings are now back down below
24,000 a year, in the range that prevailed from 1969 through 1971. Those
years produced about 1200 to 1600 contested ALJ decisions annually. Even
assuming that three-quarters of such a number would still be appealed, I am
satisfied that 900-1200 cases a year are a manageable workload for a five- or
seven-member Appeal Board, given substantially reduced record-reading and
fact-finding responsibilities, the use of legal assistants, and the authority
to adopt ALJs' decisions as the Board's. Although the seven-member Appeal
Board of the early '70s was having trouble with the caseload of that period,
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I envisage a markedly less onerous assignment for the Board in the future.
(The five-member National Labor Relations Board, operating with a large legal
staff but with considerably broader statutory responsibilities, decides about
2,000 contested cases a year.)
To promote stability and continuity on the Appeal Board, I believe the
length of terms should be increased from the current four years to six or
seven years. These of course should be staggered terms. The interest-group
designations of Appeal Board members ought to be abolished. To ensure
acceptability, the Board's membership should continue to be representative of
business, labor, and other interests throughout the State. But to assign the
actual label of "employer," "employee," or other such representative is too
likely to convey the notion that each individual member has an ongoing
obligation to promote the interests of a particular constituency in handling
every individual case. That is unseemly, and detracts from the higher public
role that each Board member should be entitled to feel he or she is playing.
To enhance the stature of Appeal Board members still further, I would also
urge that the Governor make use of a bipartisan Advisory Committee to assist
in the evaluation of candidates. This could be either the same body as, or a
body similar to, the ALJ Qualifications Advisory Committee I discussed
earlier.
At present Appeal Board members need not be lawyers, and they are paid
less than the ALJs whose decisions they review. (All new ALJs must be
attorneys.) That is anomalous under any set of conditions, and it will be
even more so if the Appeal Board becomes substantially less involved in
factfinding and concentrates instead on legal rulings. I would therefore
recommend that only attorneys at law be eligible for membership on the new
Appeal Board, and that their rate of compensation be substantially
increased. With an eventual reduction in the total membership of the Appeal
Board from fifteen to five, or at most seven, a considerable raise could be
granted without an addition to the total budget. It would also be
considerably more economical to provide law clerks for each Board member to
assist in legal research and decision drafting than to maintain the existing
complement of fifteen members.
Streamlining the Appeal Board should produce some financial savings for
the State directly. But I anticipate that the elimination of de novo review
and the consequent reduction in the number and complexity of appeals will
have the most pronounced and beneficial effect on the costs incurred by
litigants.
There remains for discussion the appalling problem of the five-year
backlog of cases at the Appeal Board. The maxim that justice delayed is
justice denied is especially cruel in its application to disabled workers.
There seems a consensus among labor, management, and other interested groups
across the State that drastic measures must be taken if necessary to remedy
the situation. One proposal has been to have ad hoc tripartite arbitration
panels replace both the ALJs and the Appeal Board. Under this arrangement
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the employer and the employee would each designate one arbitrator and the
latter two would then select a third person as the impartial chair.
I see at least two major flaws in this suggestion. First, it would
eliminate the element of administrative expertise from the decisional
process, and prevent the systematic development of any coherent, unified body
of law, except through costly and time-consuming court litigation. Second,
as an occasional labor arbitrator myself, I am more than a little skeptical
about the availability of an adequate number of persons capable of serving in
the critical role of impartial chair. The law of workers' compensation is
far more technical and complex, and takes far more time to master, than the
sort of issue presented in the usual labor arbitration case. Experience
under the Michigan Medical Arbitration Program is not at all comparable.
From the inception of medical arbitration in 1976 through August 1984 there
had been only 95 arbitral awards. By contrast, from 1978 (I start with 1978
for comparison purposes because that is the year the Medical Arbitration
Program could fairly be said to have swung into full operation) through
September 1984, ALJs issued 17,643 decisions granting or denying benefits.
Needless to say, even if arbitration is not made a formal part of the
workers' compensation system, it could always be encouraged for voluntary
adoption by the parties in any given case as a final and binding method of
resolving their dispute.
Hy recoaaendation is to retain the existing fifteen-meaber Appeal Board
on a temporary basis, probably for three or four years, and have it devote
its efforts solely to the eliai.nation of the backlog. In other words, there
should be a complete break with the past, and the new five- or seven-member
Board should start with a clean slate. Its jurisdiction should attach only
to those cases in which ALJs had not yet begun trials on the effective date
of the amendatory legislation or on some specified subsequent date. That
also means that the members of the new Board might not have to be appointed
innnediately, since presumably there would be some lapse of time before
appeals from post-amendment ALJ decisions would reach the Board in any
volume.

I would also suggest that the old Board consider establishing some type
of expedited process for handling the more routine cases caught in the
backlog. It would seem senseless to make the parties in such cases await
their turn in the multiyear mass when a relatively short time spent with
their file could result in a quick disposition. Perhaps one or two
three-person panels could be given the special assignment of sifting through
the entire backlog to identify and decide those cases susceptible of summary
treatment.
It is probably inevitable that members of the old Appeal Board will begin
to leave for other positions as the Board nears its termination date. Rather
than have the process of cleaning up the last of the backlog slowed down, I
would recommend that ALJs be made eligible to serve temporarily (perhaps for
a maximum period of one year) on the old Board. There is precedent for such
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an approach in the 1984 amendments to the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 u.s.c. § 92l(b)(5). As another emergency
measure, the Legislature may wish to authorize the appointment of retired
Board members, members of the "new" Board during its expectably slow start-up
period,, ALJs, or similarly qualified personnel to serve on a temporarily
enlarged Appeal Board to enable an even swifter liquidation of the backlog.
B.

Miscellaneous

1. Evidence, including medical testiaony. Several decisions of the
Michigan Court of Appeals have indicated that the rules of evidence in
workers' compensation cases are less rigorous than those applicable in courts
of general jurisdiction. Specifically, for example, an ALJ is entitled to
admit hearsay of the sort that would probably be excluded in a court of law.
Nonetheless, workers' compensation hearings before an ALJ are relatively
formal, and it is clear that the reviewing courts expect the proceedings to
comply generally with the Michigan Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Holford v.
General Motors Corp., 116 Mich. App. 488 (1982).
As a practical matter, perhaps the most significant evidentiary problem
in the processing of workers' compensation cases is the treatment of medical
evidence. Once much emphasis was placed upon obtaining the personal
testimony of medical witnesses for both the claimant and the defendant at the
trial before the ALJ. That inevitably produced many frustrating
postponements, since it required the simultaneous appearance of several
extremely busy people. Gradually it became customary to take medical
evidence by deposition, i.e., sworn testimony on the record outside the
actual hearing. In Detroit, this is ordinarily done after the trial, while
in the rest of the State, it is done before the trial. One can understand
the Detroit procedure if the ALJ is essentially just a compiler of the
official record, but the outstate approach makes much more sense if the ALJ
is a true decision-maker.

One further step away from live testimony should be taken in the usual
case. Although depositions mean that the physician or other medical witness
does not have to appear before the ALJ, there will still be a need ordinarily
for a joint session involving the doctor, the two lawyers, and a court
reporter. It is surely time to ask whether a simple (perhaps notarized)
medical report would not be adequate prima facie evidence, with the opposing
party entitled (at its own expense) to seek a deposition or to submit
interrogatories in clarification or rebuttal. My own experience as an
arbitrator suggests that a good, extensive medical report, which can be read
over at leisure, will often serve as well as live testimony.
With regard to occupational diseases, the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws declared (Report at 51):
R2.15.
We recommend that the etiology of a disease, being a
medical question, be determined by a disability evaluation unit
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under the control and supervision of the workmen's compensation
agency.
R2.16.
We further recommend for deaths and impairments
apparently caused by a combination of work-related and
nonwork-related sources, issues of causation be determined by the
disability evaluation unit.
The Michigan workers' compensation system of course has nothing akin to a
disability evaluation unit, and the functions envisaged for it by the
National Commission are performed in this State by the ALJs. See, e.g.,
Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich. 152 (1946). The National Commission's
proposals run counter to the American tradition of resolving medical
questions, like other factual questions, through the adversarial process.
There are strongly vested interests favoring the practice of letting
imaginative lawyers and their supporting casts of paid medical witnesses
fight out the issues of etiology and causation. Furthermore, it cannot be
gainsaid that in some individual cases greater justice will be achieved by a
hard-hitting, creative adversarial presentation. Nonetheless, for the system
as a whole, it is all very costly and time-consuming. In light of the
intrinsic imponderables of occupational diseases, as discussed earlier in
this report, the adversarial approach to medical determinations is probably
in net effect quite meaningless. The ALJ is ultimately going to have to
make, for legal purposes, a medical judgment that in many cases will
necessarily be an arbitrary one. Much can be said in favor of substituting
for this trial by contradictory medical testimony a single detendnation by
an iapartially selected medical panel. The results would not necessarily be
better, but there is little reason to think they would be worse, and they
would almost surely be much cheaper and faster.
Impartial medical panels or examiners have not proved popular, needless
to say, in the workers' compensation systems of this country. Nonetheless,
they exist in one form or another in about fifteen jurisdictions, sometimes
concentrating on dust or other lung diseases. Professor Peters. Barth, of
the University of Connecticut, a leading authority on occupational diseases,
is currently conducting a major study of medical panels in several states.
In 1980 he produced a most thoughtful and balanced report on medical review
panels in what he described as the "profoundly" different workers'
compensation systems of British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. If his
findings concerning the generally successful Canadian experience can only be
given limited weight because of the differences in the two countries'
systems, his forthcoming American study should definitely receive the closest
attention.
2. Limitations. Employers have long sought a "tougher" or "more
meaningful" statute of limitations in workers' compensation cases. There is
an understandable resistance to the assertion of stale claims that may be
based on forgotten events of long ago. On the other hand, the consequences
of certain injuries, especially those involving occupational diseases with a
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long period of latency, may not be known for many months or even years. The
legislative effort to work out a reasonable balance between employer and
employee interests is reflected in MCL §§ 418.381, 441, and 833. These
statutory provisions, which were amended in 1980 and 1981, contain some
drafting inconsistencies, but their general purport seems as follows. An
employee must give the employer notice within 90 days after the employee
knows or should have known of an injury, although failure to give notice is
excused unless the employer can prove prejudice. Then, an oral or written
claim for compensation must be made to the employer, or a written claim must
be made to the Bureau, within two years after the injury, or the
manifestation of disability, or the last date of employment. (That last
phrase obviously introduces the possibility of a considerable extension of
the time for filing a claim after the actual date of injury.) Despite the
possibility that a claim may be filed many years after an injury occurs, the
employee cannot receive compensation benefits for more than two years
preceding the application for a hearing with the Bureau. Furthermore, if
payment of compensation is begun and then stopped, and a worker later
petitions for a resumption of the payment of benefits of the same type,
compensation will not be ordered for more than one year prior to the filing
date. Both these latter provisions protect an employer against liability for
a large accumulation of benefits.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments on limitations have not yet received
definitive interpretations. My impression is that they will probably not
produce significant changes in the preexisting law. (One definite but
relatively minor change is the reduction of the period for notice concerning
occupational diseases from 120 days to 90 days, to coincide with the period
for giving notice of personal injuries.) Limitations on claims for
occupational diseases will continue to be the most troublesome area, but that
a nationwide problem. However a statute is worded, agencies and courts are
going to be sympathetic to the worker who ultimately succumbs to a disease
with a recognized period of long latency. Michigan's two-year limitation on
claims is generally in line with other industrial states, and less generous
than the three-year period of Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and
Recoaaendation 6.13 of the Rational Coaai.ssion (Report at 107-08).
3. Voluntary payments, petitions to stop, etc. Employee and employer
counsel called to my attention two situations about which both groups felt
grieved in different ways. The first is when an employer starts voluntary
payments, and then terminates them for some reason, e.g., it discovers the
employee has been working elsewhere or believes the employee is no longer
disabled. The second situation is when the employer is under a final Bureau
order to make payments, and wishes to stop for reasons similar to those just
mentioned.

In the case of voluntary payments that are later cut off, the employee
has to file a new application and wait a year or more for a hearing before an
ALJ. On the other hand, if the employer's payments are pursuant to a final
Bureau order, they must be continued until the employer is able to obtain an
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ALJ hearing in accordance with a "petition to stop" compensation. Rule 10(2)
of the Bureau's Administrative Rules provides that a hearing shall be
scheduled within 30 days of the filing of the petition to stop, but the ALJs'
backlog has usually prevented this. The results make all parties unhappy.
Employees and their representatives do not think it is fair that the
employer gets priority treatment on its petition to stop, while the employee
must ordinarily wait for a whole year to get a hearing before an ALJ
concerning the employer's termination of voluntary payments. That is
especially galling if the voluntary payments only began on the eve of a
previously scheduled hearing, after the employee had already waited a year or
so. For its part, the employer paying under an order feels that it is being
denied its plain rights under the rules to a 30-day hearing, and in the
meantime it must maintain payments to a worker whom it considers no longer
eligible.
In my view, both positions are sound. At the very least an employee
subjected to an employer's unilateral termination of benefits should have to
wait no longer for a new hearing than he would have had to wait for the
originally scheduled hearing at the time when the employer began voluntary
payments. Furthermore, after voluntary payments have been continued for some
substantial length of time, regardless of when they started, any subsequent
cessation should entitle the employee to priority processing of the
application for a new hearing. The same 30-day period should be applicable
to both employee and employer petitions, and every effort should be made to
comply with those deadlines. Strong equities are at stake in these cases,
feelings run high, and special measures may be warranted. With a decline in
claims filings and an increase in the number of ALJs, as discussed in Part
VII-A-1, supra, iapleaentation of a priority hearing calendar may soon becoae
practicable.
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VIII.
A.

BUREAU ADIIIRISTRATION

In general

In the past the administrative apparatus of the Michigan workers'
compensation system was sadly underfunded. For example, Wisconsin, which is
approximately half the size of Michigan, spent just about as much as this
State on its system, while California, about two and a half times the size of
Michigan, spent over five times as much. Probably the major reason for its
inadequate funding was that the Michigan system had to rely exclusively on
general appropriations from the State Legislature. Workers' compensation
agencies in over thirty other states are funded in whole or in part by
special assessments against insurance carriers and self-insured employers •
. The differences in the levels of state funding can be detected simply by
walking into the offices of the various workers' compensation agencies in St.
Paul, Madison, Columbus, and Detroit. The offices in the first three cities
are brightly painted, cheerful, and inviting. Clients have comfortable
surroundings in which to wait until their case is reached. In stark contrast
the Detroit facilities are bleak and dreary. Claimants must await their turn
in a large, spare room that exudes all the cordiality of a prison's
visitation center.
Modern equipment and support staff have similarly been lacking in the
Bureau. 'until recently many ALJs had to type their own decisions on manual
machines. No dictating equipment was available. Bureau records were not
computerized, and data essential for efficient administration and intelligent
assessment of proposed reforms were simply unobtainable.
Hopes that much of this depressing situation might be changed were raised
by the 1983 amendment requiring each party to an approved redemption to pay a
$100 fee to help defray the costs of the Bureau and the Appeal Board in
administering the statute. On the basis of the estimate that there would
continue to be about 16,500 redemptions a year, it was calculated that this
new fee would produce an annual income of about $3.3 million. The Bureau is
now in the process of implementing a highly commendable plan, spread over the
next five fiscal years, to add additional staff (including new ALJs), fully
automate all Bureau programs, establish a management services unit, improve
the monitoring of employers' insurance arrangements, expedite claims
processing, and provide enhanced public information and education. In view
of my own limited acquaintance with the Bureau's management and
administrative problems, I am willing to defer to its judgment on most of the
steps necessary to remedy existing deficiencies. There are two particular
points, however, that individual injured workers have brought to my
attention, which I believe deserve a special word.
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B.

Public Inforaation and Consultants

As the Bureau itself recognizes, there is a serious lack of knowledge
concerning the workers' compensation system on the part of employers,
employees, and the public generally. As just mentioned, that is one of the
areas the Bureau intends to cover in its five-year program. I only wish to
underscore my endorsement of this initiative, and to urge the Bureau to
review periodically whether it is actually spending enough in this endeavor.
I am convinced from my own conversations with a few intelligent, articulate
disabled workers that, despite their full capacity to understand a simple
explanation of the law, they found it excruciatingly difficult to secure the
necessary information about their rights. The Bureau staff is well
intentioned but overburdened and harassed by the numbers seeking their
assistance. More good literature of the "plain English" variety is an
imperative.
Beyond that, from all I can gather the Bureau could use more persons to
deal directly with the public, especially disabled workers, both at the
informal inquiry stage and at the mediating stage, after a hearing has been
sought. Effective intervention by consultants may often avoid more formal
proceedings before an ALJ, with increased outlays of time and litigation
fees. According to my latest information, there are only a couple of
consultants or mediators in the Detroit office, and I think the Bureau should
consider the advisability of adding several more.
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IX.

ADVISORY COUBCIL

A large message emerging from this study is that, apart from some
fundamental structural changes in the decision-making process itself, the
time is probably not yet ripe for major revisions in the substantive law of
workers' compensation in Michigan. As yet we have had far too little
experience with the 1980 and 1981 amendments in actual operation. We cannot
assess their impact except in the most tentative terms. Yet before we can
even determine what we have already accomplished, proposals for still further
changes are being pressed upon us. Workers' compensation has been a
political football in Michigan for over two decades, and it bids fair to
continue as such for the foreseeable future.
It is time to defuse the situation. Instead of the periodic legislative
crisis we have endured in recent years, we should seek to create an
institutional framework for dealing with the issues of workers' compensation
in a cooler and more reasoned manner. Other states have managed this. Over
half a century ago, for example, Wisconsin established a workers'
compensation council, consisting of leading figures from labor and
management, to which insurance representatives have since been added as
nonvoting members. Wisconsin officials inform me that only once in the last
fifty years has this council failed to place an "agreed bill" on the desks of
the state's legislators at the beginning of each biennial session. States
having had success with similar if less long-lived institutions include
Minnesota, Ohio, Iowa, Colorado, and Texas.
From my own personal experience, I know that there is enough good will,
dedication, and common sense in the business and labor communities of
Michigan -- if only it can be tapped -- to make such a body work here. In
1974-75 I had the good fortune to work with six outstanding representatives
of labor and management on the Governor's Workmen's Compensation Advisory
Commission, which had the assignment of coming up with an "agreed bill" on
this same subject. We failed, probably in large part because of pressures
generated from outside our group regarding one overarching issue. That issue
may now be behind us. More important for present purposes, I can attest that
substantial progress was made during our deliberations, and, most heartening
of all, genuine understanding of, and respect for, each other's views became
the characteristic attitude of the entire group.
I am confident the labor-management community of Michigan need take no
back seat to Wisconsin's, Minnesota's, or Ohio's. In that spirit, I strongly
urge the creation of a per.anent Workers' Compensation Advisory Council in
this State, composed at least of aajor representatives of employers and
eaployees, but probably including also representatives of other interested
groups, such as insurance and perhaps medicine. The continuing charge to
this body should be the formulation and transmission to the Governor and the
Legislature of recommendations for changes in the workers' compensation law
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on which the group has reached consensus. The Council could also consult
with the Bureau on administrative and procedural matters.
Several significant benefits would flow from such an institution. Over
time a mutual trust will develop among the members of the Advisory Council,
which should promote a frank exchange of facts and opinions. Everyone agrees
even today on the dual goals of fair compensation to workers disabled by
work-related injuries and the maintenance of a competitive economy in this
State. There is enormous suspicion (in my view, quite unwarranted) in many
quarters that those goals are not universally shared. Much of that suspicion
will be dissipated, I firmly believe, by a fuller disclosure of just what is
needed by a disabled worker and his or her family for a decent standard of
living, and just what it costs an employer in a particular industry to meet
its legal obligations. Compromises on benefit increases and cost cutting
ought to take place, partly reflecting a balancing of the equities and partly
reflecting straight political trade-offs. There are any number of issues
previously identified in this report that lend themselves to comprehensive
fact-finding, dispassionate analysis, and ultimately some hardheaded,
sensible give-and-take. Perhaps most important, the solutions eventually
devised through such a process by the parties themselves will invariably
prove more enduring, and certainly more acceptable to all concerned, than
anything that could be conceived by an outsider.
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1. Preliminary figures indicate that opea coapetition in insurance for
workers' compensation in Michigan aay be saving the State's eaployers about
30 percent a year in net costs.
2. &estrictioaa on eligibility for workers' compensation resulting from
the 1980 and 1981 amendments aay have reduced eaployer payout• approxiaately
6.2 percent, even though aazi-- weekly benefit• for many disabled workers
have been aubatantially increaaecl.
3. The coabination of open coapetition and reduced coapeuation payaenta
appears to have saved Michigan business well over a half billion dollars in
the put two yeara.

4. The 1980 and 1981 amendments to the workers compensation law dealing
with the definition of "disability," liability for occupational diseases, the
eligibility of retired persons for benefits, etc., have not yet been
definitively interpreted. But a dramatic drop in claims filings, especially
· by retirees, attests to the likely impact of the recent changes. It is
preaature to cOll8ider farther aajor nbatantive revisions in the statute at
thia tiae. Technical amendments are needed, however, to clarify ambiguities
in the existing legislation.
5. Much more emphasis should be placed on aedical and vocational
rehabilitation to get injured workers back on the job. At the same time
strong measures must be adopted to contain aedical care coats.
6. The backlog of cases at the Workers Compensation Appeal B.oard has
reached almost 7,000, about a five-year caseload. Fundamental procedural
changes are necessary. Short-fora finding• of fact and conclusions of law
ahould be aade at the trial atage; duplicative "de novo" review of the facts
ahoald be eliai.aated at the appeal level; aad the Appeal Board should be
atreaalined by a reduction in aize to a 110re . .aageable five or seven
aeabera.
7.

Bureau administration should be automated and otherwise improved.

8. A peraaaent worker• coapeuation labor-aanageaent advisory council
ahould be eatabliabecl to engage in an ongoing review of the aystea and to
rec.,_acl appropriate atatutory aacl aainiatrative change• to the Governor,
the Legislature, aacl the Bureau.
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